Children’s true and false memories of valenced material by Pearce, Laura J
   
 
A University of Sussex PhD thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
  
 
 
   
 
Children’s True and False Memories of Valenced Material 
 
By 
Laura J. Pearce 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
School of Psychology 
University of Sussex 
June 2017 
  
  2 
 
Declaration 
Chapter II: Children’s Internalizing Reactions to Scary TV: A Meta-Analysis. The 
author contributions are as follows: Laura Pearce was responsible for all aspects of data 
collection including the literature search and contacting key authors, for coding the data 
and extracting effect sizes, and for writing the manuscript; Andy Field was responsible 
for the initial conception of the research, providing feedback on study design, providing 
the meta-analysis and sensitivity bias scripts, providing feedback on the manuscript for 
Chapter II and for collaborating on an alternative manuscript for publication.  
Chapter III: Children’s True and False Memory for Media: Valence, Stimulus Modality 
and Congruency; Chapter IV: Effects of Emotional Context and Valence on Children’s 
True and False Memories and; Chapter V: Depth of Processing and Valence Effects on 
Children’s Emotional Memory are written in the style of articles appropriate for 
Experimental Child Psychology. 
 
The author contributions are as follows: Laura Pearce and Andy Field were collectively 
responsible for initial conception of the research. Laura Pearce was responsible for all 
aspects of data collection, data analysis and writing of the manuscripts; Andy Field was 
responsible for providing feedback on study design, analysis and manuscripts.  
 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in 
part to another University for the award of any other degree. However this thesis 
incorporates to the extent indicated below, material already submitted as part of 
required coursework for the degree of MRes in Psychological Methods, which was 
awarded by the University of Sussex. 
 
A previous version of the meta-analysis presented in Chapter II was analysed and 
submitted as part of a module of work for the MRes qualification. A substantial amount 
of work was later carried out during the PhD by Laura Pearce, including expansion of 
the search terms, contacting additional researchers for any unpublished data, and using 
new methods of analysis. Chapter II presents the updated data and analysis in a different 
theoretical context, and has been rewritten in its entirety by Laura Pearce. 
A paper based on the data and analysis in Chapter II has been published in Human 
Communication Research as: 
 
 Pearce, L. J., & Field, A. P. (2016). The impact of ‘Scary’ TV and film on 
children’s internalizing emotions: A meta-analysis. Human Communication Research, 
42(1), 98-121. doi:10.1111/hcre.12069. 
 
 
 
 
Signature: Laura Pearce 
  
  3 
 
Acknowledgements 
Firstly, I would like to thank my Mum, my Dad, Jin, and Alison for their loving support 
throughout my postgraduate studies.   
Secondly, a massive thanks to all of my friends from Sussex University who have 
believed in me, supported me, helped me through difficult times, and who I have 
celebrated achievements with: Becky Grist, Hazel Anderson, Kerry Fox, Georgia Leith, 
Fidelma Hanrahan, John Maule, Zoë Field, and Ellie Snape, amongst many others. 
Thanks to Alice Skelton and Jesse Bull for their assistance in coding data in Chapter III, 
Maxine Sherman and Andy Mealor for their advice with signal detection methodology 
and analysis, and Sam Berens for his technical advice in Chapter V.  
To my other friends outside of Sussex University in no particular order: Beth Parry and 
James Parmenter for always sharing their home with me, Andy Hicks for lending his 
voice to my studies and always offering a new perspective, Sandy Gould for his 
unwavering patience, Rachel Schmitz for her wit, humour and all round sparkling 
personality, Phil Xavier for always bringing the rum, and Jesse Bull for inspiring, 
encouraging and motivating me through the final stages of this PhD. You are all 
wonderful, amazing people. 
I would like to thank Robin Banerjee for his helpful feedback on Chapters III-V, the 
other members of the CATTLab for useful discussions, and the ESRC and School of 
Psychology for providing me with the opportunity to pursue this PhD. I am fortunate to 
have had supervision from Professor Andy Field, with his academic expertise, sense of 
humour and patience. Thank you for your guidance, feedback and encouragement over 
the past five years.    
Thank you to all of the schools who participated: Brighton and Hove High School 
Junior School, Broadmere Primary Academy, Chesswood Junior School, City 
Whitehawk Academy, The Holy Family Catholic Primary School (Addlestone), The 
King Alfred School (London), Ripley CofE Primary School, Seaford Primary School, St 
John the Baptist Catholic Primary School (Brighton), St Paul’s CofE Nursery and 
Primary School (Brighton), West Byfleet Junior School, and West Rise Junior School. 
Last but not least, thank you to all the parents who provided consent, and to the 
hundreds of children who took part in my experiments.   
  4 
 
Contents 
Declaration ........................................................................................................................ 2 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 3 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 7 
Chapter I: Overview 
Introductory Remarks........................................................................................................ 8 
Why Study Emotion in Children? ..................................................................................... 9 
Why Study Children’s Emotional Responses to Scary TV? ........................................... 11 
Why Study Children’s Emotional Memory?................................................................... 12 
An Introduction to Valenced Stimuli .............................................................................. 16 
Memory Methodology .................................................................................................... 18 
What Do We Already Know About Emotional Memory? .............................................. 32 
Theories of Memory Preferences .................................................................................... 39 
Moderators of Memory ................................................................................................... 46 
Outline of the Thesis ....................................................................................................... 52 
Chapter II 
Children’s Internalizing Reactions to Scary TV: A Meta-Analysis ......................... 57 
Method ............................................................................................................................ 66 
Results ............................................................................................................................. 73 
Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 82 
  
  5 
 
Chapter III 
Children’s True and False Memory for Media: Valence, Stimulus Modality and 
Congruency .................................................................................................................... 90 
Experiment 1: Children’s True and False Memories of Emotional Fictional TV........... 99 
Method ............................................................................................................................ 99 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 104 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 115 
Experiment 2: Children’s Memories of Emotional Images and Stories ....................... 116 
Method .......................................................................................................................... 117 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 121 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 132 
Chapter IV 
Effects of Emotional Context and Valence on Children’s True and False Memories
 ....................................................................................................................................... 143 
Method .......................................................................................................................... 151 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 157 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 167 
Chapter V 
Explicit Elaboration and Valence Effects on Children’s Emotional Memory ...... 179 
Method .......................................................................................................................... 186 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 190 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 198 
  6 
 
Chapter VI: Discussion ............................................................................................... 206 
Aims and Methodologies .............................................................................................. 206 
Internalizing Effects of “Scary” TV .............................................................................. 209 
Valence Effects on Memory.......................................................................................... 210 
Depth of Encoding ........................................................................................................ 216 
Contribution of Other Factors on Memory Performance .............................................. 217 
Moderators .................................................................................................................... 217 
Contributions and Limitations....................................................................................... 222 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 230 
References .................................................................................................................... 232 
Appendix ...................................................................................................................... 275 
Chapter III – Supplementary Material. ......................................................................... 275 
Experiment 1: Children’s True and False Memories of Emotional Fictional TV......... 275 
Experiment 2: Children’s Memories of Emotional Images and Stories ....................... 278 
Chapters IV, V - Stimuli ............................................................................................... 287 
Chapter IV – Supplementary Materials......................................................................... 292 
Chapter V - Supplementary Material ............................................................................ 294 
 
  
  7 
 
Summary 
There has been a rise in anxiety amongst typically developing children in recent years. 
Existing research has suggested a link between the increase of television viewing, and 
the increase in childhood anxiety. This thesis confirms the plausibility of this 
hypothesis; a meta-analysis found a small but consistent effect of viewing “scary” 
television on children’s internalizing responses.  
Existing cognitive models of emotional processing in anxious individuals 
identify attention, interpretation, and memory preferences towards emotionally negative 
materials as potential mediators. Whilst attention and interpretation preferences have 
been well evidenced, the link between anxiety and negativity preferences in memory is 
more tenuous, particularly in typically developing children. A positive-negative 
asymmetry in memory is well established in adults; however, the extent to which 
children process and remember positive, negative and neutral stimuli differentially is 
relatively unexplored. The Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm has been 
utilised to allow analysis of memory accuracy and response bias.  
There were several key findings within this thesis. In line with previous 
research, a preference away from negatively valenced material was found when simple 
word list stimuli was used. When narratives were used as a richer source of material, 
memory performance was greater for negatively, than positively valenced stimuli. 
However, when two sources differing on richness of information (visual vs narrative 
stimuli), and valence (positive vs negative) were presented simultaneously, the modality 
effect became dominant; the richer source of material was discriminated with higher 
accuracy, regardless of valence. When this effect was followed up, no evidence of a 
mood interaction within emotional memory was found. Semantic elaboration was 
explored as a potential mechanism behind valence effects in memory. However, no 
positive findings were identified. Age, gender and trait anxiety did not reliably 
moderate valence effects on memory.  
This thesis adds to the small body of knowledge focusing on children’s 
emotional memory, particularly by including response bias analyses. It highlights the 
complex nature of emotional processing in children and some of the factors contributing 
to accuracy. Further research should explore in greater depth how valence effects differ 
for various types of stimuli, and under which circumstances these effects can be 
overridden. Mechanisms behind these valence effects are also yet to be unpicked.   
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Chapter I: Overview 
Introductory Remarks 
Global levels of childhood anxiety are on the rise. A variety of clinical risk 
factors can increase the likelihood of developing internalizing disorders such as 
depression and anxiety. Early adverse experiences including child maltreatment 
(Famularo, Kinscherff, & Fenton, 1992; Margolin & Gordis, 2000), or being victimised 
or bullied (Bond, Carlin, Thomas, Rubin, & Patton, 2001; Troy & Sroufe, 1987) are 
some such examples. Rates of child anxiety also increased by around 1 standard 
deviation in typically developing children between 1952 and 1993, with the average 
American child in the 1980s reporting more anxiety than child psychiatric patients in 
the 1950s (Twenge, 2000). Twenge proposes that environmental influences such as 
decreased social connectedness and a perception of increased overall environmental 
threat have led to this rise. However, many models of anxiety postulate that disorders 
are caused by, or linked to differences in cognitive processing of emotional information 
(for a review see Hadwin & Field, 2010). Whilst literature on emotional preferences 
within attention and interpretation for clinically anxious and non-anxious individuals is 
relatively well established, research surrounding memory effects is less clear cut. This 
thesis aims to: (1) evaluate whether environmental influences (specifically “scary” TV) 
do affect children’s internalizing symptoms, such as anxiety; (2) to explore whether trait 
anxiety is related to memory performance for valenced material, within typically 
developing children; and (3) to explore memory for different types of valenced stimuli, 
within typically developing children. Potential moderators of emotional memory 
preferences are also explored.       
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Why Study Emotion in Children? 
Internalizing (emotional) disorders are highly prevalent across children in Great 
Britain. Internalizing disorders are one of two broad psychopathology classes; the other 
being externalizing (behavioural) disorders. Internalizing disorders signify a core 
disturbance in intropunitive emotions and moods (e.g. sorrow, guilt, fear, and worry), 
whereas externalizing problems are characterized by behaviours that are harmful and 
disruptive to others (Zahn-Waxler, Klimes-Dougan, & Slattery, 2000). The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) categorizes internalizing disorders 
as those with prominent anxiety, depressive, and somatic symptoms, characterized by 
depressed mood, anxiety, and related physiological and cognitive symptoms (American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Anxiety and depressive disorders are the primary 
internalizing disorders, although other disorders such as trauma related disorders, sleep-
wake disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, and attention-deficit/ hyperactivity 
related disorders can also have internalizing components. 
A 2004 Office of National Statistics (ONS) survey found a prevalence rate of 
3.7% for emotional disorders in 5-16 year olds (Green, McGinnity, Meltzer, Ford, & 
Goodman, 2005). Prevalence rates were 0.9% for depression, and 3.3% for anxiety 
disorders, of which specific phobia (0.8%) and generalized anxiety (0.8%) were most 
commonly reported. Research papers generally report much higher rates of emotional 
disorders, indicating that many children and adolescents may not have received a formal 
diagnosis, despite meeting criteria as set out by the DSM-V (APA, 2013) or 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-
10; World Health Organization [WHO], 2010). A review by Beesdo, Knappe, and Pine 
(2009) reported prevalence rates for anxiety disorders of between 3.1% (Gau, Chong, 
Chen, & Cheng, 2005) and 29.9% (Woodward & Fergusson, 2001), concluding that the 
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lifetime prevalence of “any anxiety disorder” in studies with children or adolescents is 
about 15% to 20% (Beesdo et al., 2009). Higher levels of depression are also reported, 
at around 2% in children and 5-8% in adolescents (Birmaher et al., 1996; Jellinek & 
Snyder, 1998).  
Children and adolescents with anxiety disorders are at higher risk of developing 
comorbid psychopathologies (Kendall, Brady, & Verduin, 2001), including depression 
(Brady & Kendall, 1992; Kovacs, Gatsonis, Paulauskas, & Richards, 1989), 
externalizing disorders (for a review see Russo and Beidel, 1994), and substance use 
disorders (Lewinsohn, Rohde, & Seeley, 1995). Anxiety is also believed to be a 
contributing factor in gastrointestinal disease, cardiovascular disease and chronic pain, 
although this is more common in adults (Roy-Byrne et al., 2008). 
Levels of anxiety are also increasing in non-clinical samples of children. The 
average American child in the 1980s reported more anxiety than child psychiatric 
patients in the 1950s (Twenge, 2000). Subclinical manifestations of anxiety disorders 
have been identified in 49.0% of children interviewed (Muris, Merckelbach, Mayer, & 
Prins, 2000). Children with subclinical levels of anxiety are at increased risk of 
developing anxiety disorders at a clinical level (Donovan & Spence, 2000; Rapee, 
Kennedy, Ingram, Edwards, & Sweeney, 2005). The amount of anxiety that typically 
developing children and adolescents currently report is at such a high level that it is vital 
to understand the underlying causes and maintenance mechanisms to ultimately provide 
effective, targeted support.  
Anxiety in children has been linked to poorer school performance (Ashcraft, 
2002; Crozier & Hostettler, 2003; Mazzone et al., 2007; Wood, 2006), poorer social 
functioning (Ginsburg, Greca, & Silverman, 1998; Greca & Lopez, 1998; Wood, 2006), 
and poorer family functioning (Hughes, Hedtke, & Kendall, 2008; Siqueland, Kendall, 
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& Steinberg, 1996). The majority of these studies note that it is unclear whether these 
factors are causes, consequences or maintenance factors in the development of 
childhood anxiety.  
Why Study Children’s Emotional Responses to Scary TV? 
A multitude of factors have been identified which may be contributing to the 
rising levels of childhood anxiety. For example, Gray (2011) cites the decline of play as 
a major factor in the rise of childhood psychopathologies. Childline reported in 2016 
that the number of children and young people needing counselling in relation to online 
bullying had increased by 88% over the previous five years (NSPCC, 2016). A report 
commissioned by the National Union of Teacher (NUT) also concludes that rising 
accountability measures (including public exams such as SATs) effectively turn schools 
into ‘exam factories’, which impacts on the pressure children and young people feel, 
increasing their levels of anxiety, disaffection and mental health problems (Hutchings, 
2015).  
Additionally, Twenge  (2000) identified two social indicators which have 
changed since the 1950s and are significantly linked to an increase in anxiety: social 
connectedness, and a perception of overall environmental threat. The rise in television 
(TV) consumption has been cited as a possible factor behind a lack of social 
connectedness and increase in perceived overall threat. In just a 10 year span from 
1999–2009, the average amount of TV sets per household has increased from 3.1 to 3.8. 
The average amount of TV children watched also increased from 3 hr 47 min, to 4 hr 29 
min per day (Rideout, Foehr, & Roberts, 2010). A rise in the use of technology, such as 
TV was also cited by Gray (2011) as a factor in the decline of play; further, TV is a 
source of information regarding other factors which might increase anxiety (such as 
news related to school exam results). Due to the cross cutting nature of television in 
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children’s lives, the effect of viewing of negative (scary) TV on internalizing emotions, 
including anxiety has been selected as one factor to explore in more depth.  
Why Study Children’s Emotional Memory? 
With levels of both clinical and sub-clinical anxiety on the rise in childhood and 
adolescence, it is vital to explore not only which environmental factors (such as 
exposure to TV) can affect anxiety, but potential mechanisms by which exposure to 
negative materials may be linked with anxiety. Traditional cognitive models of anxiety 
are built on a schema-based information processing perspective (Beck, 1985). In Beck’s 
early model, anxiety was thought to result when a situation arose, was encoded, and 
subsequently interpreted as fitting within a threat schema. The term ‘schema’ appears to 
be used inconsistently throughout literature, but is often described as a knowledge 
framework within memory that selects and actively modifies experience in order to 
arrive at a coherent, unified, expectation-confirming and knowledge-consistent 
representation of an experience (Alba & Hasher, 1983). Schema theory commonly 
includes four stages: selection, abstraction, interpretation, and integration of stimuli into 
existing memory schema. 
More recently, theories have described various distortions apparent in various 
steps in cognitive processing in children exhibiting anxiety (see Muris & Field, 2008 for 
a review). A cognitive distortion refers to a systematic pattern of deviation from the 
norm, or rationality in judgment whereby inferences about other people and situations 
may be drawn in an illogical fashion. Muris and Field (2008) propose an integrative 
theoretical model of cognitive distortions on the processing of threat-related 
information, such as scary TV; processing patterns found in anxious individuals, but not 
non-anxious individuals. These are hypothesized to play a role in the maintenance 
and/or exacerbation of childhood anxiety (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Theoretical model showing the influence of cognitive distortions on the 
processing of threat-related information, which is hypothesized to play a role in 
the maintenance and/or exacerbation of childhood anxiety. Figure from Muris and 
Field, 2008.  
Within this model, anxious children are thought to have overactive schemas 
involving the themes of vulnerability and danger. When confronted with potential 
threat, novelty, or ambiguity, schemas strongly guide the processing of information and 
chronically focus resources on threat-relevant information in three ways: (1) increased 
attention towards threatening stimuli compared to non-threatening stimuli, not seen in 
non-anxious individuals; (2) increased propensity for negative interpretations of 
ambiguous situations, compared to non-anxious individuals; and (3) a tendency to 
selectively recall memories congruent with the emotional state of anxiety, not evident in 
non-anxious individuals.  
Within memory literature, this type of cognitive distortion has been referred to 
inconsistently as an ‘emotional enhancement effect’, ‘negativity effect’, and ‘negativity 
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bias’ (see Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008 for a review). These terms have been used to 
refer to a variety of outcomes: (1) where negative material is remembered at a 
significantly higher rate, or more accurately than neutral material; (2) where negative 
material is remembered at a significantly higher rate, or more accurately than positive 
material; (3) where one group of participants remember negative material at a 
significantly higher rate than another group; and (4) where negative material is 
remembered at the same rate between groups or conditions, but the rate of remembering 
positive material decreases. Where this effect is towards positive material, it is known 
as a positivity bias, effect, or enhancement effect. In line with the approach taken by 
Murphy and Isaacowitz, the term ‘negativity preference’ will be used throughout the 
thesis, when negative material is recalled or recognized (or attended to) at a 
significantly higher rate than neutral or baseline material, and ‘positivity preference’ 
will be used when positive material is recalled or recognized (or attended to) at a 
significantly higher rate than neutral or baseline material. Where differences between 
positive and negative performance are highlighted, these will not be referred to as a 
‘preference’ because there is no baseline comparison.  
Emotional Preferences in Clinically Anxious Individuals 
Within the context of anxiety, an attentional preference for threat related 
material over neutral material was reliably demonstrated in anxious adults (k = 101. d = 
0.45), and children (k = 11, d = 0.50) using a meta-analysis (Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). This effect held across 
different experimental paradigms and under a variety of experimental conditions. Non-
anxious individuals did not exhibit this effect (k = 87, d = –0.01). A more recent meta-
analysis found a similar effect of preference for threatening, compared to neutral 
material in anxious children (k = 38, d = 0.54) (Dudeney, Sharpe, & Hunt, 2015). The 
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effect in non-anxious children (d = 0.15) was much smaller compared with non-anxious 
adults, but was still evident.    
When examining memory preferences in adults, a review categorized by anxiety 
disorder found some support for a preference towards threatening material in implicit 
memory across all anxiety types, but preferences within explicit memory were mixed 
depending on disorder type (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). A preference towards threat 
related information in explicit memory was seen in individuals with panic disorder 
across most studies that used deep encoding procedures. The number of studies looking 
at posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) are 
small, but offer some support, whilst studies including people with social phobia and 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) found little support for preferences towards 
threatening materials. Further, a meta-analysis of 165 studies found no overall 
relationship between anxiety and implicit memory, and that high-anxious adults do not 
differ from low-anxious adults in the selective recognition of threat-related information 
for hit rates, false alarms, or corrected hit rates (discrimination) (Mitte, 2008). However, 
high-anxious adults did exhibit better recall for threatening material and poorer recall 
for positive material compared with low-anxious adults. The authors note that effect 
sizes are small, with the magnitude of the effect depending on experimental study 
procedures like the encoding procedure or retention interval.  
Research into memory preferences in anxious children is more limited. It 
appears that there is a trend for an increase in anxiety predicting lower memory 
performance for positive compared to neutral stimuli, across several task types. 
Children with PTSD were found to recall significantly lower proportions of positive and 
neutral words than a control group, but the same proportion of negative words (Moradi, 
Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000). Similarly, children with high social 
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anxiety recalled less positive self-referent words than low socially anxious counterparts 
(Vassilopoulos, 2012). Daleiden (1998) had more mixed findings; an increase in anxiety 
levels predicted a positivity preference on procedural memory tasks, a negativity 
preference during conceptual but not perceptual memory tasks, and a preference away 
from positive compared to neutral information on declarative memory tasks.  
In addition to the lack of research surrounding emotional memory preferences 
and anxiety in children, there is a limited amount of research into emotional memory 
preferences within the typically developing child population. Because anxiety is 
becoming increasingly prevalent in the typically developing population, it is important 
to understand whether the preferences that exist in clinically anxious adults, and to 
some extent in anxious children are atypical, or merely part of typical development. The 
remainder of this introduction initially introduces the theories and associated 
methodologies used to investigate recognition and recall memory, to explain and defend 
the methodologies used within the experiments of this thesis. The introduction then 
moves on to discuss what we already know about emotional memory in typically 
developing adults and children. Finally, the introduction will provide an overview of the 
remaining chapters of the thesis.  
An Introduction to Valenced Stimuli 
When investigating emotional memory, the appropriate stimuli must be selected. 
Emotional stimuli can vary on two dimensions; arousal and valence. In a laboratory 
setting, valenced stimuli typically include words or images that have been judged as 
negatively or positively valenced, using affective norms gained from large populations 
(Norris, Larsen, Crawford, & Cacioppo, 2011). There are many word, picture and sound 
banks from which researchers draw their stimuli, including: the Affective Norms for 
English Words (ANEW) (Bradley & Lang, 1999); AFINN (Nielson, 2011); The Berlin 
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Affective Word List Reloaded  (BAWL-R) (Võ et al., 2009); The Cornell/Cortland 
Emotion lists (Brainerd, Toglia, Reyna, & Stahl, 2008); the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS) (Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention (CSEA-NIMH), 
1995); the Geneva Affective Picture Database (GAPED) (Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 
2011); and the International Affective Digitized Sounds (IADS) bank (Bradley & Lang, 
1999). 
However, emotional stimuli can also vary on strength of arousal (how exciting 
or calming a stimulus is) (Adelman & Estes, 2013). Typically, more strongly valenced 
stimuli are also more strongly arousing (Bradley & Lang, 1999), and stimuli with a 
negative valence are rated higher in arousal than stimuli with an equally positive 
valence (for example, Citron, Weekes, & Ferstl, 2014). There is ongoing debate 
surrounding the relative contributions of each to the effect that emotional material has 
on memory. Historically, much research has pointed towards arousal being the sole 
contributor (Hamann, 2001; Mather, 2007; Phelps, 2005), meaning that both positive 
and negative stimuli would enhance memory if suitably high on arousal. Other research 
suggests valence affects memory performance independent of arousal (Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2003, 2004), or has an effect on the processing of different aspects of the 
stimuli within memory (Kensinger, 2009; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006, 2008). These 
studies revealed that the lateral prefrontal cortex responded differentially to negative 
items, whereas the medial prefrontal cortex was more engaged during the processing of 
positive pictures. This corresponded to increased perceptual processing for negative 
items, and increased conceptual processing for positive items, again indicating that 
negative and positive material could enhance memory under specific circumstances. 
Additionally, some existing evidence suggests a  curve-linear relationship between 
valence and arousal measures (Söderholm, Häyry, Laine, & Karrasch, 2013), and an 
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interaction effect has been reported between valence and arousal on word recognition 
tasks (Citron, Weekes, & Ferstl, 2014). It is therefore important to ensure that selected 
emotional stimuli are matched not only on intensity of valence, but levels of arousal 
during laboratory studies.  
The Cornell/Cortland word lists (Brainerd, Toglia, et al., 2008) have been used 
in Chapters IV and V of this thesis, because they are split not only by positive, negative 
and neutral valence, but also by low and high arousal within each valence category. 
Word lists of low and high arousal were selected for each valence condition. Ratings 
from large populations were also used to produce norms for arousal and valence 
strength for each word. Valence and arousal norms were taken from the Warriner, 
Kuperman, and Brysbaert norms for 13,915 English lemmas (2013) to check the main 
manipulation of valence, and to investigate arousal as a potential confounding variable. 
Word lists can also vary on many other characteristics that should also be held constant 
where possible, or considered when interpreting results of a memory study. Word 
frequency, familiarity, word length, neighbourhood size, imageability and age of 
acquisition have all been shown to affect response time and accuracy in recognition 
tasks (Atkinson & Juola, 1971; Brown & Watson, 1987; Carroll & White, 1973; James, 
1975; Luce & Pisoni, 1998; Morrison & Ellis, 1995; Whaley, 1978). Scores across these 
features were obtained using N-Watch (Davis, 2005) for all words presented in Chapters 
IV and V. Analysis of the word list properties is presented in the results section of 
Chapter IV, with further details presented in supplementary materials. 
Memory Methodology 
Once a suitable stimulus set has been chosen, either recall or recognition tasks 
may be employed to study emotional memory. In their most basic form, recall refers to 
the retrieval of encoded and stored information in the absence of stimuli, whereas 
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recognition refers to the ability to judge whether presented material matches previously 
presented material (Medina, 2008). Recognition memory is therefore a subtype of 
declarative memory. There are several subtypes of recognition and recall tasks, with 
different strengths and limitations, allowing different components of memory to be 
studied.   
Recognition Memory Theory 
Signal detection theory. Signal detection theory (SDT) is applied when two 
stimulus types must be discriminated (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Participants are 
required to discriminate between ‘signals’ (previously presented stimuli) and ‘noise’ 
(stimuli not previously presented).  SDT is based on the assumption that there is no 
differentiation between stages of simply knowing a signal has been presented before, 
and actually being able to recollect the experience. Recognition occurs when a value of 
a decision variable is sufficiently high to meet the criterion of a signal. SDT has been 
used as a basis to analyse the recognition task results throughout the experimental 
chapters of this thesis. A brief overview of the types of tasks and calculations used, and 
a critique of the approach are provided here. For a fuller review of the overarching 
theory see Green and Moses (1966) and Green and Swets (1966).  
Recognition Memory Methodology 
Yes/No (Old/New) task. Within memory studies a Yes/No paradigm is most 
commonly utilized. Experiments in Chapters IV and V employed a Yes/No task. In the 
Yes/No paradigm, stimuli (e.g. lists of words presented verbally or visually) are 
presented in a learning phase. In the subsequent test phase participants are shown some, 
or all of the original stimuli (targets) and some distractor stimuli (noise). Participants 
can either be asked to indicate whether they have seen the stimulus before (Yes/No), or 
whether the stimulus is Old/New (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). As long as participants 
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are using a relevant decision criterion, and are able to distinguish signals from noise, 
then signals should seem more familiar than noise in memory tasks.   
Responses are coded into one of four categories: a hit (H) corresponds to a ‘yes’ 
for a target, whereas a miss is a ‘no’ response to a target, a false alarm (F) is a ‘yes’ 
response to a distractor, and a correct rejection is a ‘no’ response to a distractor. Within 
the SDT model, a hit signifies a remember response. These responses are used to 
calculate measures such as sensitivity or discriminability (d’) and response bias, or 
criterion C (C). Sensitivity shows whether respondents are able to discriminate signals 
from noise significantly better than at chance level. The larger the value of d’, the better 
discrimination is between signals and noise. The following formula is commonly used 
(Macmillan, 1993), effectively subtracting the z score of false alarm rates (the 
probability of responding yes to distractors) from the z score of hit rates (the probability 
of responding yes to targets)  see Eq. 1. 
d’ =   Φ−1(H) − Φ−1(F) Eq. 1 
When H or F rates equal 0 or 1, the use of the Φ−1 function is problematic 
because the corresponding z scores are −∞ and +∞, respectively. To combat this 
problem, data can be combined from several participants before calculating H and F 
rates (Macmillan & Kaplan, 1985). This process relies on participants exhibiting 
comparable sensitivity and response bias, and complicates statistical analysis, and so it 
is not a preferred method. A second approach is to adjust only the extreme measures 
themselves by replacing scores of 0 with 0.5/n and scores of 1 with (n − 0.5)/n, where n 
is the number of trials (Macmillan & Kaplan, 1985). However, this adjustment results in 
a statistically biased sensitivity measure (Miller, 1996). A third option is the loglinear 
approach; to adjust all the scores by the same amount to retain the relationship between 
them, and therefore preserve the unbiased sensitivity measure (Hautus, 1995). This 
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approach entails the addition of 0.5 to all H and F scores, and 1.0 to the number of 
targets and number of distractor trials responded to, prior to calculating H and F rates. 
This approach has been used throughout the thesis. 
Discrimination is unaffected by response bias and is, therefore, a pure measure 
of sensitivity when the two d’ assumptions are met: (1) both signal and noise 
distributions must be normal; and (2) the standard deviation for both signal and noise 
distributions must be equal. These assumptions cannot be tested by the Yes/No task, and 
are arguably not always tenable (Swets, 1986). Where this is suspected, nonparametric 
measures such as A’ may be used (Pollack & Norman, 1964). For further discussion of 
nonparametric measures and formulae see Stanislaw & Todorov (1999). A d’ measure 
was calculated throughout this thesis because the calculations are statistically more 
straightforward, and there were no concerns that signal and noise distributions, and their 
SDs would be incomparable. These assumptions could not be directly tested in Chapters 
IV and V however, because a Yes/No task was employed.  
Criterion C scores show the general tendency to respond yes (or no) regardless 
of whether the stimulus is a signal or distractor. The standard formula for C is shown in 
Eq. 2 (Macmillan, 1993).  
𝐶 =
Φ−1(𝐻) + Φ−1(𝐹)
2
 
Eq. 2 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between d’ and C. It shows an example 
where a decision criterion is arbitrarily set at 0.5. The signal and noise distributions 
show the values realized by the decision variable across signal and noise trials, 
respectively.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of the decision variable across noise and signal trials, showing d' and C. 
Figure from Stanislaw and Todorov (1999). 
When a stimulus is presented and its value exceeds the 0.5 criterion threshold, it 
is classed as a signal. This means all shaded areas in the graph (about 30% of noise 
stimuli and 90% of signal stimuli) are classified with a ‘yes’ response. The hit rate 
equals the proportion of the signal distribution that exceeds the criterion (approximately 
0.90), whereas the false alarm rate equals the proportion of the noise distribution that 
exceeds the criterion (approximately 0.30). The neutral point is located where the signal 
and noise distributions cross over (at 1.0). C is defined as the distance between the 
criterion and neutral point, where neither response is favoured. When C equals 0, the 
criterion will be located at the neutral point and there is no response bias. When a ‘yes’ 
response is more likely than a ‘no’ response (such as in Figure 2), the false alarm rate 
will exceed the miss rate and C becomes a negative value. The criterion appears to the 
left of the neutral point. When it varies significantly in this direction, it is classified as 
liberal response bias. If the decision criterion is set to a lower figure, it will become 
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even more liberal, because more signals and distractors will be accepted. If the criterion 
is set higher than the neutral point then C will become positive; more stimuli would be 
rejected and a conservative response bias would be shown. This occurs when the miss 
rate exceeds the false alarm rate. 
There are several methods for running SDT analysis. First, d’ can be calculated 
using tabular methods (Elliott, 1964; Freeman, 1973), although this is noted to result in 
poor accuracy (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Specialized SDT software has been 
created for Yes/No tasks such as the BASIC programme (Brophy, 1986) and the Pascal 
programme (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). Source code such as RSCORE4 is also 
available for analysis of ratings task data (Dorfman, 1982). The simplest method to use 
without compromising accuracy is general purpose software with access to the Φ−1 
function. MS Excel was therefore used throughout this thesis to compute measures of d’ 
and C using the NORMSINV (Φ−) function. 
Rating tasks. The overall stimulus presentation and test phases for rating tasks 
are identical to the Yes/No procedure, with the exception that a ratings scale is used, 
rather than a dichotomous yes or no response. A signal detection rating task was used in 
the two experiments in Chapter III, rather than a Yes/No task. A rating task was chosen 
because the stimuli were more complex than simple word lists and more likely to lead to 
varying levels of certainty. A memory ratings task therefore allowed for a graded level 
of recognition response (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).  
There is considerable debate around whether Likert scales should include a mid-
point, based on both methodological and epistemological arguments. Some researchers 
argue that including a mid-point results in a high tendency to choose mid-point options, 
leading to a falsely elevated reliability score on the measure (Weems & Onwuegbuzie, 
2001). However, primary school age children  are no more likely to tend towards the 
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centre of the scale when administered a 5-, compared to 4-point scale (Adelson & 
McCoach, 2010). In their study the mean, variance, and residuals were equal for both 
scales, but the 5-point scale also resulted in a higher reliability statistic compared to the 
4-point scale, suggesting it is a better choice methodologically. From an epistemological 
perspective, various authors have noted that the true meaning of a mid-point is often 
unknown because participants will interpret the midpoint differently. For example, 
Raaijmakers, Van Hoof, Hart, Verbogt, and Vollebergh (2000) noted that the midpoint 
could relate to either neutral attitudes, or an undecided/ don’t know response. If a mid-
point is included, it must be made very clear to participants exactly what it represents. 
Likert-type scales can also be conceptually difficult for children to understand, and 
should be used with caution; formats with words are easier to understand than numbers 
(Mellor & Moore, 2013). A 5-point scale was therefore chosen for Experiments 1 and 2 
to include a midpoint. Each point on the scale was labelled, and it was made clear to 
children that the mid-point represented ‘I don’t know’.  
Typically, ratings are used to determine receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curve points on a graph during analysis. However, to allow comparisons between results 
in Chapter III, IV, and V, scores of 1 (sure this is false) and 2 (think this is false) were 
grouped together as a no response, and scores of 4 (think this is true) and 5 (sure this is 
true) as a yes response, in Chapter III. Scores of 3 (don’t know) have been treated as 
non-responses/missing data. The H and F rates have been calculated using the total 
number of items responded to, excluding non-responses.  
Further analysis could also be conducted with this data to calculate meta-
memory scores; the efficacy with which observers’ confidence ratings discriminate 
between their own correct and incorrect stimulus classifications (Maniscalco & Lau, 
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2012). Whilst this is a little-explored area and would be of value to investigate further, it 
was not central to the aims of this thesis and so has not been reported.  
Recall Memory Theory 
Generate-recognize theory. Watkins and Gardiner (1979) provide an overview 
of a variety of two-stage recall models which all share core features. These models are 
based on memory-trace theory, whereby distinct concepts or ideas are stored as a finite 
number of nodes or atoms in a network (Anderson & Bower, 1972). This is one of the 
key theories of memory recall. A search is first conducted to identify associated 
pathways and generate potential items for recall. Recognition is then carried out to 
identify whether the item has an appropriate ‘tag’ assigned to it. Generate-recognize 
theories are therefore more in line with SDT, whereby recognition only occurs when 
value of a decision variable is sufficiently high to meet the criterion of a signal 
(Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). This means that recall can fail at two stages, either the 
items are not generated initially, or they can be assessed incorrectly once generated. 
Traces can be strengthened by various aspects of stimuli such as valence, arousal, 
relatedness, and distinctiveness (Talmi, Luk, McGarry, & Moscovitch, 2007a; Talmi & 
Moscovitch, 2004; Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 2007). Emotional 
items tend to receive higher valence and arousal scores than neutral items. Emotional 
items are assumed to naturally be more related because they share categorical and 
thematic relatedness (Talmi et al., 2007a). Emotional items are also assumed to be more 
distinct in ‘absolute’ terms because they share a limited overlap of features in long term 
memory (LTM), and are more distinct in ‘relative’ terms because there is less overlap of 
items in the active conceptual framework in working memory (Schmidt, 1991). These 
features allow traces for emotional items to be strengthened during encoding. 
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Recall Memory Methodology  
Free recall. In free recall tasks, participants are presented with stimuli and then 
asked to repeat back what was presented. As with recognition tasks, free recall can be 
initiated immediately after all stimuli have been presented (immediate recall) or after a 
delay, typically including a distractor task (delayed recall). Recall stimuli often consist 
of lists of words (e.g. Howe, 2007; Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010; 
Howe & Derbish, 2010). Although word lists are typically used, participants may be 
asked to recall passages of text (Bartlett, 1932), images (Marks, 1973), or life events 
(Casey, Masuda, & Holmes, 1967). A delayed free recall task was employed in addition 
to a recognition task in Experiments 1 and 2.  
Primacy and Recency Effects 
Commonly, primacy and recency effects are observed within recall and 
recognition tasks (Oberauer, 2002). Items presented towards the beginning and end, 
respectively, of stimulus presentation have a higher probability of being remembered 
than those in the middle of the list. Figure 3 shows this effect for recall tasks with a 10 
and 30 s delay between stimulus presentation and initiation of the recall task.  
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Figure 3. The primacy and recency effect in probability of recall, by length of delay between 
stimulus presentation and initiation of recall task. Figure from Universal Principles of Design 
(Lidwell, Holden, & Butler, 2003). 
The primacy effect is thought to reflect an advantage in processing for earlier 
items, whereby they are rehearsed for a longer time, resulting in a transfer from short 
term to long term memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968, Fischler, Rundus, & Atkinson, 
1970). The recency effect is thought to occur because later items are still being actively 
held in working memory and can be easily retrieved. Evidence for this comes from 
studies manipulating the length of the delay before recall. As the delay increases, recall 
of all items decreases, but particularly for those presented near the end of the list. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. This effect is assumed to arise because the items have not been 
activated whilst still in working memory, but have also not been rehearsed due to the 
distraction task; which would result in them being discarded (Tan & Ward, 2000). 
Delayed free recall tasks are employed in Experiments 1 and 2, with the use of a 
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distractor task in Experiments 1, 2, and 4 to ameliorate the recency, and to a lesser 
extent, the primacy effects. 
False Memory: The Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) Paradigm.  
The DRM paradigm was pioneered by Deese (1959) and extended upon by 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) to explore false memory. Initially, Deese presented 
participants with 36 lists, each comprising 12 words from Kent-Rosanoff word-
association lists (Russell & Jenkins, 1954). The 12 words on each list were all 
semantically related to a key word (critical lure), which was not presented to 
participants. Participants completed an immediate free recall task after each list. The 
number of times the critical lures were recalled was noted as a measure of false 
memory: a memory of an event that never occurred. False memory rates varied between 
0% intrusion rate for the butterfly, and 44% intrusion rate for the sleep critical lure.  
Roediger and McDermott (1995) expanded upon this by using the six lists Deese 
had identified as most likely to lead to false memory recall, and employing a 
recognition task at the end of the procedure. The recognition task contained 12 targets 
(2 from each list) and 30 distractors. Of the distractors, 6 were the critical lures from 
each list, 12 were non-critical lures, or items weakly related to the targets (2 items from 
below position 13 on each of the original lists, which had not been previously 
presented) and 12 were non-associated items. The recognition task employed a 4-point 
ratings scale from 1 (sure the item is new) to 4 (sure the item is old), with no midpoint 
for don’t know/can’t remember.  
DRM studies have been used to explore how emotional processing changes with 
development, including across childhood. Typically, accuracy increases with age as 
audiospatial and visuospatial working memory capacity increase (Thomason et al., 
2009; Vuontela et al., 2003). However, one exception to standard age improvements is 
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when false information is presented that reflects a prototypical exemplar of a well-
studied topic (critical lure). Older children and adults tend to erroneously remember 
these items as having been presented previously, with this effect increasing with age. 
These “developmental reversals” have been consistently found in many DRM studies, 
and are believed to be a result of age-related increases in associative connections among 
related information and increased reliance on gist (as opposed to surface) level 
processing of information while encoding and retrieving information. Sometimes, they 
can also lead to decreases in net accuracy, although this is not always found. For a 
review of the data and theories of developmental reversals in false memory see  
Brainerd, Reyna and Ceci (2008). The DRM procedure has been utilised in Chapters IV 
and V using fewer, and shorter lists than Deese (1959) and Roediger and McDermott 
(1995), respectively, to account for children’s lower working memory capacity. 
Interpreting Memory Effects 
Power. Power analysis is typically recommended in experimental studies 
(Marszalek, Barber, Kohlhart, & Holmes, 2011). Power is the probability of detecting 
an effect, if the effect actually exists. It is therefore the probability of finding a 
difference between two or more conditions, where there is a ‘true’ effect. Higher 
powered studies have higher precision to detect genuine effects. Power, effect size, 
sample size and alpha are related such that each is a function of the other three. In other 
words, if three of these values are fixed, the fourth is completely determined (Cohen, 
1988). Typically, power analysis is conducted before collecting data, to determine what 
sample size is needed to detect an effect of a given size. Power analysis can also be used 
to determine power, given an effect size and the number of participants available.  
G*Power is a tool commonly used to compute statistical power analyses for F 
tests (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). However, it does not allow for a mixed 
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ANCOVA design to be entered, allowing either a mixed ANOVA or a fixed effect 
ANCOVA design to be entered. This means it was not possible to calculate power or 
sample sizes for the recognition task analysis throughout this thesis, where covariates 
were explored in a mixed design. GLIMMPSE (Muller & Glueck, 2016) was considered 
as a second option. GLIMMPSE is an open-source online tool for calculating power and 
sample size for general linear multilevel models. This allows power to be calculated for 
mixed ANCOVAs, but allows for only one covariate to be included. Three covariates 
were explored throughout the thesis, with more than one being entered into final 
univariate models in some instances, limiting the usefulness of GLIMMPSE.  
GLIMMPSE also requires previous data to be included from previous or pilot studies to 
complete analyses. This includes expected mean and standard deviation scores, base 
correlation and decay rate for each factor of within-participant variability, and 
variability due to the covariate at each level of the repeated measures variable. Some 
‘best guesses’ can be made from previous studies, however, design differences mean 
these are not likely to be accurate. The cumulative effect of this loss of accuracy across 
multiple parameters is undesirable, leading to largely imprecise estimates of power. Due 
to the complex design of the experiments throughout this thesis, power analysis was not 
possible.  
Sample size. Sample size was therefore determined based on the number of 
variables, interactions, and the resulting number of cells for comparison. The aim was to 
achieve at least 30 data points per cell, which should lead to approximately 80% power 
(the minimum suggested power for an ordinary study) given a medium to large effect 
size (Cohen, 1988). Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2011) suggest a smaller 
minimum sample size, arguing that researchers must both decide a rule for terminating 
data collection before collection begins, and ensure that at least 20 observations are 
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included within each cell, unless a compelling cost-of-data collection justification can 
be offered. Fewer observations than this are likely to result in inadequate power. Within 
practice, this is not always achievable, particularly in the context of a doctoral research 
programme, where time and financial resources may be limited. Recruiting child 
participants also presents additional challenges in comparison to recruiting adult 
participants. Achieved sample sizes are discussed within each experimental chapter and 
the discussion chapter.  
Effect sizes. In addition to considering power and discussing achieved sample 
sizes throughout, effect sizes have also been reported and interpreted throughout 
Chapters II-V. Within the experimental chapters, 𝜂𝑝
2 has been reported for F-tests, d for 
pairwise comparisons, and Pearson’s r for covariates. Cohen provided guidance for 
what should be considered a small, medium, and large effect size for d (0.20, 0.50, 
0.80), and r (.10, .30, .50) (Cohen, 1988). When Cohen addresses effect sizes for 
factorial ANOVA, his account of the partialling out of variables aligns more closely 
with the modern day use of the term partial eta squared (𝜂2), rather than eta squared. 
This has led many textbooks and researchers to report values of .01, .06, and .14 as 
guidelines for small, medium, and large values of both 𝜂2for one way ANOVAs and 𝜂𝑝
2  
for multiway analysis (for example, Aron, Aron, & Coups, 2008; Coolican, 2009; 
Howitt & Cramer, 2010).  
However, Cohen himself noted that ‘‘The terms ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’ 
are relative, not only to each other, but in the area of behavioural science, or even more 
particularly to the specific content and research method being employed in any given 
investigation’’ (1988). Tabachnick and Fidell (2012) assert that Cohen’s guidelines 
were originally proposed to apply to experiments and social/ clinical areas of 
psychology; larger values could be expected for non-experimental research, sociology, 
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and the more physiological aspects of psychology. Morris and Fritz (2013) analysed all 
of the 𝜂𝑝
2 and d effect sizes reported within memory journal articles in 2010, the two 
most commonly reported effect sizes in memory, to estimate memory-specific 
guidelines for interpreting effect sizes. The quartile figures they obtained for 𝜂𝑝
2 (.08, 
.18, and .41) were considerably higher than Cohen’s values, whilst they were fairly 
similar for d (0.25, 0.57, and 0.99). Whilst it is acknowledged that memory 
methodology can vary considerably, the data used to obtain these quartiles were domain 
specific, and included various memory methodologies and paradigms. They are 
therefore likely to be a more useful guide for interpreting effect sizes throughout this 
thesis than Cohen’s original values. The guidelines suggested by Morris and Fritz 
(2013) have therefore been adhered to throughout.
1
 
What Do We Already Know About Emotional Memory? 
The remainder of this thesis examines preferences for emotional content in 
memory for typically developing children, using the recognition and recall theory and 
methodologies outlined above. A summary of the existing research into emotional 
memory in adults and children is provided below.  
Evidence of Negativity Preferences in Non-Clinical Populations 
Adult negativity preferences. A meta-analysis of laboratory experiments 
mostly using emotional stories, pictures, faces, or word lists as stimuli examined 
negativity and positivity preferences in recognition and recall memory amongst adults 
(Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008). A significant, medium sized negativity preference in 
recall was identified across 86 samples of younger adults (Mage = 22 years), and a small 
effect size across 37 samples of older adults (Mage = 71 years). There was also a 
                                                          
1
      Where covariate main effect sizes are discussed, their overall effect in the model 𝜂𝑝
2 is used 
rather than their correlation with the outcome measures (r). This is to account for other variance 
in the model, and because memory specific guidelines for r were not available. 
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significant negativity preference in recognition, although only for younger adults. The 
recognition effect was smaller than for recall, with a near medium effect size observed. 
The findings suggest that negativity preferences may decrease with age, within adult 
samples.  
Child negativity preferences. As with clinical populations, there is 
considerably less research into negativity preferences in memory in children compared 
to adults. The majority of these studies use a DRM paradigm, utilising word lists as 
stimuli. All but one identified studies found a preference away from negative stimuli 
during recognition tasks, and report either a preference away from negative material, or 
do not report net accuracy in recall tasks. Only two studies report evidence of a 
negativity preference: (1) a recall study using emotional narratives; and (2) a 
recognition study using images as stimuli.    
First, findings are examined where word lists are used within a DRM paradigm. 
In two studies, discrimination was significantly lower for negative adjectives (Neshat-
Doost, Taghavi, Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1998) and negative words, compared to 
neutral words (Moradi et al., 2000). Five subsequent experiments found lower hit rates 
and higher false alarm rates for emotionally negative than for neutral words in 
recognition tasks, indicating a preference away from emotionally negative stimuli, 
rather than towards it (Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010, Exp 2, 4, and 5). Although 
analyses on net accuracy (discrimination) have not been reported across these five 
experiments, the observed lower hit rates, and higher false alarms for emotionally 
negative words would have resulted in lower discrimination rates than for neutral 
words, although significance cannot be assumed.   
This pattern was found across 8- and 12-year olds (Howe, 2007) and in 7- and 
11- year olds (Howe, 2010, Exp 2). These findings were replicated in Experiment 4 with 
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5- and 8- year olds, and Experiment 5 with 7- and 11- year olds (Howe, 2010). The 
designs in Experiment 4 and 5 were more complex, including an immediate and delayed 
recognition task. A three-way interaction in both experiments showed that for neutral 
lists, hit rates fell but false alarms did not change significantly across the retention 
interval, whereas for negative lists, hit rates fell at the same rate as for neutral lists, but 
false alarms increased across the retention interval. These means suggest that memory 
performance was worse during the immediate recognition for negative compared to 
neutral material, and decreased at a faster rate across the retention interval, again 
suggesting a preference away from negative words. Conversely, Quas et al. (2016) 
found no significant differences in overall net accuracy (discrimination) on a word 
recognition task depending on valence.  
When examining recall tasks using word lists, Howe (2007) found that hit rates 
and false alarm rates were lower for emotionally negative than for neutral word lists. 
This effect was replicated in two subsequent studies (Howe et al., 2010, Exp 4 and 5). It 
is unclear whether this pattern would have resulted in any significant difference in 
memory performance, because net accuracy is not reported. This pattern was partially 
replicated in Experiment 2 (Howe et al., 2010), where lower hit rates but higher false 
alarm rates were identified for emotionally negative than neutral word lists. This again 
indicates poorer recall memory for negative words. Likewise, a further two experiments 
found that fewer negative adjectives than neutral words were recalled, with more 
negative than neutral intrusions (Neshat-Doost et al., 1998), and a significantly lower 
proportion of negative than neutral words recalled by 11-17 year olds (Moradi et al., 
2000).  
The only evidence of preferences towards negative stimuli comes from two 
studies using non-word list stimuli. When short emotional stories were presented as 
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narrative slides to young children (age 5 – 6 years), a negativity preference in recall was 
shown (Van Bergen, Wall, & Salmon, 2015). Negative images were also discriminated 
more accurately than neutral images, indicating a negativity preference (Cordon, 
Melinder, Goodman, & Edelstein, 2013).  
To date, the majority of emotional memory experiments in children have 
employed recognition tasks using word lists as stimuli. Experiment 1 of this thesis 
presents film clips as stimuli but included no neutral material for comparison. 
Experiment 2 compares recall performance for negative images and narratives to neutral 
images and narratives. It is expected that a preference towards negative items will be 
shown, such as in other studies using similar stimuli (Cordon et al., 2013; Van Bergen 
et al., 2015). Experiments 3 and 4 of this thesis further explore negativity preferences in 
recognition memory using word lists. A preference away from negative words is 
expected based on previous findings. 
Evidence of Positivity Preferences 
Adult positivity preferences. Murphy and Isaacwitz (2008) also identified a 
significant positivity preference in recall, with a medium effect for both younger and 
older adults. However, no positivity preference was found in recognition in either 
group. Despite Murphy and Isaacwitz not finding a positivity preference in recognition, 
the sample was small (k = 11), and a further 4 studies using recognition tasks with DRM 
word lists have been identified which show a positivity preference, and were not 
included in the meta-analysis but appeared to meet the inclusion criteria (Adelman & 
Estes, 2013; Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001; Kousta, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2009; 
Leigland, Schulz, & Janowsky, 2004). Two of these were published after the meta-
analysis was conducted. A further study was also identified which found that positive 
images are recognized more accurately than neutral images (Charles, Mather, & 
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Carstensen, 2003). It is unclear whether the addition of these studies would affect the 
results of the meta-analysis and bring out an overall effect of a positivity preference in 
adults.  
Child positivity preferences. Fewer studies explore positivity preferences in 
memory in children, compared to positivity preferences in adults, or negativity 
preferences in children. Two of the three word list DRM studies identified indicate a 
preference away from positive words, whilst no preference was observed in the final 
study. Only one experiment using emotional narratives as stimuli found evidence of a 
positivity preference. 
 Two word list studies report lower discrimination for positive adjectives 
(Neshat-Doost et al., 1998) and positive words (Moradi et al. 2000) compared to neutral 
words in a DRM paradigm. Neshat-Doost et al. (1998) also report that children recalled 
significantly fewer positive adjectives, and more positive intrusions than neutral words, 
whilst Moradi et al. (2000) report that children recalled a significantly lower proportion 
of positive than neutral words. The findings of these two experiments indicate a 
preference away from positive stimuli in recognition and recall task. As with negative 
stimuli, Quas et al. (2016) report no significant difference in net accuracy 
(discrimination) between positive and neutral word lists in 7-8, and 12-14 year olds. The 
only experiment to show a positivity preference was Van Bergen et al. (2015) whereby 
positive narratives (in addition to negative narratives) were recalled significantly more 
accurately than neutral narratives. Due to the limited number of studies in this area, 
trends must be interpreted with caution.  
The limited research in this area and the mixed results in existing literature 
therefore warrant further exploration into positivity preferences in memory for typically 
developing children. Recall performance for positive images and narratives has been 
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compared to neutral stimuli in in Experiment 2 of this thesis. A tentative hypothesis is 
that the positive portions of narrative will be recalled more accurately than neutral 
portions, in line with Van Bergen et al. (2015). Positive word lists are compared to 
neutral words in Experiments 3 and 4. It is expected that discrimination will be lower 
for the positive lists in line with previous research (Moradi et al., 2000; Neshat-Doost et 
al., 1998).  
Evidence of Positive versus Negative Memory Performance 
Positive vs. negative memory performance in adults. Murphy and Isaacowitz 
(2008) report within their meta-analysis that significant positivity and negativity 
preferences are shown in younger and older adults in recall tasks. Although the effect 
size remained consistent across the age ranges for positivity preferences, there was a 
larger negativity effect (compared to the positivity effect) in younger adults, and a 
smaller negativity effect in older adults. This difference in the negativity effect between 
younger and older adults was not significant; significance tests of the differences 
between positivity and negativity preferences were not reported. These findings suggest 
positivity and negativity preferences remain consistent across adulthood and they 
appeared equal in size. When examining effect sizes for recognition, all effects were 
small and non-significant, except for the negativity preference in younger adults. This 
was a medium effect, significant at p < .01. This suggests that negativity preferences in 
recognition memory are stronger than positivity preferences. A significant difference 
between the negativity effect in younger and older adults also indicates that this effect 
decreases with age.    
Positive versus negative memory performance in children. There is mixed 
evidence regarding the difference between memory performance for positive versus 
negative material in children. When examining recall for word lists, it appears that 
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performance does not differ depending on valence, whereas negative items are recalled 
more successfully than positive where the stimulus is richer. When examining 
recognition performance for word lists, findings suggest either no difference in 
accuracy, or greater accuracy for positive than negative words.  
 In very young children, negative memory appears more salient than positive 
memory. Pre-schoolers recall more details about ‘mean’ than ‘nice’ people (Baltazar, 
Shutts, & Kinzler, 2012), and children aged 2-2.5 years recall a significantly greater 
proportion of negative, than either neutral or positive material when talking about their 
own life experiences (Miller & Sperry, 1988). Within this paper, recall was not 
compared to observed experiences of the young children, and the majority of 
conversations were initiated by another person. However, there is nothing reported to 
suggest that the children in this study experienced a high level of negative events in 
their lives, and children often brought up the negative aspects of the experience 
themselves even if they did not start the conversation. This finding is in contrast to the 
observed positivity preference when adults recalled life events (Thomsen, Olesen, 
Schnieber, & Tønnesvang, 2014). In children age 5-6 years, negatively valenced stories 
presented as narrative slides were also recalled significantly better than negatively 
valenced stories (Van Bergen et al., 2015).   
Findings are more mixed for recognition of word lists. Two studies found 
significantly higher rates of discrimination for positive compared to negative words 
(Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010; Moradi et al., 2000), with this effect 
increasing with age (Brainerd et al., 2010). A further two studies found no significant 
differences in net accuracy between recognition of positive and negative words in 7-8 
year olds, or 12-14 year olds (Quas et al., 2016), or discrimination between positive and 
negative words in 10-17 year olds (Neshat-Doost et al., 1998).  
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Recall and recognition performance for a positive versus a negative film is 
compared in Experiment 1, and between positive and negative images and narrative sets 
in Experiment 2 of this thesis. Positively valenced material has infrequently been 
included when exploring emotional memory in children, with no direct comparisons 
between images or films within existing literature. Recognition performance for positive 
and negative word lists are compared in Experiments 3 and 4. It is expected that recall 
will be greater for the negative than positive film, images and narratives in the recall 
task, in line with previous findings (Baltazar et al., 2012; Miller & Sperry, 1988; Van 
Bergen et al., 2015), whilst the pattern of results for recognition is unclear.  
Theories of Memory Preferences 
It is clear from the experimental evidence presented earlier in this paper that 
memory performance for emotional content differs to that of neutral content. Further, 
performance for positive material differs to that of negative. There is no one model 
which explains the origins and mechanisms involved in various aspects of memory 
preferences. Whilst evolutionary approaches attempt to provide explanations of why 
memory preferences have evolved, cognitive models endeavour to undercover the 
underlying mechanisms. 
In addition, preferences appear to change with age; whilst a preference away 
from negative and positive words is shown in children in recognition and recall, a 
preference towards negative materials in recognition and recall, and towards positive 
materials in recall is shown in adults. Negativity effects are stronger than positivity 
effects in adults, whereas only negative narrative material is recalled at a higher rate 
than positive narrative material in children. No difference was found when word lists 
were recalled, and findings were mixed for recognition memory. Developmental 
theories therefore aim to identify the emergence and progression of preferences across 
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the lifespan. Approaches can be modular, seeking to explain only one aspect of memory 
preferences (such as negativity preferences), or take a more holistic view of processing.   
Evolutionary Models 
In essence, evolutionary models assume that animals show a preference towards 
stimuli of evolutionary significance. One view is that only emotionally negative, 
threatening stimuli are privileged because they threaten to disrupt the transport of genes 
between generations (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). The Evolved Module of Fear builds 
on activation and evolutionary models (Öhman and Mineka, 2001) and is assumed to 
mediate an emotional level of fear learning. The authors argue that there is dedicated 
circuitry in the amygdala that is selectively sensitive to any stimuli associated with 
evolutionarily threatening stimuli encountered in the past, but can also be updated with 
experience. Once the module is activated, behaviour is modified accordingly. The 
evolved fear module is automatically activated, and relatively impenetrable to other 
modules that is has no direct link to. This module allows for maintenance of its activity 
over time. Evolutionarily advantageous (positive) stimuli are not considered within this 
module. This model fits with evidence of a negativity preference in adults (Murphy & 
Isaacowitz, 2008) but is limited in its power to explain positivity preferences, or why 
this pattern is not observed in children. 
An alternative view is that both emotionally positive and negative stimuli have 
relevance to survival and reproductive success and would therefore be privileged 
(Hamann, 2001). The Evaluative Space Model (ESM) (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 
1997; 1999) is built around this premise. Norris, Gollan, Berntson and Cacioppo (2010) 
present a review of the ESM. The model posits that positive and negative affective input 
is processed differentially with two asymmetries in the activation functions for positive 
and negative input: (1) the activation function for positivity has a higher intercept than 
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the activation function for negativity (the ‘positivity offset’), resulting in greater 
positive than negative affect at low levels of affective input; and (2) the activation 
function for negativity has a higher gain than the activation function for positivity (the 
‘negativity bias’). The relationship between positivity and negativity preferences 
therefore varies according to stimulus strength; when the stimulus is mildly emotional, a 
positivity preference is typically exhibited, whereas a negativity preference is usually 
observed for stronger emotional stimuli (Norris et al., 2011). This effect, illustrated in 
Figure 4, is known as the positive-negative asymmetry (Lewicka, Czapinski, & Peeters, 
1992).  
 
Figure 4. Activation functions for positive and negative dimensions of affective processing; the 
x-axis represents affective input, whereas the y-axis represents output of the system. Figure 
taken from Norris et al. (2011), modified from ‘‘Relationship Between Attitudes and Evaluative 
Space: A Critical Review, With Emphasis On the Separability of Positive and Negative 
Substrates,’’(Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). 
This model provides a potential framework for understanding possible 
behavioural predispositions based on the affective system, and theorizes evolutionary 
origins for these predispositions, or preferences. A review of available research found 
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converging behavioural and neural evidence of the seperability of positivity and 
negativity, allowing for multiple modes of activation. Multiple modes of activation 
allows for co-activation, also supported by a body of behavioural and neural data 
(Norris et al., 2010). This asymmetry is thought to have evolved as an evolutionary 
mechanism to promote exploration in the absence of threat, resulting in appetition 
(approach), which can be observed as a positivity preference, and to maintain vigilance 
towards threatening stimuli to allow for a quick and targeted response to escape any 
potentially harmful situations, resulting in avoidance (withdrawal). This can be 
observed as a negativity preference (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1997; 
1999). As with the Evolved Fear Module, this is only supported by empirical findings of 
memory preferences in adults. The limited data comparing recognition and recall for 
positive to negative material appears to support this model, with stronger recognition for 
positive than negative word lists (Brainerd et al., 2010; Moradi et al., 2000), and 
stronger recall for negative than positive narratives, where word lists can be thought of 
as less strong stimuli than narrative materials (Baltazar et al., 2012; Miller & Sperry, 
1988; Van Bergen et al., 2015). There is still limited scope within this model to explain 
preferences away from positive and negative words in children observed across several 
studies.  
Within the experimental chapters of this thesis, findings of significant negativity 
but not positivity memory preferences for stimuli would provide support for theories 
claiming an advantage for only threatening stimuli (for example, see Öhman and 
Mineka, 2001; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Findings of negativity and positivity 
preferences would indicate that both threatening and emotionally positive stimuli are 
privileged (for example, see Hamann, 2001). However, where no neutral stimuli are 
included, these predictions can only be partially tested.  
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Cognitive Models  
Bower’s Network Affect Theory (Bower & Cohen, 1982; Bower, 1981; Bower, 
Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981) postulates that emotions are represented as central nodes in 
semantic networks within memory. These central nodes have many connections to 
related ideas, autonomic activity, muscular and expressive patterns and events. 
Emotional material is encoded propositionally within these semantic networks. Once a 
central node is activated by emotional material, activation spreads down the prime 
connections to other related nodes. If activation of these nodes passes threshold levels 
then they are also activated. Because the central nodes are representations of emotions, 
the model postulates that emotional stimuli will therefore activate more additional nodes 
than neutral stimuli. According to this model there should be no difference in memory 
performance for emotionally negative and positive stimuli, as both are privileged. 
However, studies have shown significant differences between memory performance for 
positive compared to negative stimuli in children, in both directions depending on the 
paradigm used (Baltazar et al., 2012; Brainerd et al., 2010; Miller & Sperry, 1988; 
Moradi et al., 2000; Van Bergen et al., 2015). 
Support for this model can only be partially sought in Experiment 1 of this 
thesis, whereby no significant difference in memory performance could indicate that 
positive and negative materials are stored in memory in the same way, but cannot 
provide support that both are privileged without any neutral stimuli to compare to. 
Throughout Experiments 2-4, evidence of both a positivity and negativity preference, 
which are not significantly different to each other, would provide support for this 
model. However, the underlying mechanism of additional nodes cannot be tested within 
the scope of these experiments. 
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Kensinger (2004) provides a more comprehensive review of theories and 
evidence behind improved emotional memory. Separate processes are hypothesized to 
account for the facilitation of memory for arousing and valenced materials. During 
encoding, arousing material is thought to capture attention selectively, evidenced by 
faster and more accurate reactions to detect threatening, compared to neutral stimuli 
(Ӧhman et al, 2001, cited in Kensinger, 2004). Consequently, memory is enhanced for 
the arousing content, as evident in the ”weapon-focus” effect, whereby memory is 
enhanced for the threatening weapon, compared to peripheral details (See Buchanan & 
Adolphs, 2002 for a review). Additionally, arousing material appears to be prioritized 
during encoding when attentional capacity is limited. This effect was observed in a 
study which found that arousing words were less likely to be missed during “attentional 
blinks” (Anderson & Phelps, 2001, cited in Kensinger, 2004). Within memory studies, 
cognitive load is typically increased by introducing a secondary task to be performed 
simultaneously. This typically leads to poorer performance in the primary task. 
However, when arousing materials are used in the primary task, this effect is 
ameliorated (Bush & Geer, 2001; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004, cited in Kensinger, 2004). 
Finally, emotional material appears to increase the likelihood of memory consolidation, 
with emotionally arousing material more likely to be converted to a permanent trace. 
Memory enhancements for arousing materials therefore tend to be greater after longer 
delays (Eysenck, 1992; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Kleinsmith & Kaplan, 1963; LaBar & 
Phelps, 1998, cited in Kensinger, 2004). Although this thesis is primarily concerned 
with valenced stimuli, it is likely that stimuli also varied on arousal, particularly in the 
more naturalistic experiments (Chapter III) and so the effects of arousal on attention and 
subsequent memory have been briefly summarised within this review.  
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Kensinger (2004) notes that in comparison, relatively few studies have explored 
memory effects for non-arousing, valenced stimuli; but those that have observed a 
memory boost for valenced material. Kensinger postulates that this is likely the result of 
conscious encoding strategies, such as semantic elaboration, whereby individuals are 
more likely to think about items’ meanings and their relations to other items, if they are 
valenced. There may be a number of reasons for increased semantic elaboration; one 
possibility is that valenced items are typically more semantically cohesive than neutral 
items. It has been shown that when neutral words and valenced words have similar 
inter-item associations, the memory advantage for valenced words dissipates (LaBar & 
Phelps, 1998; Talmi & Moscovitch, in press, cited in Kensinger, 2004). 
Developmental Models  
Field and Lester (2010) provide an overview of developmental theories of 
information processing preferences (covering memory, as well as attention and 
interpretation) towards threatening content in children and adolescents. They propose 
three main theories of emergence. Firstly, in integral bias models, it is assumed that 
children are born with varying, innate levels of preferences towards threatening stimuli 
that remain constant over time. The level of preference is determined by individual 
factors such as trait anxiety levels. Due to the consistency of preferences over time, this 
is not strictly speaking, a developmental model. Secondly, moderation models propose 
that all children are born with high levels of preferences towards threatening stimuli. 
These preferences are moderated over time by cognitive, social and emotional 
developmental factors such as anxiety, personality and temperament. This means that 
they would be moderated to various degrees in different individuals. A review of 
empirical evidence is provided in (Field and Lester, 2010). Finally, acquisition models 
are based on the assumption that infants are born without preferences towards 
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threatening stimuli. Instead, these develop further into childhood, or even adulthood, as 
social, cognitive, and emotional skills develop. The resulting processing preferences are 
present to a lesser or greater extent depending on an interaction between development 
and individual factors. Within this model, the level of trait anxiety a child exhibits could 
either be an individual factor which contributes to the development of processing 
preferences, or a consequence of these preferences. There is limited research directly 
assessing acquisition models. However, learning about a stimulus via verbal 
information increased attentional preferences towards that stimulus in children (Field, 
2006a), particularly in anxious individuals (Field, 2006b).  
Throughout the experimental chapters in this thesis, age will be considered as a 
potential covariate in all analyses. Moderation and acquisition models will also be tested 
by investigating the relationship between discrimination for negatively valenced stimuli 
and age. For the acquisition model to be supported, the relationship between age and 
discrimination of negatively valenced stimuli needs to be more positive than the 
relationship between age and discrimination for neutral stimuli. The reverse pattern 
would need to be observed to provide support for moderation models. This can 
therefore only be assessed where a neutral condition is included (the recall task of 
Experiment 2, and Experiments 3 and 4).  
Moderators of Memory 
Memory for Different Stimuli Types 
Despite only a handful of studies exploring emotional memory in children, some 
differences begin to emerge when considering the different stimuli sets used. Findings 
are fairly consistent for DRM studies using word lists. Preferences away from 
emotionally negative and positive words, towards neutral words are typically observed 
in both recognition and recall tasks (Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010; Moradi et al., 
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2000; Neshat-Doost et al., 1998). Positive words were discriminated significantly more 
accurately than negative words in word list experiments, though this finding was not 
consistent (Brainerd et al., 2010; Moradi et al., 2000).  
When more elaborative, narrative stimuli were used, a positivity and negativity 
preference in recognition was observed (Van Bergen et al., 2015). Recall also appears 
greater for negative than positive material when more elaborative, narrative stimuli were 
used (Baltazar et al., 2012; Miller & Sperry, 1988; Van Bergen et al., 2015). It appears 
that stimuli type interacts differentially with the effect of valence on memory 
performance, and that this results in different outcomes depending on type of memory 
task. It is important to note that these conclusions are based on very small samples and 
should be interpreted with caution. General memory performance between these 
stimulus types is explored below, followed by exploration of emotional memory for 
different stimulus modalities. 
Verbal vs. pictorial stimuli. Baddeley proposed in his working memory model 
that there are two different cognitive systems for information processing: a verbal 
system transmitting and processing sequential information such as written or spoken 
text, and a visual system responsible for spatial information (Baddeley, 1992). Within 
recognition and recall memory, pictures are frequently remembered better than words. 
This is known as the picture superiority effect (Mintzer & Snodgrass, 1999; Paivio & 
Csapo, 1973). 
A variety of DRM studies have been conducted in adults directly comparing 
memory for verbal/auditory stimuli and visual/pictorial stimuli. Participants recognize 
and recall images more accurately than words and sentences even when very large pools 
of stimuli were presented (e.g. Gehring, Toglia, & Kimble, 1976; Shepard, 1967; 
Standing, 1973). Auditory recognition has also frequently been observed as inferior to 
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visual recognition, for example words and isolated sounds are recalled more accurately 
when they were presented visually than aurally (Cohen, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2009; 
Hilton & Gottwald, 2001). Very little research has been conducted directly exploring 
differences between auditory and visual memory in children. However, it is well 
established that younger children rely more heavily on visual working memory in recall, 
whereas older children rely chiefly upon a phonological component (Hitch, Halliday, 
Schaafstal, & Schraagen, 1988; Hitch, Woodin, & Baker, 1989). It is therefore expected 
that children’s visual memory would also be superior to verbal memory.  
Moving images/film vs. static images. Very few experiments directly compare 
memory for static images to their moving counterparts. However, several meta-analyses 
have been conducted comparing the effectiveness of instructional materials presented 
using different modalities. Those presented through a virtual reality headset were 
significantly more effective for learning than using computer screens or audio tapes 
(Ginns, 2005). The sample size for virtual reality headset studies was very small (n = 4), 
so this effect should be interpreted with caution. No differences in learning advantage 
were found between computer-screen and audio tape tuition material. A further meta-
analysis found a medium effect of a learning advantage when instructions were 
displayed as dynamic rather than static images (Höffler & Leutner, 2007). It is 
tentatively anticipated that memory for film should be greater than memory for images, 
which in turn are greater than auditory materials. However, this pattern may differ with 
emotional material.  
Modality and valence. As researchers have begun to move away from simple 
experimental stimuli, real-life TV clips have been incorporated as complex visual 
stimuli. A considerable amount of work explores memory for information delivered via 
TV news broadcasts in comparison to radio or news print. The majority of news 
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broadcasts can be considered emotionally negative, covering topics such as natural 
disasters, terrorist attacks, and murder. Most earlier work with adult participants showed 
a superiority effect in recall when news was reported in print, compared to TV or audio 
presentation (DeFleur, Davenport, Cronin, & DeFleur, 1992; Furnham & Gunter, 1985; 
Gunter, Furnham, & Gietson, 1984; Wilson, 1974). A minority of studies reported no 
significant differences between recall of news presented in text or audio-visual format 
(Stauffer, Frost, & Rybolt, 1980;1981; Wicks & Drew, 1991). It has been proposed that 
information from print is better recalled because reading is self-paced, and contains less 
detail, which allows extra time, and encourages the reader to conjure up their own 
images. These steps result in the stimuli being processed at a deeper level (Craik & 
Tulving, 1975). By comparison, TV is assumed to be a superficial medium that inhibits 
deeper processing and detailed recognition of material because of the volume, 
variability and pace of stimulus presentation (Singer, 1980).  
However, more recent studies using child and adolescent participants have found 
the reverse effect. Children aged 10-11 years recalled more information from a televised 
news report than from text (Beentjes, Vooijs, & Van Der Voort, 1993), or audio only 
versions (Gunter, Furnham, & Griffiths, 2000). Fourth and sixth graders recalled 
significantly more detail from televised news clips than from printed transcripts (Walma 
Van Der Molen & Van Der Voort, 1997) or news text articles (Walma Van Der Molen 
& Voort, 1998). However, an earlier study had previously reported the same effect in 4
th
 
graders after controlling for reading ability, but found that 6
th
 graders’ recall did not 
differ significantly depending on mode of presentation (Beentjes & van der Voort, 
1991). This difference in recall performance for 6
th
 graders is likely due to the content 
of the clips; Walma Van Der Molen and Van Der Voort (1997) used news reports, 
whereas Beentjes and van der Voort (1991) used stories. The stories contained 
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emotionally negative content such as a boy falling into a ravine, but were not in the 
style of a news report. It was therefore presented as fictional rather than factual content. 
The effect of presentation mode is also ameliorated when children were told before 
presentation that they needed to learn it for a test (Beentjes et al., 1993).  
Fewer studies explore memory for neutral or emotionally positive visual and 
verbal TV content in children. An early study compared memory and comprehension of 
audio only, visual only, matched audio-visual, and mismatched audio-visual clips from 
Sesame Street (Pezdek & Stevens, 1984). Discrimination was higher for the visual only, 
than audio only conditions, although significance testing was not reported. When 
presented simultaneously, discrimination was similar for audio and visual elements in 
the matched condition, but lower for the audio elements in the mismatched condition.  
Visual discrimination scores remained stable across all conditions regardless of whether 
it was presented alone or with audio; whereas audio discrimination was significantly 
lower in the mismatched condition than the matched and audio only conditions.  
Summary of modality effects. Research comparing verbal, pictorial and 
moving image stimuli shows that modality of stimulus, complexity of stimulus, and age 
interact to affect memory performance. Overall, simple visual stimuli (such as images) 
are remembered better than simple verbal stimuli (such as individual words), and 
motion pictures are remembered better than their still image counterparts. However, for 
more complex visual stimuli such as motion pictures (TV), age moderates the modality 
effect on memory. Children remember motion pictures better than complex verbal 
counterparts (narrative or newspapers), whilst this effect is reversed in adults. This fits 
with the theory that children initially rely more heavily on visual working memory, with 
this changing to phonological working memory through development (Hitch et al., 
1988, 1989).  
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Experiment 1 in this thesis incorporates positive and negative TV clips, with the 
memory tasks broken down to compare performance for the visual and narrative 
components. It is expected that visual elements will be remembered more accurately, 
but it is unclear how this will interact with valence. Experiment 2 in this thesis 
incorporates images and audio narratives to further explore this hypothesis with more 
controlled stimuli, and an added variable of matched or mismatched valence.     
Gender 
In 1974, Maccoby and Jacklin published a review of psychological gender 
differences. They concluded that there were no gender differences in learning and 
memory between boys and girls. However, when looking specifically at episodic 
memory, 17 of 64 experiments reviewed showed a memory advantage in females, 
whilst only 2 showed an advantage in males (Herlitz, Nilsson, & Bäckman, 1997). In 
addition, a large meta-analysis of 165 studies showed a reliable female superiority for 
verbal ability in girls aged 5 years and under, age 6-10 years, and age 11-18 years (Hyde 
& Linn, 1988). Longitudinal data in children has shown a relationship between memory 
capacity and specific verbal skills between kindergarten and second grade, indicating 
that a verbal skills advantage may also predict a memory advantage (Näslund & 
Schneider, 1991). Gender has therefore been included as a covariate in all analyses 
throughout this thesis.   
Age 
 A review of theoretical and empirical research on the development of short term 
memory across children concludes that there are two distinct short term memory 
systems; phonological and visuospatial memory (Gathercole, 1998). Phonological short-
term memory abilities develop rapidly through the early and middle childhood years. 
Much of this development appears to arise from developmental increases in the speed of 
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rehearsing and of retrieving material from memory. The capacity to retain information 
about the visuospatial characteristics of events for short periods of time is mediated by a 
short-term memory system dissociated from the phonological loop, and may consist of 
dissociable visual and spatial-temporal sub components. Although young children can 
retain both kinds of information in memory, their abilities to do so undergo substantial 
increases between 5 and 11 years of age, when short-term memory capacity approaches 
adult levels. Experiments using valenced word lists as stimuli have reliably observed an 
increase in both hit rates, and true recall, but also false alarms and false recall (Howe, 
2007; Howe et al., 2010; Howe, Wimmer, & Blease, 2009). Limited differential effects 
have been reported according to valence.  
Outline of the Thesis 
Apart from the introduction and concluding chapter, this thesis contains a meta-
analysis and three chapters reporting empirical work. The meta-analysis chapter is based 
on a paper which has been published in Human Communication Research (Pearce & 
Field, 2015).  
The meta-analysis reported in Chapter II explores whether an increase in the 
viewing of “scary” TV could be a contributing factor to the rising levels of anxiety seen 
in typically developing children (Twenge, 2000). The analysis utilises a multilevel 
model approach to quantify the overall internalizing effects (fear, anxiety, sadness, and 
sleep problems) of scary TV on children, and to identify any significant moderators. 
Findings of the meta-analysis reported in Chapter II support the general perception that 
violent or scary TV does indeed have a reliable effect on children’s internalizing 
emotions; however, the impact is relatively low. The main finding shows that increased 
viewing of scary TV is one of many plausible reasons for the increase in cohort level 
anxiety, as suggested by Twenge (2000).  
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This finding raised questions surrounding the mechanisms involved in creating a 
fear response towards emotionally negative material. An integrative model proposed by 
Muris and Field (2008) suggests that attention, interpretation and memory distortions 
may all play a role in the emergence and maintenance of anxiety. Different patterns of 
attentional (Dudeney et al., 2015) and interpretation (Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan, 
1996; Marsh, 1986) preferences for threatening stimuli have been shown in clinically 
anxious, compared to typically developing children, indicating that different processing 
mechanisms may be involved. Research into memory preferences in children with 
anxiety is sparse; a meta-analysis with adults found evidence of an increase in recall for 
negative items in anxious compared to non-anxious adults (Mitte, 2008). There is also 
evidence of lower memory performance for positive stimuli in some child populations 
with specific anxiety disorders compared to non-clinical samples (Daleiden, 1998; 
Moradi et al., 2000; Vassilopoulos, 2012).  
Experiments 1-4 therefore explored valence effects on memory in typically 
developing children. Measures of trait anxiety were recorded to include as a potential 
covariate in analysis. This enabled the relationship between anxiety levels and 
preferences toward or away from valenced material to be explored, in non-clinical 
samples of children. Because no relationship was found in the first three experiments, 
trait anxiety was not measured in Experiment 4.  
Experiments 1 and 2 in Chapter III explore the role of valence, stimulus 
modality and stimulus congruency on children’s memory for narrative and visual 
aspects of positively and negatively valenced media. The overarching objectives of 
these experiments are to firstly identify whether ‘scary’ media is processed differently 
to positive media within memory, evident as an increase in memory performance for 
negative, compared to positive material, and second, to explore whether trait anxiety co-
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varies significantly with any negativity preference found. As anxiety scores increase, an 
increase in memory performance for negative, over and above that positive material 
would provide support for the Muris and Field (2008) model of cognitive distortions.     
Experiment 1 uses a TV clip with predominately ‘scary’ scenes as a negatively 
valenced stimulus set designed to elicit a mild internalizing response, and a non-scary 
clip with predominantly benign and altruistic scenes as a positively valenced stimulus 
set for comparison. The clips were taken from the TV series Merlin, and were designed 
to provide a high level of ecological validity within a controlled laboratory setting. Prior 
to the experimental clips being presented, children viewed an introduction clip with 
images of the main characters and some background information. After stimulus 
presentation and a brief distractor task, children completed a free recall task. When they 
indicated they could not remember any more details, they were provided with several 
cues of character names. Following this, a DRM recognition task was completed where 
half the items from each clip related to visual aspects, and half to narrative aspects of 
the clips. The main manipulation of valence was unsuccessful and no differences in 
discrimination or true recall between the two clips, or modality were revealed. Rotation 
order appeared to interact with valence and modality effects.  
Experiment 2 extends on the findings from Experiment 1 by using valenced still 
images from the same clips, but matching the images to a narrative of either congruent 
or incongruent valence, to explore the role of congruency in emotional processing. This 
allows for two positive and two negative narratives to be compared, in comparison to 
one clip of each in Experiment 1. It also allows for tighter control of the stimuli sets, 
because images of the most appropriate exemplars for each valence condition can be 
chosen, and the narratives can be written to include a portion of neutral information 
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common to both the positive and negative versions. The same procedure was used as in 
Experiment 1, to allow for comparison between the two experiments.  
Valence was successfully manipulated between the conditions with the positive 
(druid) images, and the negative (monster) images. However, the interaction with 
modality and congruency shows that the negative narratives were recognized and 
recalled more successfully than the positive, across the congruent and incongruent 
conditions. Further, in the incongruent condition only, children recognized the narrative 
items more accurately than the visual items, and recalled more neutral than emotional 
material.  
The results of the experiments reported in Chapter III provide tentative support 
for theories of a negativity preference in children, rather than a preference towards all 
emotional content. One possible reason for the modality effects is the difference in 
levels of processing between narrative and visual information, whilst the congruency 
and valence interaction could be explained in part by cognitive dissonance theory and 
stress coping behaviours.  
Chapters IV and V employ a yes/no DRM paradigm to measure accuracy of 
recognition memory and response bias towards valenced word lists. Experiment 3 
(Chapter IV) explores the role of prior emotional context on memory for neutral, 
positively valenced and negatively valenced words, to extend upon the congruency 
effect found in Experiment 2. Children were presented with a neutral or valenced story 
to elicit an emotional context prior to encoding. Children were then presented with 
emotionally negative, positive and neutral DRM word lists adapted from, or created by 
Budson et al. (2006) and from the Cortland/Cornell word lists (Brainerd, Toglia, et al., 
2008). Immediate recognition tasks were completed after each list was presented. The 
results do not support the prediction that memory accuracy would be enhanced for 
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words which matched the prior emotional context, but do show a large effect of 
negative items being discriminated at a greater rate than positive items, when negative 
items were presented first. The word lists were not fully controlled on other measures 
such as arousal, imageability and age of acquisition, and it is possible these differences 
contributed to the effects observed. Additionally, power was assumed to be extremely 
low once rotation order was included as a fixed effect, making it likely that other true 
effects in the data were not borne out. 
In Experiment 4 (Chapter V) depth of encoding is manipulated to explore its 
potential role in the mechanism behind the negativity preferences reported in Chapters 
III, and discrimination difference between positive and negative words in Chapter IV. 
The same DRM lists were presented as in Experiment 3. A 2 × 2 design was used; 
children were either instructed to rate the words on spelling (low elaboration task) or 
emotion elicited (high elaboration task). Orthographic tasks such as assessing spelling 
are categorised as shallow due to their non-semantic nature, whereas semantic tasks are 
thought to processed more deeply (Dixon & von Eye, 1984). Children in the 
emotionally positive groups completed recognition tasks for emotionally positive and 
neutral word lists, whereas those in the negative groups completed recognition tasks for 
emotionally negative and neutral word lists. Contrary to expectations, there were no 
effects of elaboration task on discrimination, and discrimination was poorer for 
emotional than neutral words, but only significantly so for negative words.  
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Chapter II  
Children’s Internalizing Reactions to Scary TV: A Meta-Analysis  
 
Abstract 
Public opinion generally portrays ‘scary’ TV as having a negative impact on children’s 
emotional wellbeing. Existing literature links viewing to sleep disturbances, fear, worry, 
anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder. This meta-analysis reviews studies providing 
a measure of exposure to scary TV, with a primary outcome of internalizing responses. 
Studies were included only when the entire sample was aged under 18 years. 
Computerized searches of PsycARTICLES/PsycINFO, PubMed, Web of Knowledge and 
Google Scholar, along with hand searches of journals, books and reference lists were 
conducted in January 2012, February 2013 and October 2014. One-hundred and seven 
key authors in the field were contacted to request any unpublished data. Of 131 studies 
considered, 26 met the full inclusion criteria. A random effects model yielded a small 
but consistent effect of scary TV viewing on internalizing responses (r = .18), in line 
with the effect sizes reported for violent TV viewing on externalizing responses. A 
multilevel model analysis identified that internalizing responses were greater in 
experimental than correlational studies, studies reporting specific rather than general 
outcomes, studies using physiological rather than self-report measures, and in samples 
where all children were aged under 10 years. Implications of these findings are that 
exposure to emotionally negative stimuli is linked to internalizing responses in typically 
developing children, in addition to children with anxiety disorders. Future studies 
should aim to explore the mechanisms behind differences in emotional, compared with 
neutral information processing in typically developing children. 
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Children’s Internalizing Reactions to Scary TV: A Meta-Analysis 
Levels of childhood anxiety are thought to be at an all-time high. Rates of child 
anxiety have increased over 1 standard deviation between 1952 and 1993 (Twenge, 
2000), with the average American child in the 1980s reporting more anxiety than child 
psychiatric patients in the 1950’s. Childhood fear and anxiety is inextricably linked; 
fears have been associated with subclinical manifestations of anxiety disorders in 49.0% 
of children interviewed, whilst 22.8% of children met the criteria for at least one DSM-
III-R anxiety disorder (Muris et al., 2000). Children between the ages of 7-17 years 
reported a mean of 13.60 fears in the United States (mean total level of fear 133.20) and 
14.29 fears (mean total level of fear 133.84) in Australia (Ollendick, Yang, King, Dong, 
& Akande, 1996). Although the number of fears are not reported for British children, a 
similar mean total fear level was reported (M = 138.33), with a similar pattern of top ten 
fears (Ollendick & Yule, 1990). Additionally, level of fear was found to be significantly 
correlated to a high extent with manifest (trait) anxiety (r = .64, p < .001).  
Limited research has been conducted on the source of these fears and associated 
rise in anxiety levels. However, Twenge  (2000) identified two social indicators which 
have changed since the 1950s and are significantly linked to an increase in anxiety: 
social connectedness and a perception of overall environmental threat. Social 
connectedness draws on research that anxiety can result from social exclusion or a lack 
of connection in a society (Baumeister & Tice, 1990), or loss of a “sense of community” 
(Bronfenbrenner, McClelland, Wethington, Moen, & Ceci, 1996). Overall threat relates 
to individuals appraising the environment and perceiving it as dangerous (Beck, 1985). 
For example, there has been an increase in reports of violent crimes (U.S. Bureau of the 
Consensus, 1925-1998), and an increase in fears about nuclear wars (Diamond & 
Bachman, 1986; Kramer, Kalick, & Milburn, 1983).  
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The rise in television (TV) consumption has been cited as a possible factor 
behind a lack of social connectedness and increase in perceived overall threat. In just a 
10 year span from 1999–2009, the average amount of TV sets per household has 
increased from 3.1 to 3.8. The average amount of TV children watched also increased 
from 3 hr 47 min, to 4 hr 29 min per day, almost an hour of which was viewed via the 
internet or mobile phones (Rideout, Foehr, & Roberts, 2010). Fifty-three percent of 8-
10 year olds and 73% of 11-14 year olds also reported their parents had no rules about 
how much TV they could view. (Rideout, et al., 2010).  
 An overall increase in TV viewing has been linked with a decrease in 
interaction with family members (Vandewater, Bickham, & Lee, 2006). An increase in 
viewing violent TV has been linked with a decrease in the amount of time spent with 
friends (Bickham & Rich, 2006), and an increase in anti-social behaviour (Paik & 
Comstock, 1994). These outcomes meet the description of a lack of social 
connectedness (Twenge, 2000). The increase in media coverage of threats has also been 
blamed for an increased perception of environmental threat (Cohl, 2005; Glassner, 
2000). For example, over half (61.8%) of 8-10 year old British children sampled were 
scared of being bombed or invaded, half (49.5%) were scared of earthquakes, whilst 
40.1% were scared of death or dead people (Ollendick, Yule, & Oilier, 1991). These 
fears were also reported at similar levels across children and adolescents in America, 
Australia, Nigeria and China (Ollendick, Yang, King, Dong, & Akande, 1996). This sort 
of content is often included on international news broadcasts, as well as in fictional TV 
content and films. Increased viewing of local news was also a significant predictor of 
perceived crime threat (Romer, Jamieson, & Aday, 2003). These specific fears would 
theoretically feed into an enhanced perception of the world as a threatening place, in 
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line with overall threat perception, the second social indicator of increased anxiety 
levels (Twenge, 2000). 
Many TV programmes have also been heavily criticized for containing violent 
or otherwise explicit content. It is estimated that children in the US are exposed to 
200,000 acts of violence on TV by the time they reach 18 years of age (Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 1999). This could lead to an inflated sense of danger from 
violence in the world, contributing to children’s fears.  
However, not all fear inducing material shown on TV will include violence. 
Despite TV and film guidelines (e.g. BBFC, 2014; FCC, 1997; MPAA, 2015) including 
information on violent content, there is a notable lack of emphasis on non-violent 
content which might elicit a fear response in children. For example, news programmes 
are not covered by FCC ratings (FCC, 1997) and can include features such as natural 
disasters, war, murders and kidnapping. These types of threat were reported as a source 
of fear in 7-12 year old children, with 70.6% afraid of being bombed/ invaded, 53.8% of 
fires, 48.0% of burglars and 42.4% of death (Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters, & Van 
Lier, 1997). This sort of news coverage, along with the high levels of violence seen on 
TV could lead to a perception of increased levels of overall environmental threat, the 
second social indicator cited by Twenge (2000) as a factor in the rising levels of anxiety 
seen in typically developing children.  
Some studies have shown that a large portion of children do indeed experience 
TV or film related fears. Over 75% of 5-6 year olds report TV induced fear, with over 
25% of 5-6 year olds reporting that they experience ‘great fear’ (Korhonen & 
Lahikainen, 2008). TV induced fears can persist for months and even years; 55% and 
35% of typically developing adolescents aged 11-16 years reported enduring fright 
responses to TV, and films, respectively, viewed when they were aged 6 years or 
  61 
 
younger (Cantor & Reilly, 1982). Additionally, almost 20% of typically developing 
adolescents report having seen something on TV that they “couldn’t get out of their 
mind” (Himmelweit, Oppenheim, & Vince, 1958). In line with Twenge (2000), even 
more adolescents were reporting enduring fright responses ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’, with 
figures up to 25% by the 1980’s (Cantor & Reilly, 1982). More recently there have also 
been anecdotal reports of obsessive thoughts and nightmares related to TV viewing 
(Cantor & Oliver, 1996). Studies of this kind suggest that fears induced by emotional 
content on TV may contribute towards the rising levels of anxiety reported by Twenge 
(2000). However, the literature surrounding the effects of ‘scary’ TV on internalizing 
emotions in children is fairly small and disparate. Many older studies are qualitative 
case studies, and scary TV is often not the primary focus.  
This meta-analysis aims to identify whether emotionally negative (scary) TV 
causes internalizing responses in children. Anxiety and depressive disorders are the 
primary internalizing disorders; studies with outcome measures relating to anxiety and 
depression will therefore be included in the meta-analysis. Specific internalizing 
outcome measures to include are: 1) general fear/ anxiety, measured with validated or 
non-validated scales; 2) Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a specific anxiety 
disorder, measured at a clinical or subclinical level using validated scales; 3) general 
sadness/ depression, measured with validated or non-validated scales; 4) sleep 
problems, not specific to any one internalizing disorder, measured using validated or 
non-validated scales; 5) physiological measures of  arousal such as increased skin 
conductance and decreased heart rate variability, not specific to any one internalizing 
disorder; and 6) general (unspecified) internalizing response, where global measures of 
internalizing outcomes have been reported (for example ‘total negative emotional and 
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behaviour reactions’, including sleep problems, trouble concentrating and avoidance of 
specific places, measured in Phillips, Prince, & Schiebelhut (2004)).  
All outcome measures except ‘general internalizing response’ have been 
categorized as ‘specific outcome measures’ rather than ‘general internalizing response’ 
in moderator analysis.  
If viewing scary TV is found to cause internalizing responses in children, this 
would be a first step in demonstrating that it is a plausible explanation of cohort level 
increases in anxiety. In addition, it will explore various potential moderators in an 
attempt to begin unpicking underlying mechanisms, should a significant main effect be 
found.   
Moderator Variables 
Ten different variables will be considered as potential moderators of the effect of 
scary TV on internalizing emotions in children. The first set of variables can be grouped 
together as study characteristics. There is a fair amount of overlap between study 
method, responder and outcome. Correlational studies tend to include self-report 
measures, typically by parents, or both parent and child. Experiments would more 
typically include measures directly from the child. The child’s behaviour can be 
observed directly by the experimenter, and preferably would be based on physiological 
outcomes, either alone or in combination with self-report measures.  
An inflated effect size might be expected for correlational compared to 
experimental studies due to an underreporting of viewing. British adults report watching 
an average of less than 20 hours of TV per week (TV Licensing, 2011) whereas official 
viewing figures were over 27 hours per week throughout January 2015 (BARB, 2015). 
Parents are often required to keep a viewing diary for their children in correlational 
studies, which is likely to reduce this effect somewhat. Over 70% of mums reported 
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knowing other mums who they judged were letting their children watch more TV than 
is recommended. Twenty-three percent reported they may not be completely truthful 
with other mums about how much TV their own child views (Netmums, 2011). This 
reflects peer-pressure felt by parents not to let their children watch ‘too much’ TV, and 
a subsequent tendency to underreport viewing. Additionally, 71% of 8-18 year olds 
sampled in the US reported having a TV in their bedroom, 36% have a computer and 
33% have internet access in their rooms (Rideout et al, 2010). Parents may simply be 
unaware of how much TV their children watch. 
Secondly, in correlational studies the stimulus may be more extreme compared 
to that used in a laboratory. The majority of the studies included in the meta-analysis 
were published in the 21
st
 century. Experimental studies in recent years have typically 
been constrained by ethical policies and procedures within universities, with children 
being classified as a vulnerable sample. This prevents experimenters from exposing 
children to anything which may cause them distress. Experimenters would not be able 
to use TV stimuli which had been rated as unsuitable for the sample age group. Thirty-
three percent of 8-10 year olds and almost half (49%) of 11-14 year olds state their 
parents have no rules about what shows they are allowed to watch on TV (Rideout et 
al., 2010). Combined with the high proportion that has a TV in their room, this means 
that children will often have exposure to stimuli considered ‘unsuitable’, either with or 
without parental consent.  
Self-report measures are often considered less accurate than physiological 
measures due to their susceptibility to measurement error, particularly social 
desirability. Socially desirable behaviours tend to be over reported, and socially 
undesirable behaviours tend to be under reported, when compared to neutral behaviours. 
Social desirability was found to influence results in 43% of questionnaire based health-
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related studies (van de Mortel, 2008). Additionally, parent reports of their children’s 
internalizing emotions are liable to be even less accurate because they cannot access 
their children’s emotions directly. For example, there is 11% mean difference in scores 
of child negative emotion when reported by adults or children (ICC = 0.55) (Theunissen 
et al., 1998). Finally, a difference might be expected between studies reporting general 
outcomes or specific outcomes. Measuring one specific outcome (such as sleep 
disorder) disregards many other symptoms of negative affect observed in mood and 
anxiety disorders. Fewer children might appear to be affected when only one specific 
outcome is measured, but for those who are affected, the effect may appear amplified if 
an in-depth scale is used, compared to just one or two items on a general questionnaire.    
Individual characteristics should also be considered as potential moderators. 
Gender has been considered in the past when researching fear. While some studies 
report no significant gender effects on number of reported fears in children 
(Derevensky, 1974; Eme & Schmidt, 1978), girls report more fears than boys in others 
(Muris et al., 1997; Ollendick & King, 1991). However, so few TV studies report 
statistics broken down by gender that it is not possible to include as a potential 
moderator. Age is another important individual characteristic to consider. Acquisition 
models assume that as children develop, they start to direct increased attention towards 
threatening compared to neutral stimuli, and develop an increased tendency to interpret 
ambiguous information with a threatening explanation rather than a neutral explanation. 
This model proposes that these behaviours are acquired with experience over a lifetime. 
Moderation models assume that infants are instead born directing a higher level of 
attention to threatening compared with neutral stimuli, and favouring threatening over 
neutral interpretations of ambiguous information. These behaviours can be moderated 
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by experience over time (Field & Lester, 2010). Internalizing responses to scary TV 
could therefore either increase or decrease with age, respectively. 
Finally, media characteristics need to be considered. Study age is included as a 
potential moderator. As previously mentioned, the type and quantity of media 
consumption is changing over time. Ethical policy for researchers is also changing, 
limiting the materials which can be used in experiments in more recent years. The type 
of media could also affect responses; studies have found differences in memory 
performance for still images compared to words (Shepard, 1967; Standing, 1973), and 
for moving images compared to still images (Buratto, Matthews, & Lamberts, 2009; 
Matthews, Benjamin, & Osborne, 2007). This signifies that radio, newspapers and TV 
are likely to be processed differently. Aspects of media content are also important to 
consider. Younger children tend to become scared after viewing more magical, 
mythical, or fictional content with a greater visual component, whereas this shifts to a 
fear of more realistic events with age (Harrison & Cantor, 1999; Valkenburg, Cantor, & 
Peeters, 2000; Wilson, 2008). This is hypothesized to be caused by a shift from the 
preoperational to concrete operational cognitive stages of processing, where children 
learn to tell the difference between fantasy and fiction more readily (Piaget & Cook, 
1952). Finally, a great emphasis has been placed on the effects of violence in TV 
content, in existing research. It is important to compare studies of scary TV with and 
without a violent component, to explore whether any internalizing effects could actually 
be associated with the viewing of violence.   
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Method 
Definitions and Inclusion Criteria 
The review was restricted to studies measuring children’s internalizing 
behaviours after viewing ‘scary’ TV. A study was included only where it met the 
following criteria: 
1. The upper limit of the age range of participants was set to 18 years or under. 
Any studies reporting an age range with participants over 18 years of age were 
excluded; 
2. Primary outcomes included measures of internalizing responses such as fear, 
anxiety, worry, sadness and depression. Studies which focused specifically on 
externalizing behaviours such as aggression and violence were excluded because 
internalizing emotions were the main focus of the study; 
3. Correlational and experimental studies were included in the meta-analysis. 
Initially only studies using physiological measures or validated scales such as 
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) (Beck, Brown & Steer, 1996) were 
considered for inclusion to obtain high reliability. This criterion was later 
broadened to include non-validated measures such as parent and child self-report 
via Likert or visual-analogue scales, due to a lack of studies meeting the stricter 
inclusion criteria; 
4. All experimental studies reported a control group or condition; either a baseline 
measurement before exposure to scary TV, or a group with no, or limited 
exposure to scary TV; and 
5. Sufficient information was needed from each study to be able to compute effect 
sizes. 
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Search Methods 
The search strategy is shown in Table 1. An initial search was run in January 
2012. Several electronic databases were searched: PsycARTICLES/PsycINFO, PubMed, 
Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar, using a combination of the following 
keywords: Child, TV and Scary, plus each of the following in turn: Negative, Positive, 
Fear, Anxiety, Depression and Sad. The library catalogue at Sussex University was 
searched using the same terms as the electronic database to identify books to be hand 
searched. In addition, books which included chapters on children’s emotional reactions 
to the media in general were hand searched. The reference lists to any relevant papers or 
book chapters were also hand searched for additional relevant studies. The initial search 
identified 101 studies in which children’s reactions to scary TV were reported, 80 of 
which did not meet the inclusion criteria.
2
 From these searches, 60 key authors were 
identified and contacted via email requesting any unpublished data or other papers they 
had worked on and felt may be relevant. Thirty-one authors responded, but had no 
further data available to add. The remaining authors either did not respond or could not 
be reached at their listed contact details. A second search in February 2013 was 
conducted to check for any papers which had been published since the first search in 
2012. This was conducted in the same manner and yielded a further five studies for 
consideration, one of which was excluded because effect sizes could not be computed.  
A final round of searches was conducted in October 2014, prior to submitting 
the work to a journal for publication. Happy was included as an extra internalizing 
emotion search term, and Television, Film and Movie were added as in turn as 
substitutes for TV. This resulted in an additional 25 studies for consideration, only one 
of which met all inclusion criteria. Authors who did not respond in the January 2012 
                                                          
2
      For the studies that did not report the relevant statistics to compute effect sizes, authors 
were contacted to request additional information. One did not respond and the remainder no 
longer had the original data. 
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were re-contacted, using any additional contact details that could be found, and a further 
47 authors were contacted for any unpublished or additional data for consideration. This 
yielded two additional published papers and five sets of unpublished data, two of which 
did not meet all the inclusion criteria because was no direct measurement of TV viewing 
included.     
In total, the three rounds of searches yielded 131 studies for consideration, 26 of 
which met all the inclusion criteria. One-hundred seven authors were contacted, 
yielding two further studies (Pfefferbaum et al., 1999; Pfefferbaum et al., 2008) for 
inclusion and five unpublished data sets for consideration, three of which met all 
inclusion criteria (Davies & Gentile, 2012; Ferguson, San Miguel, & Hartley, 2009; 
Gentile & Walsh, 2002). A total of 31 studies were included in the analysis. 
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Table 1.  
Summary of search methods for a meta-analysis of studies into the internalizing reactions to scary TV. 
Time of Search 
Studies Excluded 
from Search Author Responses 
Studies 
Retained 
January 2012 
   Studies identified via search (K = 101) 
   Authors contacted (N = 60) 
Total excluded (K = 80) 
     Main outcome externalizing (k = 38) 
     Review articles/ no new data (k = 15) 
     Qualitative studies (k = 12) 
     No control group (k = 10) 
     Could not compute ESs (k = 5) 
 
No unpublished data (n = 31) 
No response (n = 19) 
Bouncebacks (n = 9) 
Deceased (n = 1) 
Additional data for inclusion (n = 0) 
 
K = 21 
February 2013 
   Studies identified via search (K = 5) 
Total excluded (K = 1) 
     Could not compute ES (k = 1) 
 
  
K = 4 
October 2014 
    Studies identified via search (K= 25) 
    Authors contacted (N = 66) 
        Repeats (n = 19) 
        New (n = 47) 
Total excluded (K = 24) 
     Main outcome externalizing (k = 6) 
     Review articles/no new data (k = 5) 
     Qualitative studies (k = 4) 
     No control group (k = 4) 
     Could not compute ESs (k = 2) 
     Did not measure quantity of TV (k = 3) 
 
Published papers (n = 2) 
Unpublished data (n = 5) 
No unpublished data (n = 29) 
No response (n = 26) 
Bouncebacks (n = 3) 
Retired/ unavailable (n = 4) 
 
K = 6 
Totals 
     Studies identified in searches (K = 131) 
     Authors contacted (N = 107) 
 
Total excluded from searches (K = 105) 
 
Data from authors to be included (K = 5) 
 
K = 31 
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Outcome Measurement  
The outcome variable was effect on internalizing behaviours. Separate analyses 
were intended for each validated scale reported. However, studies used a variety of 
instruments to measure the same outcome variables. For example, 13 studies measured 
PTSD symptoms; three used the Impact of Events Scale – Revised Scale (IES-R) 
(Fairbrother et al., 2003; Pfefferbaum et al., 2000; Pfefferbaum et al., 2001), two used 
the University of California at Los Angeles Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Reactions 
Index (UCLA PTSD RI) (Fairbrother et al., 2003; Weems, Scott, Banks, & Graham, 
2012), and two used the PTSD Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children (Phillips et 
al., 2004; Schuster et al., 2001). The following were each used within just one study; 
DSM IV criteria (Braun-Lewensohn, Celestin-Westreich, Celestin, Verte, & Ponjaert-
Kristoffersen, 2009), the Child PTSD Symptom Scale (Lengua, Long, Smith, & 
Meltzoff, 2005), the Kiddie Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia, 
Epidemiologic Version (KSADS-E) (Otto et al., 2007), the Parent Response of 
Posttraumatic Symptoms (PROPS) (Saylor, Cowart, Lipovsky, Jackson, & Finch, 
2003), and the Clinical Needs Assessment Instrument (Pfefferbaum et al., 1999). The 
low numbers of studies using the each validated scale meant this could not be used as a 
moderator in the analysis. 
There were six physiological effect sizes, across two studies. In Gilissen, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn and van der Veer, (2008) and Gilissen, 
Koolstra, van IJzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg and van der Veer (2007), 
physiological responses of increased skin conductance level (SCL-reactivity) and 
decreased heart rate variability (Root Mean of the Squared Successive differences; 
RMSSD-variability, computed from raw inter-beat-intervals) were reported. The use of 
these outcome measures to indicate internalizing responses is consistent with a meta-
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analysis showing that anxiety disorders are significantly associated with reduced heart 
rate variability (Chalmers, Quintana, Abbott, & Kemp, 2014), and reports that anxiety 
and fear increase sweat-gland activity, and subsequently, skin conductance level 
(Davey, 2014). 
There were three effect sizes categorized as ‘general internalizing responses’, 
from two studies. Braun-Lewensohn et al., (2009) assessed behavioural and emotional 
problems using the Hebrew version of Achenbach’s Youth Self-Report (YSR; 
Achenbach  and  Rescorla, 2001) to give a ‘Total Problem Score’, and assessed 
Psychological and Psychiatric Problems using the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; 
Derogatis, 1993). This inventory measures nine dimensions of mental health difficulties, 
which are summarized by a ‘Global Severity Index’. Phillips et al. (2004) used items 
from several existing scales to measure ‘negative emotional and behaviour reactions’ 
including sleep problems, trouble concentrating, and avoidance of specific places. 
PTSD related symptoms were also recorded but were reported separately. Remaining 
items were combined into a ‘negative reaction’ score.  
Analysis Procedure 
For each study, Pearson’s r was estimated as the effect size of scary TV viewing 
on the outcome variables; internalizing behaviours. For correlational studies, r was 
taken directly from the articles. Where r was not reported directly, it was calculated 
from descriptive statistics such as mean, standard deviation and frequencies using 
common formulae (e.g. Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins & Rothstein 2009; Rosenthal, 
1991). This was then converted to Zr as a variance stabilizing transformation (Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985).  
In studies where multiple groups of participants, measures or outcomes were 
measured, multiple effect sizes were produced. This violates the assumption of 
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independence of effect sizes. The overall analysis and publication bias analysis were 
therefore conducted with effect sizes aggregated within studies. A random-effects meta-
analysis (Hedges & Vevea, 1998) using the DerSimonian-Laird estimator of between 
study variability (DerSimonian & Laird, 1986) was used for three reasons: first, in 
social science data, effect size variability is the norm (Field, 2005; Hunter & Schmidt, 
2000); second, the random effects model reduces to the fixed effect model if effect sizes 
do not vary, but not vice versa (Field, 2003); and finally, random-effects meta-analyses 
enable the results to be generalized beyond the studies included in the meta-analysis 
(Hedges & Vevea, 1998). The result is a weighted average effect size (and confidence 
interval) where studies with large samples are weighted more heavily than studies based 
on small samples. Sensitivity analysis based on Vevea and Woods (2005) was 
conducted to examine any potential effect of publication bias.  
For moderator analysis, a multilevel model was fitted with effect sizes (level 1) 
nested within studies (level 2). The intercept was a random effect (varying across 
studies) and moderators were treated as fixed effects. Using a multilevel approach 
enabled the power of moderator analyses to be maximised by including effect sizes 
within studies connected to different levels of the moderator variable of interest 
(Cheung, 2014; Field, 2015; Goldstein, Yang, Omar, Turner, & Thompson, 2000; 
Konstantopoulos, 2011; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
All analyses were conducted using R 3.1.1. (R Core Team, 2014). The overall 
analysis was conducted using the rma() function in the metafor package (Viechtbauer, 
2010). The moderator analysis multilevel models were fitted with the rma.mv() function 
in the metafor package. The publication bias analysis used Vevea and Woods’ (2005) 
scripts for S-plus adapted for R. 
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Moderator Variables  
Ten variables were included in the moderator analysis: (1) method (experimental 
vs. correlational); (2) measure (physiological vs. self-report); (3) responder (parent, 
child, or parent and child report of child’s emotional state); (4) outcome measure 
(internalizing response: fear/anxiety, physiological symptoms, PTSD, sadness/ 
depression, sleep problems, general/ unspecified internalizing response); (5) mean age; 
(6) whether the whole sample consisted of children under 10 years of age (all under 10 
years vs. all under 18 years); (7) age of study; (8) media type (TV only vs. mixed 
media, such as TV and radio exposure); (9) media content (fact/news vs. 
fiction/fantasy); (10) violent content (violent, general, or non-violent). Variables 1-4 
comprise study characteristics, 5-6 comprise individual characteristics, and 7-10 
comprise media characteristics.  
In relation to the violent content moderator, studies were classified as violent if they 
expressly focused on violent context such as terrorist attacks, assassinations and wars, 
non-violent if they explicitly did not contain any violence, but otherwise were classed as 
general (i.e. mixed content).   
Results 
The average effect size for each study was used to calculate the overall 
population effect size. Figure 1 shows a forest plot (Lewis & Clarke, 2001) with the 
effect of scary TV on children’s internalizing emotions (Zr) for each study and its 
associated 95% confidence interval. The hashed vertical line indicates no effect. 
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Figure 1: Forest plot of the studies in the meta-analysis. From Pearce and Field (2015). 
There was a consistent effect of scary TV on internalizing behaviours, with 
confidence intervals from 20 of the 31 studies not crossing the hashed line. The overall 
estimate of the effect of exposure to scary TV on children’s internalizing responses is 
shown as a diamond at the bottom of the forest plot; it shows a modest but consistent 
effect, Ẑ𝜌 =.18, 95% CI [.14, .22], p < .001. When converted back to r this is an overall 
effect of r = .18. This would typically be evaluated as a small effect size using Cohen’s 
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widely adopted cut-offs, where r = .10 (small effect size) would account for 
approximately 1% of variance and r = .30 (medium effect size) would account for 
approximately 10% variance (Cohen, 1988). There was significant heterogeneity in 
effect sizes, Q(30) = 93.38, I
2
 =67.87%, p < .001, indicating variability in study 
findings that might be explained by moderators. 
Publication Bias 
Publication bias is a type of selection bias. Publication bias occurs whenever the 
research that appears in the published literature is systematically unrepresentative of the 
population of completed studies (Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005). This means a 
sample would not be representative because the likelihood of studies with certain 
characteristics being published is higher compared to studies with other characteristics. 
There are many types of publication bias; this section is concerned with outcome bias. 
Experiments with positive or significant results are typically more likely to be published 
than those with negative or non-significant results, resulting in a positive-result bias 
(Dwan et al., 2008). However, a negative-result bias can also be found in some 
instances, with papers reporting a negative result significant more likely than papers 
reporting a positive result to be published in low impact factor journals (Littner, 
Mimouni, Dollberg, & Mandel, 2005). A lack of publication bias would mean that all 
studies were equally likely to be published regardless of their outcome.  
As noted by Sterne, Becker and Egger (2005), funnel plots are a primary visual 
tool for the investigation of publication and other bias in meta-analysis, and are 
appropriate where there are more than approximately five studies included in the 
analysis. The use of funnel plots necessarily leads to subjective evaluation of selection 
bias due to visual assessment, however, funnel plots are considered useful in gaining an 
understanding of the nature of the data. Publication bias causes a distortion of the shape 
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observed on a funnel plot, away from the expected shape. If two tailed selection occurs, 
the funnel plot will show a sparse area in the neighbourhood of an effect of zero for 
studies with small sample sizes; both tails may extend beyond that sparse region, so that 
the funnel appears hollow. When selection is one-tailed, studies with effects near or 
below zero tend to be missing from the plot, so that the funnel becomes asymmetrical 
(Vevea, Clements & Hedges, 1993).  
Begg and Mazumdar (1994) proposed an adjusted rank correlation method to 
examine the association between the effect estimates and their sampling variances, and 
Egger et al. (1997) introduced a linear regression approach in which the standard normal 
deviation is regressed against its precision to statistically test for funnel plot asymmetry 
(Stern and Egger, 2005). Begg and Mazumdar (1994) found that their method had only 
moderate power to detect asymmetry when meta-analyses used a small number of 
studies (approximately 25). Although Sterne et al (2005) found the linear regression 
model to be more powerful than the rank correlation method, both were found to have 
lower power when low number of studies are included and in the absence of severe bias. 
Lastly, failsafe N methods, introduced by Rosenthal (1979) calculates the number of 
unpublished ‘negative’ studies (studies in which the intervention effect was zero) that 
would be needed to increase the p value for the meta-analysis to above .05. However, all 
of the above methods work on the assumption that the unpublished or omitted studies, 
on average, show a null result. Additionally, sample size information is not incorporated 
into the calculations, widely varying estimates of the number of additional studies are 
produced when using different methods, and there is a lack of clarity on what 
constitutes a large N (see Becker, 2013 for a review). These methods are therefore not 
recommended. 
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Figure 2. Funnel plot showing effect size of scary TV on internalizing behaviours, plotted  
against standard error. The vertical line represents the population effect size and the  
diagonal lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Diagram from Pearce and Field (2015). 
Figure 2 shows a funnel plot of the studies in the analysis. In the absence of 
publication bias, a uniform dispersion of observed outcomes should be shown both 
above and below the population effect size, within the boundaries of the 95% 
confidence interval. Funnel plots therefore provide some indication as to whether 
studies are more or less likely to be published as the observed effect size becomes 
increasingly smaller or larger in comparison to the population effect size, rather than 
indicating a bias towards significant or non-significant results being published. This plot 
indicates likely publication bias, due to the relatively empty space in the bottom left 
corner; studies with both large SEs and effects around and below zero tend to be 
missing. This deviation from the expected funnel form indicates a ‘file-drawer 
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problem’: typically, studies with smaller sample sizes produce less precise estimated 
effects, resulting in larger SEs (Sedgwick, 2013). These smaller studies are less likely to 
be published if they show no significant effect than if they show a significant positive 
effect (Rosenthal, 1979). In addition, there are several effects falling outside of the 
funnel (in the grey area). These outliers signify heterogeneity, which could also indicate 
moderators (Huedo-Medina, Sanchez-Meca, Marin-Martinez, & Botella, 2006), 
alternative selection biases, true heterogeneity, data irregularities such as fraud or 
inaccurate analysis, artefact, or chance (Egger, Davey Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 
1997). 
The fact that the bottom left and right panels are very sparse suggests potential 
one-tailed selection bias, but also studies with small Ns (and hence large SEs) tend not 
to show effect sizes at or below zero, which could suggest two-tailed selection bias. 
Therefore, to quantify the likely impact of publication bias on the population effect size, 
a sensitivity analysis based on Vevea and Woods (2005) was conducted. Vevea and 
Woods’ sensitivity analysis adjusts the population effect size estimate by applying a 
sequence of four hypothetical weight functions representing different degrees and forms 
of possible selection bias. Moderate and severe one- and two-tailed selection bias 
weight functions were applied because inspection of the funnel plot implied both one- 
and two-tailed publication. 
The original analysis yielded a population estimate of Ẑ𝜌 = .18, and the most 
different adjusted estimate was for severe one-tailed selection bias, Ẑ𝜌 = .15. The 
application of a severe one-tailed bias function represents a pattern of selection that 
strongly favours the publication of significant positive effects, in which only a small 
fraction of large negative correlations survive and fewer than half of any correlations 
near zero are observed. The resulting adjusted estimate shows what the estimate of the 
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population mean effect would have been if this pattern of publication had been observed 
(Vevea & Woods, 2005). The difference between the adjusted and unadjusted 
population effect size estimates was relatively small, showing that the estimate of the 
population mean effect would not be substantially altered. We can therefore be 
confident that the estimated population effect size has not been severely inflated by 
unpublished studies missing from the meta-analysis, and no adjustment was needed to 
correct for publication bias. 
Moderator Analysis 
Table 2 summarizes the effect size by study, individual, and media 
characteristics. There were significant, small to medium, positive effects of scary TV 
viewing on internalizing emotions for studies using all methodology, and measure 
types, for all responder types, and both age brackets of children, all types of media and 
content, and all violence categorizations. Significant, small to medium, positive effects 
were also found for studies reporting all specific outcomes. Studies reporting general 
internalization as an outcome measure did not result in a significant effect.  
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Table 2. 
Effect sizes of the relationship between exposure to scary TV and internalizing responses by 
study, individual, or media characteristic 
    95% CI 
Moderator k Ẑ𝜌 p Lower Upper 
Study Characteristics      
    Methodology      
        Experimental 17 .30 .001 0.13 0.47 
        Correlational 112 .17 <.001 0.13 0.20 
    Measure      
        Self-report 123 .18 <.001 0.14 0.22 
        Physiological 6 .37 <.001 0.24 0.50 
    Responder      
        Parent 31 .16 <.001 0.13 0.20 
        Child 92 .20 <.001 0.13 0.26 
        Both 6 .21 <.001 0.19 0.23 
    Outcome      
        General internalization 3 .10 .325 -0.10 0.30 
        Fear/anxiety 68 .19 <.001 0.13 0.25 
        Physiological  6 .37 <.001 0.24 0.50 
        PTSD 32 .17 <.001 0.10 0.24 
        Sadness/ depression 11 .27 .010 0.06 0.47 
        Sleep problems 9 .18 <.001 0.10 0.27 
Individual Characteristics      
    Mean age 129 -.01 .432 -.02 0.01 
    Age under 10      
        Under 10 16 .28 <.001 0.17 0.38 
        Under 18 113 .18 <.001 0.13 0.22 
Media Characteristics      
    Study age 129 -0.01 .298 -0.02 0.00 
    Media type
1
      
        TV only 97 .19 <.001 0.14 0.25 
        Mixed media 20 .16 <.001 0.08 0.24 
    Media Content      
        Factual 99 .20 <.001 0.14 0.25 
        Fantasy 30 .17 <.001 0.11 0.24 
    Violent Content      
        No violence 38 .14 <.001 0.07 0.21 
        Violence 59 .20 <.001 0.14 0.26 
        Unspecified 22 .30 <.001 0.16 0.44 
1
Note: 12 effect sizes could not be categorized by media type and were excluded from 
moderator analysis. 
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Table 3.  
Summary of multilevel models showing moderator effects on the relationship between exposure to scary TV and internalizing responses. 
   95% CI   
Moderator k Estimate Lower Upper Test p 
Study Characteristics       
   Method (experimental vs. correlational) 129 −0.159 −0.269 −0.049 χ2(1) = .08 .005 
   Measure (self-report vs. physiological) 129 −0.177 −0.359 0.005 χ2(1) = 3.64 .056 
   Responder 129    χ2(2) = 0.12 .932 
     Child vs. Parent  −0.010 −0.067 0.047 Z = −0.34 .736 
     Child vs. Both  0.016 −0.215 0.246 Z = 0.13 .895 
   Outcome 129    χ2(5) = 22.39 <.001 
     General vs. Fear/ Anxiety  0.213 0.111 0.315 Z = 4.11 <.001 
     General vs. Physiological symptoms  0.356 0.150 0.561 Z = 3.39 <.001 
     General vs. PTSD  0.126 0.050 0.201 Z = 3.25 .001 
     General vs. Sadness/ Depression  0.244 0.132 0.356 Z = 4.28 <.001 
     General vs. Sleep problems  0.208 0.061 0.355 Z = 2.77 .006 
Individual Characteristics       
   Mean age 129 −0.006 −0.022 0.009 χ2(1) = 0.62 .432 
   All in sample under 10 years old 129 0.123 0.001 0.246 χ2(1) = 3.88 .049 
Media characteristics       
   Study age 129 −0.007 −0.017 0.002 χ2(1) = 2.31 .128 
   Media type (TV only vs. Mixed media) 117 0.035 −0.076 0.145 χ2(1) = 0.38 .539 
   Media content (Fact/ news vs. Fantasy/  
   fiction) 
129 −0.017 −0.067 0.033 χ2(1) = 0.45 .501 
   Violent content 129    χ2(1) = 2.50 .287 
     No violence vs. General  −0.102 −0.256 0.052 Z = −1.30 .193 
     No violence vs. Violent  −0.034 −0.175 0.108 Z = −0.47 .640 
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The multilevel models in which each moderator predicts effect sizes are 
summarized in Table 3. In terms of study characteristics, the following moderators were 
significant: (1) methodology, with effect sizes significantly stronger in experimental 
designs (k = 17), Ẑ𝜌  = .30 [.13, .47], p<.001, than correlational designs (k = 112), Ẑ𝜌 
= .17 [.13, .20], p<.001; (2) outcome, compared to general indicators of internalizing (k 
= 3), Ẑ𝜌 = .10 [−.10, .30], p = .325, effect sizes were significantly stronger for specific 
measures such as fear/ anxiety (k = 68), Ẑ𝜌 = .19 [.13, .25], p<.001, physiological 
symptoms (k = 6), Ẑ𝜌 = .37 [.24, .50], p<.001, PTSD, (k = 32), Ẑ𝜌 = .17 [.10, .24], 
p<.001, sadness/ depression (k = 11), Ẑ𝜌 = .27 [.06, .47], p = .010, and sleep disorders 
(k = 9), Ẑ𝜌 = .18 [.10, .27], p<.001; and (3) measure, there was borderline significance 
that effect sizes measured using self-report (k = 123), Ẑ𝜌 = .18 [.14, .22], p<.001, were 
weaker than those measured physiologically (k = 6), Ẑ𝜌 =.37 [.24, .50], p<.001.  
For individual characteristics, the mean age of participants did not significantly 
predict effect sizes, however, effect sizes from studies where all participants were under 
10 years old (k = 16), Ẑ𝜌 = .28 [.17, .38], p<.001, were significantly stronger than those 
that included children aged 10 years and above (k = 113), Ẑ𝜌 = .18 [.13, .22], p<.001. 
For media characteristics, all moderators had a small, non-significant, influence on 
study effect sizes.  
Discussion 
Main Findings 
The meta-analysis found a small but consistent effect of scary TV on children’s 
internalizing responses overall: as amount of viewing of scary TV increased, so did 
levels of reported internalizing responses. Publication bias analysis shows that despite 
smaller studies with smaller effect sizes less likely to be published, this had minimal 
impact on the overall effect size produced by this meta-analysis. 
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Findings are in line with classic studies and reports which generally portray 
media, especially scary and violent media, as having a negative effect on children’s 
emotions (Harrison & Cantor, 1999, 1999; Korhonen & Lahikainen, 2008; Mathai, 
1983; Valkenburg et al., 2000). The overall effect size is perhaps smaller than would be 
expected based on classic papers reporting case studies of children showing severe 
anxiety (e.g. Mathai, 1983) and previous findings that over a quarter of young children 
experienced ‘great fear’ in response to TV content (Korhonen & Lahikainen, 2008). 
However, the effect size for internalizing emotions (r = .18) does fall between the size 
of the effect of violent TV on externalizing behaviours reported by Wood et al. (1991) 
(r = .13), and Paik and Comstock (1994) (r = .31).  
The key finding of this meta-analysis is that scary TV has a significant effect on 
internalizing emotions, including anxiety, in children. As scary TV consumption 
increases, this is likely to lead to an increase in internalizing responses. This fits in with 
the social indicators theory put forward by Twenge (2000), whereby an increased 
perception of threat in the environment contributes towards the increased levels of 
anxiety seen in typically developing children.  
Moderators 
The meta-analysis found: (1) a significantly greater effect size in internalizing 
responses reported by experimental than by correlational studies; (2) significantly 
greater effect sizes where specific rather than general measures were used as the 
outcome; (3) a borderline weaker effect size when self-report was used rather than 
physiological measures; and (4) a significantly greater effect size when all the children 
were under 10 years of age than when older children were also included. 
 In terms of study characteristics, a larger effect size for internalizing emotions 
in experimental compared to correlational studies was found. It was anticipated that 
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parents would be likely to underreport TV viewing in correlational studies, leading to an 
inflated effect size. However, it is also possible that parents would underestimate 
negative affect experienced by their children because they do not have direct access to 
their internalizing emotions (Stokes, Pogge, Wecksell, & Zaccario, 2011; Theunissen et 
al., 1998), or may underreport children’s negative affect for fear of appearing a ‘bad-
parent’. Additionally, experimental studies typically measure the outcome during, or 
very soon after the stimuli is presented (e.g. Ortiz et al., 2011; Unz, Schwab, & 
Winterhoff-Spurk, 2008). In comparison, many correlational studies were conducted 
from several months up to a year after initial TV exposure (Becker-Blease, Finkelhor, & 
Turner, 2008; Otto et al., 2007). Negative affect may have faded from memory 
considerably by this point. On a similar note, there was a borderline stronger effect for 
physiological than self-report measures. This links in with the stronger effect seen in 
experimental studies than correlational, where physiological measures are typically 
taken during stimulus presentation in experiments (Gilissen et al., 2007) and can easily 
be quantified.    
As predicted, a larger effect size was reported for specific compared to general 
outcomes. Specific outcomes are typically measured using validated scales, with high 
reliability, for example the Post-Traumatic Stress Index used by Braun-Lewensohn et al. 
(2009) to measure PTSD, and The State–Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAIC) 
(Spielberger, 1973) used by Comer et al. (2008) to measure anxiety. When a validated 
scale is used, all aspects of the outcome are included and parents would be more likely 
to think in depth about the outcome in question. Studies reporting general outcome 
measures often included a single, or very few questions, such as asking parents to rate 
negative affect on a 3- or 5-point Likert scale. This could cause confusion for parents 
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between considering the breadth and the severity of various specific outcomes when 
weighing up how to assign an overall value to the general outcome.   
As predicted, stronger effects were found in studies excluding children over 10 
years of age. It is unlikely that this is due to younger children watching ‘scarier’ 
content, as the content would likely be comparable in terms of age appropriateness. 
Within experimental studies, it is likely that material would be tailored to ensure age 
appropriateness, due to ethical concerns. Within correlational studies, it is unlikely that 
children under 10 years watch TV shows with ‘scarier’ content than those over 10 years 
of age, due to the ratings system used in the UK and US and the scheduling of TV 
programmes around the watershed. This means material unsuitable for children should 
not, in general, be shown before 9pm or after 5.30am, when those under 10 are most 
likely to see it (Ofcom, 2016). In a survey of 1,876 UK parents, 82% claimed they 
always know what films and television programmes their children watch (ParentPort, 
2012), and 83% of parents of 5 – 15 year olds in the UK report having rules in place for 
their child’s use of television (Ofcom, 2014). This means that younger children 
responded with greater levels of internalizing responses than older children, despite a 
lower likelihood that they are viewing material with sexual content, violence, graphic or 
distressing imagery and swearing. This result could favour a moderation model of fear 
over an acquisition model; younger children are more likely to direct attention and 
memory resources to negative or scary, than to neutral TV content, and interpret 
ambiguous material in a negative fashion, resulting in greater levels of fear. As children 
develop, these processes can be moderated by experience, and other factors such as 
social development. This leads to a reduction in attention towards negative or scary over 
neutral TV material, and less frequent interpretations of ambiguous TV content as threat 
stimuli (Field & Lester, 2010). It was expected that internalizing emotions would 
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decrease as mean age increased, but this effect was not borne out. Empirical evidence 
shows a cognitive shift around 7-10 years of age (Cantor & Sparks, 1984; Piaget & 
Cook, 1952; Valkenburg et al., 2000). The majority of moderation for the processing 
mechanisms for threat-related stimuli might occur earlier in development, prior to age 
10 years, or it could reflect the different materials that younger and older children find 
scary.  
Finally, no significant differences in effect sizes were observed depending on 
study age, media type, media content (fact or fiction), or whether the stimuli contained 
violence. It was predicted that older studies would produce greater effect sizes because 
of the more challenging or unregulated stimuli included. However, newer studies may 
have been designed with increased methodological rigour, eliminating confounding 
variables. In terms of media type, it is very difficult to separate correlational studies 
where children only had access to TV or had access to mixed media. Studies were 
categorised depending on what exposure measures were reported, but some 
questionnaires might have only included items on amount of TV viewing and 
discounted any other forms of media. For example, when exploring the effect of a 
particular news story in the media (such as a city bombing) the questionnaire might 
have only included an item on number of times or number of hours of TV exposure, but 
not included similar items for radio or newspaper exposure. Alternatively, a 
questionnaire might combine these different media types into one item regarding overall 
amount of media exposure, which makes it impossible to disentangle their individual 
contributions. The lack of a significant difference in effect sizes between factual and 
fictional material is not surprising when considering that younger children are more 
prone to fear of fantasy items, and older children to fear of factual items (Harrison & 
Cantor, 1999; Piaget & Cook, 1952; Valkenburg et al., 2000). This implies that one type 
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of content is no scarier than the other, but the relative ‘fear factor’ changes across 
development. The lack of difference in effect size between scary TV that did, and did 
not contain violence is somewhat surprising because it was predicted that the inclusion 
of violence would increase internalizing emotions. However, this could simply imply 
that both scary and violent content have internalizing effects but do not combine to 
create a larger effect, rather both are processed simply as ‘negative’ material.  
It should also be noted that some moderator sub-groups had small sample sizes 
(for example, general indicators of internalizing (k = 3), physiological symptoms (k = 
6), and both parent and child responding (k = 6)). This leads to a lack of power and an 
increased likelihood of Type II errors (accepting the null hypothesis when it is false) as 
well as a reduced likelihood that a statistically significant result reflects a true effect. It 
is suggested that at least five cases are required to be able to estimate a separate 
variance component for each subgroup (Williams, 2012). 
Implications 
The overarching finding from this meta-analysis is that viewing scary TV has a 
small but significant effect on internalizing emotions in children. In addition, scary TV 
and film with no violent content is just as detrimental to children’s mental health as that 
containing violence. Within the context of this thesis, this meta-analysis has identified 
that levels of state anxiety in children are affected by the viewing of scary TV. The 
increase in viewing of TV, and in particular, scary TV, is one of many plausible reasons 
for the rise in cohort levels of anxiety in typically developing children, as suggested by 
Twenge (2000). Existing literature exploring children’s reactions to scary TV indicates 
that TV induced fear and anxiety can be severe enough to require hospitalization in 
children in rare cases (Mathai, 1983; Simons & Silveira, 1994). Some of the studies 
included in the meta-analysis showed that these effects persist over a prolonged 
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duration. For example, Phillips et al. (2004) reported a significant relationship between 
amount of televised coverage of the 9/11 attacks viewed and negative reactions three 
months later, Otto et al. (2007) found that amount of news coverage viewing of the 9/11 
attacks significantly predicted PTSD symptoms in children aged under 10 years, one 
year after the attacks, and Becker-Blease et al. (2008) found significant internalizing 
responses to televised news coverage of several events up to a year after they occurred. 
There is also evidence of lasting effects from qualitative studies: 55% and 35% of 
adolescents report enduring fright responses to TV and films viewed in childhood 
(Cantor & Reilly, 1982). Up to 90% of adults recall an incident from their childhood 
when they were ‘really frightened’ by a TV program or movie, and 26.1% of these 
adults still experienced residual fear or avoidance in relation to the event (Cantor, 
1998a, 1998b; Hoekstra, Harris, & Helmick, 1999).   
Muris and Field (2008) propose that anxiety is linked to cognitive distortions in 
attention, memory, and interpretation. There is a considerable lack of research into 
memory effects of emotionally valenced stimuli in children. A limited number of 
laboratory studies have been conducted utilising emotionally negative and neutral DRM 
word lists (e.g. Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010; Neshat-Doost et al., 1998; Quas et al., 
2015) and images (Cordon et al., 2013) and even less so using emotionally positive 
words (Brainerd et al., 2010; Moradi et al., 2000; Quas et al., 2015). Many existing 
studies into the effects of negative TV content typically do not contain positive 
conditions for comparison (Cantor & Reilly, 1982; Cantor & Sparks, 1984; Hoekstra et 
al., 1999). Future studies should therefore focus on emotional memory processing in 
typically developing children, using both emotionally negative and positive materials.  
The internalizing effect found in the meta-analysis was greater when measured 
experimentally, using specific outcome measures, and in children under 10 years. 
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Future studies should be designed with these features in mind; for example by focussing 
on children aged under 10 years. In some instances it can provide extremely valuable 
information to study a naturally occurring event, such as a natural disaster that receives 
widespread news coverage. However, there are a lot of confounding variables to 
consider; other sources of exposure, family and child viewing styles, coping styles, and 
even which channel the news is broadcast on. For example, parents with an active 
mediation style can successfully reduce the amount of fear and worry younger children 
experience in response to news coverage, whereas restricting viewing can even increase 
fear and worry (Buijzen, Walma van der Molen, & Sondij, 2007). To control some of 
these variables, experimental studies could utilise novel TV programmes (to control for 
other sources of exposure), and ensure that children view alone (to eliminate parental 
co-viewing effects), but still use the type of stimuli that typically developing children 
would be exposed to on a regular basis. 
Studies in the Meta-analysis 
 (Becker-Blease et al., 2008; Braun-Lewensohn et al., 2009; Buijzen et al., 2007; 
Comer et al., 2008; Davies & Gentile, 2012; Fairbrother et al., 2003; Ferguson, San 
Miguel, & Hartley, 2009; Gentile & Walsh, 2002; Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, 
van IJzendoorn, & van der Veer, 2008; Gilissen et al., 2007; Lengua et al., 2005; Ortiz 
et al., 2011; Paavonen, Pennonen, Roine, Valkonen, & Lahikainen, 2006; Paavonen, 
Roine, Pennonen, & Lahikainen, 2009; Pfefferbaum et al., 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 
2008; Phillips et al., 2004; Saylor et al., 2003; Schredl, Anders, Hellriegel, & Rehm, 
2008; Schuster et al., 2001; Smith & Moyer-Gusé, 2006; Smith & Wilson, 2002; Sparks 
& Cantor, 1986; Unz et al., 2008; van der Molen & Bushman, 2008; Weems et al., 
2012; Wilson, Martins, & Marske, 2005). 
  
90 
 
Chapter III  
Children’s True and False Memory for Media: Valence, Stimulus Modality and 
Congruency 
 
Abstract 
Despite developmental theories of information processing suggesting a negativity 
preference in memory, previous experiments report lower recall and recognition rates 
for negative compared to neutral words. The present two experiments sought to 
compare the effects of more ecologically valid negative, neutral and positive materials 
on children’s memory. Valenced TV clips were presented in Experiment 1; still images 
from each clip were matched with positive and negative narratives in Experiment 2. The 
valence manipulation was unsuccessful in Experiment 1; the only significant finding 
was a higher number of false memories recalled for the negative clip, when it was 
presented second. Further research on the clips would be needed, to identify which 
alterative features might be interacting with order effects. The valence manipulation was 
more successful in Experiment 2; discrimination and recall was greater for negative than 
positive narrative material, in line with existing findings. However, there was also a 
modality and congruency interaction effect that appeared to supersede valence effects. 
Narrative stimuli were recognized more accurately than visual, where they were 
incongruently matched. This is discussed in relation to cognitive dissonance and an 
information seeking approach to coping in stressful situations, as one potential 
explanation. Future studies should seek to improve the methodological design by 
increasing power, ensure materials are piloted, and consider any other features of the 
stimuli which should also be held constant. The interaction between congruency and 
modality would be an interesting are to research further. 
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 Children’s True and False Memory for Media: Valence, Stimulus Modality and 
Congruency 
Chapter II presented a meta-analysis which found a small, reliable effect of 
scary TV on internalizing emotions in children. Despite the effect being small, some 
individual studies within the meta-analysis showed that these effects can persist for up 
to a year after initial TV exposure (e.g. Becker-Blease et al., 2008; Otto et al., 2007; 
Phillips et al., 2004). When duration and strength of effect are considered together, 
viewing of scary TV may have a much higher impact on internalizing emotions such as 
fear, anxiety and sadness, particularly on some individuals. Internalizing emotions such 
as persistent fear, worry, and sleep disturbances are features of clinical anxiety 
according to the DSM-V (APA, 2013). It is therefore possible that sustained negative 
effects of viewing scary TV material could escalate to clinical levels of anxiety in some 
individuals. Anxiety has been linked to distortions in attention, memory, and 
interpretation (Muris & Field, 2008). Whilst attention and interpretation have been 
relatively well researched, memory has received less attention. This chapter explores the 
effects of valenced material on memory, where an enhanced effect of negative, 
compared to positive or neutral media, would indicator that memory preferences could 
potentially moderate the link between scary TV exposure and internalizing responses.   
This chapter is concerned primarily with episodic memory in children, 
specifically in relation to viewing emotional media. The majority of laboratory 
experiments exploring emotional memory in children have thus far utilized DRM word 
lists as stimuli. Negative emotional media is shown to have an impact on children’s 
internalizing emotions, such as anxiety, fear, and depression (Pearce & Field, 2015). TV 
clips are therefore considered as a suitable, more naturalistic stimulus for inclusion in 
memory studies requiring the elicitation of emotional reactions. Preferences towards 
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threatening (negative) stimuli in attention, interpretation, and memory have also been 
implicated in the emergence and maintenance of anxiety disorders (see Hadwin & Field, 
2010 for a review). The following two experiments will explore whether increased 
memory for negative stimuli can be predicted by an increase in trait anxiety, in line with 
developmental models of fear acquisition and moderation (Field & Lester, 2010).  
Experiment 1 seeks to compare recognition and recall memory in typically 
developing children for emotionally positive and negative TV clips, taking visual and 
narrative aspects into account. Experiment 2 seeks to further explore the roles of visual 
and verbal input, and emotional congruency of multiple inputs, by separating images 
from narratives and presenting these simultaneously. Congruency is explored as a 
contextual factor by presenting stories and images which are either matched (congruent) 
or mismatched (incongruent) on valence. Three potential covariates are explored: (1) 
age, to test developmental models of fear acquisition and to account for differences in 
memory performance across childhood; (2) gender, to explore whether girls experience 
a memory advantage, and to account for any advantages between gender; and (3) trait 
anxiety, to explore the hypothesis that negativity preferences are stronger in more 
anxious individuals, and to control for any effect found.   
Emotional Memory Enhancement  
Early studies into emotional memory focused on memory for real life events, 
such as being a witness to, or involved in a traumatic event. A meta-analysis revealed 
that in threatening situations which include the presence of a weapon, people are 
significantly less likely to identify or to give accurate descriptions of the perpetrator 
than if no weapon was present (Maass & Köhnken, 1989). This ‘weapon focus’ effect 
postulates that attention is narrowed towards the weapon and away from the periphery. 
Experimental studies have since sought to explore processing mechanisms for more 
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benign emotional material across the general population, finding clear evidence of a 
memory preference towards both positive and negative emotional stimuli compared 
with neutral stimuli in adults (see Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002, and Hamann, 2001 for 
reviews, and Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008 for a meta-analysis of empirical findings).  
Evolutionary models of information processing, including memory, fall into two 
camps. Models such as the ESM propose that all stimuli relevant to survival is 
privileged (Cacioppo et al., 1997; Cacioppo et al., 1999). Alternative models, such as 
the Evolved Module of Fear propose that only threatening stimuli are privileged 
(Öhman & Mineka, 2001). Findings reported by Murphy and Isaacowitz (2008) provide 
evidence that all valenced stimuli is privileged, in support of models such as the ESM.  
However, the same pattern of preferences is not observed in children, with the 
majority of DRM word list experiments showing a preference away from emotionally 
negative and positive stimuli in both recognition and recall tasks (Howe, 2007; Howe et 
al., 2010, Exp 2, 4, and 5; Moradi et al., 2000; Neshat-Doost et al., 1998). An additional 
cognitive ‘editing function’ has been proposed in recall in which children can filter out 
more semantically related items compared to neutral items, as an extra step (Howe, 
2007; Howe et al., 2010). Although both positive and negative emotional materials have 
stronger semantic relationships between items, compared to neutral items, literature 
suggests that this additional filtering is specific to emotionally negative lists; children 
are more reluctant to talk about negative events and more resistant to false negative 
suggestion (Goodman & Aman, 1990; Goodman, Hirschman, Hepps & Rudy, 1991). 
There is limited evidence for this hypothesis from experiments that do not use DRM 
word lists though. Further, a preference towards recalling negative and positive 
narratives over neutral has been observed (Van Bergen et al., 2015), and a large body of 
evidence shows an increase in discriminability as semantic relatedness increases, in 
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adults (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Ochsner, 2000; Talmi, Luk, et al., 2007a; Talmi & 
Moscovitch, 2004; Talmi, Schimmack, et al., 2007). Recall performance should also be 
lower for negative than for positive stimuli if the editing function hypothesis is correct. 
Most existing studies into emotional memory with children do not compare positive and 
negative emotional memory directly. However, of the identified experiments which do, 
negative material is recalled at a higher rate than positive material when narratives are 
used as stimuli (Baltazar et al., 2012; Miller & Sperry, 1988; Van Bergen et al., 2015), 
though no differences were found when word lists were used (Moradi et al., 2000; 
Neshat-Doost et al., 1998). This is particularly surprising, given narratives are likely to 
hold stronger semantic meaning than lists of words.  
An integrative model proposed by Field and Lester (2010) suggests that children 
are either born with varying levels of attention, memory, and interpretation preferences 
towards threatening stimuli which remain constant with time, are born without these 
preferences and develop them over time, or are born with high levels of preferences 
towards threatening stimuli which can be moderated over time (the integral bias, 
acquisition, and moderation models, respectively). Of these three models, the 
acquisition model best fits with the empirical evidence, showing more reliable 
negativity preferences in adults than children. These models will be tested by looking at 
the relationship between age and memory performance for negatively valenced stimuli 
within this chapter.  
This chapter aims to add to the growing knowledge of emotional memory 
preferences in children by directly comparing recognition for emotionally positive and 
negative items, as well as recall for emotionally positive, neutral and negative stimuli. 
In the first experiment, children will view an emotionally positive clip and an 
emotionally negative clip. If all evolutionarily advantageous material (both pleasant and 
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unpleasant) is privileged, then no valence effects will be found in the recall task 
(Experiment 1) and recognition task (Experiments 1 and 2). In addition, higher 
proportions of both positive and negative narrative will be recalled than the neutral 
portions in Experiment 2. If only threatening material is privileged, then negative 
material will be recognized and recalled at a greater rate than both positive 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and neutral material (recall task in Experiment 2).  
Alternatively, if the additional editing function proposed for recall is tenable 
(Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010), recall should be greater for neutral than emotional 
material, with higher recall of positive than negative material. Similarly, when 
exploring developmental theories of anxiety emergence, if no relationship is found 
between age and memory performance for negative material, this will support the 
integral bias model, a positive relationship will support the acquisition model, whereas a 
negative relationship will support the moderation model. A positive relationship 
between age and negativity preference in memory is expected, given the empirical 
evidence. 
False Memory and Emotions  
Despite the apparent superiority of emotional memories, false or inaccurate 
emotional memories are concurrently reported. A false memory refers to remembering 
and reporting an event that never happened, or an event being remembered differently 
from the way in which it happened, due to memory distortions (Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). Memory distortions become increasingly prevalent with repeated recollections 
over time (Bartlett & Bartlett, 1995), but can also be reported after just a single stimulus 
exposure and recollection.  
The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm is frequently used to 
measure both true and false memory (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). 
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Within the DRM paradigm, a false memory refers to a false alarm, specifically, a 
participant stating they remember a lure being presented to them (which had not been 
presented previously). Studies exploring false memories in children using the DRM 
paradigm consistently report that although hit rates increase with age, false alarm rates 
also increase with age for both recall and recognition tasks (e.g. Howe, 2007; Howe et 
al., 2010, Exp 2 and 4; Howe, Wimmer, & Blease, 2009). A pattern of higher false 
alarm rates for negative items than neutral items, in addition to lower hit rates for 
negative than neutral items is found across these experiments. Across time, hit rates for 
negative and neutral words are found to decrease, whilst false alarm rates remain stable 
for neutral items, and increase for negative items (Howe et al., 2010), suggesting 
differential processing. It has also been shown that children are able to suppress false 
alarms during directed forgetting conditions, whereas adults are not (Howe, 2005). 
Although changes in false memory across age, and differences between rates of false 
memory for neutral negative items are consistently reported, less research includes 
measures of false memory for positive material, or for stimuli other than DRM word 
lists. The following two experiments therefore explore rates of false recall for positive 
compared to negative TV clips (Experiment 1), and images and audio narratives 
(Experiment 2). 
Salience of Stimuli 
The majority of existing research exploring emotional memory in children has 
utilized the DRM paradigm, and specifically, word lists as stimuli. Word lists are less 
salient than pictures, because they have less attributes associated with them and are 
encoded less distinctly. Some studies have found an advantage for emotional memory 
performance only when items are presented pictorially (e.g., Talmi, Luk, McGarry, & 
Moscovitch, 2007b). The only experiment identified which found a negativity 
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preference recognition in children used images as a stimuli (Cordon et al., 2013). Both 
visual and narrative stimuli will be presented in the current studies, to explore whether 
increasing stimuli salience will affect emotional memory performance in children.    
Ecological Validity of Stimuli 
DRM lists have also been criticized for lacking ecological validity, with 
increases in memory performance thought to be due to details of presentation of words 
or scenes compared to the individual words (Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli, & Cahill, 
2000; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). The current studies seek to investigate memory for 
emotional material in children using stimuli with higher ecological validity compared to 
regular DRM lists. Children spend a large proportion of their waking hours watching 
TV with 6-11 year olds watching an average of 28 hours per week in the US 
(McDonough, 2009), and 4-15 year olds watching an average of 15 hours 42 minutes of 
television per week in the UK in 2010 (Ofcom, 2014). Eighty per cent of viewing 
among 10-15 year olds is in ‘adult’ airtime3, while just over half (52%) of 4-9 year olds’ 
viewing time is in ‘adult’ airtime, which may contain emotionally challenging material. 
A meta-analysis, presented in Chapter II, has shown that there is a small, consistent 
effect of scary TV on children’s internalizing behaviours (Pearce & Field, 2015), and 
this effect can persist for up to a year after initial viewing (Becker-Blease et al., 2008; 
Otto et al., 2007). Emotionally charged TV clips have therefore been chosen as stimuli 
in place of DRM lists in the first study. As well as increased ecological validity, TV 
clips contain both visual and narrative elements, which can be directly compared in the 
recognition task in an attempt to tease out any differential effects. Images and narratives 
have been extracted from these clips for the second study to allow neutral material to be 
inserted.  
                                                          
3
      ‘Adult’ airtime is defined as the main five PSB channels and ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 
+1 channels, excluding the slots when children’s programmes are shown, combined with all 
other multi-channel channels except for the dedicated children’s channels. 
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Moderators  
Because research into emotional memories in children is at such an early stage, 
most studies have so far not sought to identify any moderators of emotional memory 
performance between individuals. Age is explored as a moderator because declarative 
memory performance increases through early childhood into adolescence (Rittle-
Johnson & Siegler, 1998). In addition, differences between emotional memory 
preferences in adults and children have been identified, and it is unclear at what age 
these changes develop. Including age also allows developmental theories of fear 
acquisition to be tested. Gender is explored as a second moderator; a trend is 
highlighted within adult literature whereby several studies show women to have an 
advantage in episodic memory studies (Herlitz et al., 1997). This difference is 
hypothesized to arise from women reflecting on associations within negative lists to a 
greater degree than men (Dewhurst, Anderson, & Knott, 2012). It is unclear from 
existing literature whether this effect is reliable, and at what age it may emerge. 
Previous studies have also pointed towards a link between anxiety and negativity 
preferences in memory in adults (Mitte, 2008), and in specific groups of anxious 
children, for specific types of memory tasks (Daleiden, 1998; Moradi et al., 2000; 
Vassilopoulos, 2012). This is explored as a third moderator.     
The aims of Experiments 1 and 2 were to: (1) identify any differences between 
true and false memories for negative and positive materials in children; (2) explore 
whether any differences in true and false memories for valenced material vary, 
depending on type of stimulus; and (3) explore whether memory performance for 
valenced materials is related to a number of factors, including age, gender, trait anxiety, 
and congruency of valence for two simultaneous inputs (Experiment 2, only).  
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Experiment 1: Children’s True and False Memories of Emotional Fictional TV 
Method 
Participants  
Forty-three parents of children in school years 3-6 returned opt-in consent 
forms. Forty-one children completed all conditions of this experiment: 22 boys and 19 
girls. Ages ranged from 7 years, 8 months to 11 years, 3 months (M = 8 years, 11 
months, SD = 13.88 months). All children spoke English as their first language and 
none had a formal diagnosis of any behavioural, developmental or educational disorders 
according to parent report. All had normal or corrected to normal hearing and vision. 
The group was ethnically, culturally and socio-economically diverse, including pupils 
from a Community State School, a Catholic State School and a Progressive Independent 
School in South England. Two schools were average sized, while one was large. One 
school had a majority of White British pupils, one a majority of pupils from minority 
ethnic cultures, and the other consisted of pupils from a diverse mix of cultural 
backgrounds. One school was noted to have a higher than average proportion of pupils 
eligible for pupil premium. One school was rated as ‘good’ and one as ‘requires 
improvement’ by their latest Ofsted (Office for Standards in Education, Children’s 
Services and Skills) report, and one was rated as ‘good’ in the latest ISI (Independent 
Schools Inspectorate) report. Children took part voluntarily and were naïve to the 
purpose of the experiment. Children were entered into a prize draw on completion of the 
study.  
Materials 
The Multidimensional Anxiety Scale for Children – Short Version (MASC-10), 
(March, Parker, Sullivan, Stallings & Conners, 1997) was used to measure levels of trait 
anxiety in children across the four domains of Harm Avoidance, Physical Symptoms, 
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Separation/ Panic and Social Anxiety. This 10-item self-report questionnaire utilises a 
4-point Likert response scale from 0 (Never true about me) to 3 (Often true about me). 
The scale has been validated for use in participants aged 8 years and above. A minority 
of children were 7 years old at time of testing, however, the MASC has previously been 
used successfully with children as young as 6 years old (Cartwright-Hatton et al., 2011). 
In the current sample, the MASC showed moderate internal consistency, = .62 and 
was deemed reliable (Bland & Altman, 1997). 
Two episodes of the PG certified BBC TV programme ‘Merlin’ (Hawes, 
Frainman, Webb, Orme, & Moore, 2009) were used to create two experimental clips, 
each 6 min 38 s long, and each containing one coherent storyline, which was 
predominantly positive, or negative in valence. Clips were edited using Windows 
Moviemaker. Both episodes were from Series 1, originally aired on British TV in 2008. 
A 'scary' (emotionally negative) clip, referred to as the ‘monster’ clip was created from 
Episode 3, "The Mark of Nimueh". In this clip a witch creates a monster, releases it into 
the town’s water supply and some townsfolk drink the water and die. Merlin and the 
town physician encounter the monster in a cave, and later go back to fight and kill the 
monster. The emotionally positive (‘Druid’) clip was created from Episode 8, "The 
Beginning of the End". In this clip, a druid boy is lost in the town. Merlin helps the boy 
using magic and the Prince later helps the boy get out of the town and back home to his 
family safely. An introduction to the main characters and fictional land of Camelot was 
created in Microsoft Powerpoint. Pictures of each character were displayed with 
additional information presented as text and a voiceover. A brief introduction for each 
clip was created, introducing clip specific characters and providing background context. 
The main introduction lasted 1 min 19 s, the monster introduction lasted 33 s and the 
druid introduction lasted 35 s.  
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A distraction task of ‘spot the difference’ was used for children in school years 
3-4 (7-9 years old) consisting of six pairs of cartoon images. There were 3 differences 
between each pair for children to point to. Children in school years 5-6 (9-11 years old) 
were given a ‘naming game’. They were presented with a printed copy of the alphabet 
and asked to name one animal starting with each letter of the alphabet. Children could 
skip to the next picture or letter if requested. Younger and older children received 
different tasks because younger children were likely to find the naming task too difficult 
due to lower vocabulary skills; older children may have found the spot the difference 
task too easy and become bored, or might have finished it before the allocated time. 
Children spent 60 s on the distraction task.  
A free and prompted recall task was completed; children were asked to verbally 
describe everything they could remember from each clip in turn. Prompts were included 
because children are shown to recall more items when there is a discussion about 
materials they have viewed (Conroy & Salmon, 2006). Children were given prompts 
relating to three main characters from each clip, for example ‘What do you remember 
about Prince Arthur? What did he say and do?’ Prompts were open ended because this 
is a feature of high-elaborative discussion styles, which are also shown to increase recall 
responses compared to closed questions and low-elaborative discussion styles (Conroy 
& Salmon, 2006). Responses were recorded on a digital audio recorder, placed on the 
table between the researcher and child. 
The recognition task consisted of a 24-item self-report questionnaire for each 
clip containing a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘0’ (Sure the statement is false) to 
‘4’ (Sure the statement is true) with the midpoint indicating 'Don't know/ can’t 
remember'. Children circled their responses on the answer sheet. Twelve items per clip 
related to visual aspects, for example ‘The witch, Nimueh was wearing a red cape’, and 
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12 related to story narrative or thematic content, for example ‘Merlin looked in some 
books to find out how to kill the Afanc monster’. Half of the visual and half of the 
narrative items were true, the other half were false.  
Children rated emotions evoked by each clip on a 4-item self-report 
questionnaire using a 5-point Likert Scale from ‘0’ (Not at all) to ‘4’ (Very, very much). 
The four emotional responses recorded were: feeling scared, happy, sad and excited. 
Fear and happiness were two of the internalizing outcomes included in the meta-
analysis in Chapter II. Recording children’s ratings for these two emotions enabled a 
manipulation check, to ensure the negatively valenced clip was causing a similar 
internalizing emotion to that seen in the previous meta-analysis. They were asked how 
often they had watched Merlin before, whether they remembered seeing either episode 
before, and whether they would like to watch Merlin again, using the same 5-point 
scale.  
Design  
A mixed design was used. There were two within-participant independent 
variables in the recognition task, both with two levels: Valence of TV clip (negative, 
positive) and Modality of information (visual, narrative). Rotation (positive clip first, 
negative clip first) was also entered as a fixed effect in analysis. The two dependent 
variables were hit and false alarm rates, used to calculate d’ and criterion C scores. In 
the recall task there were two within-participant independent variables, each with two 
levels: Valence of TV clip (negative, positive) and Valence of memory (negative, 
positive), with Rotation also entered as a fixed effect in analysis. The dependent 
variables were the number of false memory utterances, and proportion of true factual 
material recalled. Participants took part in all conditions, each viewing the positive and 
negative clip, and each completing the recognition and recall tasks. Age, gender and 
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trait anxiety (MASC-10 scores) were examined in exploratory analyses to see whether 
their inclusion as covariates was warranted. Analyses for all dependent variables 
consisted of series’ of three exploratory ANCOVAs; age, gender and trait anxiety 
levels, respectively, were added as covariates separately at each step. They were 
retained in subsequent steps only when they significantly predicted the outcome 
measure. Non-significant covariate results are reported in supplementary materials 
because they are not central to the main findings of the experiments.   
Procedure 
Interviews were conducted individually in a quiet space at the children’s school, 
away from their classroom. Children had the interview procedure outlined to them along 
with information regarding confidentiality, anonymity and their right to withdraw. They 
were given a chance to ask any questions they had, and assent was attained. For all self-
report measures except the recall tasks, the researcher read the questions out loud and 
children circled their response on the answer sheet. Children were told they could ask 
questions if they did not understand any of the items. Children were monitored closely 
for any signs of distress, at which point the interview would be terminated immediately 
with the choice of reading an age appropriate book before the child returned to class.  
Children were first asked to answer some questions to measure their personality, 
at which point they completed the MASC-10. Next, they were asked to watch several 
sets of pictures and video clips, which they would discuss with the researcher a little 
later. The introduction to Merlin was played first, followed by the first clip introduction 
and corresponding film clip, and then the second clip introduction and corresponding 
clip. They were presented on a laptop with a 12” screen, using headphones set to a 
standardized volume. The laptop was placed on a table approximately 12” from 
participants. Immediately after viewing the final clip, children were asked to play a 
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quick fun game, at which point they were given the distraction task for 60 s. The order 
of clip presentation was counterbalanced between participants.  
Assent was attained for audio recording prior to the recall task; where assent was 
not attained, the researcher wrote down children’s responses. Children were asked to 
recall out loud everything they could remember from the first clip, followed by any 
additional details after each prompt. During free recall, and after each prompt, the next 
prompt was given if the child spontaneously indicated they could not remember any 
further details, or if this was indicated when the researcher asked for further details after 
10 s silence. Lastly, the emotional ratings for the corresponding clip were completed. 
The recall and emotional rating tasks were then repeated for the second clip. 
The recognition task was then completed for the first, followed by the second 
clip. Finally, children answered several questions relating to frequency of viewing of 
Merlin and their familiarity with the material. Children were thanked for their time and 
awarded a sticker. They were given the option of viewing the correct answers for the 
recognition task before returning to class.  
Results 
Familiarity with Merlin 
The majority of children (68.29%) had viewed Merlin on TV or DVD prior to 
the experiment, but most had not seen the episodes from which the clips were edited. 
Only seven children (17.08%) could recall seeing any part of the positive clip, and nine 
(21.95%) could recall seeing any part of the negative clip before. Boys reported 
watching Merlin more frequently (M = 1.60, SE = 0.29) than girls (M = 1.14, SE = 
0.27), and reported liking Merlin to a greater extent (M = 3.05, SE = 0.30) than girls (M 
= 2.62, SE = 0.26). However, neither of these two differences were significant, t(39) = 
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1.15, p = .258, 95% CI [−0.35, 1.26], d = 0.36, t(39) = 1.08, p = .288, 95% CI [−0.38, 
1.24], d = 0.34, respectively.    
Trait Anxiety 
Children’s normed t-scores for trait anxiety (MASC-10) ranged from 30.00 to 
67.00 (M = 48.05, SE = 1.29), matching the normal distribution for anxiety in the 
population (March, 1998). There were no significant differences of reported anxiety 
scores between males (M = 47.95, SE = 1.81) and females (M = 48.16, SE = 1.87), t(39) 
= −0.08, p = .938, 95% BCa CI [−5.40, 4.61], d = 0.02. Age was not significantly 
correlated with anxiety scores, r = −.12.  
Emotional Ratings 
Rotation order had no significant effect on children’s self-reported levels of 
internalizing emotions (fear and sadness scores combined), F(1, 36) = 0.77, p = .387, 𝜂𝑝
2  
= .02. There was no significant difference in children’s self-reported internalizing 
emotions after viewing the negative (M = 0.86, SE = 0.14) and positive (M = 0.78, SE = 
0.14) clips, F(1, 36) = 0.41, p = .525, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, or significant interaction between 
rotation and clip valence, F(1, 36) = 0.05, p = .832, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00. Similarly, rotation order 
had no significant effect on children’s self-reported levels of happiness, F(1, 36) = 0.04, 
p = .849, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00. There was no significant difference in children’s self-reported 
happiness after viewing the negative (M = 2.18, SE = 0.18) and positive (M = 2.34, SE = 
0.16) clips, F(1, 36) = 0.65, p = .426, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02, or interaction between rotation and clip 
valence, F(1, 36) = 0.29, p = .585, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01.  
Recognition Task  
Data from three participants were removed from the recognition analysis 
because their non-response rates were more than 2 SDs above the mean, and deemed to 
be too high for inclusion. The non-response rate was significantly higher for the 
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monster clip (M = 0.24, SE = 0.03) than for the druid clip (M = 0.18, SE = 0.03), t(37) = 
2.11, p = .042, 95% BCa [0.01, 0.11]. Table 1 shows the mean number of items 
recognized for each clip by memory type and modality.   
Table 1  
Mean number of items correctly recognized for each clip by memory type and modality, out of a 
maximum score of 6. 
Stimulus Type Positive Clip  Negative Clip 
M SE  M SE 
True      
     Visual 4.29 0.19  4.14 0.19 
     Narrative 5.22 0.15  4.46 0.25 
False      
     Visual 4.19 0.22  3.11 0.20 
     Narrative 4.10 0.26  3.97 0.26 
 
Data from one participant were removed from recognition analysis because one 
of their C scores was more than 3 SDs below the mean. A total of n = 22 males and n = 
15 females were included in the recognition analysis.  
Sensitivity: d’ analysis. Type I d’ prime was calculated as a measure of how 
accurately participants recognized true and false details from the TV clips presented to 
them in the recognition task. Scores were calculated separately for visual, and for 
narrative items, for each clip, using the method described in Chapter I (see section on 
Recognition Memory Methodology).   
There was a high level of discrimination overall, with mean d’ scores of around 
1.0 or above in all conditions (see Figure 1). One sample t-tests showed that participants 
could discriminate at better-than-chance levels in all conditions, because d’ scores were 
significantly greater from 0: positive visual t(36) = 10.65, p = .001, 95% BCa CI [1.18, 
1.75], d = 3.55, positive narrative t(36) = 16.05, p = .001, 95% BCa CI [1.76, 2.19], d = 
5.35, negative visual t(36) = 7.56, p = .001, 95% BCa CI [0.69, 1.12], d = 2.52, and 
negative narrative t(36) = 10.37, p = .001, 95% BCa CI [1.25, 1.78], d = 3.46.  
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Figure 1. Interaction effects between type of clip and type of modality discriminability 
rates (d’ scores). Error bars show standard error.  
Age was significantly related to d’ scores, F(1, 34) = 6.78, p = .014, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .17. 
Discrimination increased with age, r = .50. Gender was significantly related to d’ 
scores, F(1, 33) = 11.57, p = .002, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .26, with boys scoring higher on discrimination 
(M = 1.66, SE = 0.09) than girls (M = 1.17, SE = 0.121). Trait anxiety did not 
significantly predict discrimination (p = .469).
 4
  
The main analysis was conducted using a mixed 2 × 2 × 2 (Story valence 
[positive, negative] × Modality [narrative, visual] × Rotation [positive clip first, 
negative clip first]) ANCOVA, including age and gender as covariates. Whilst average 
discrimination scores were higher for narrative (M = 1.75, SE = 0.10) than visual signals 
(M = 1.20, SE = 0.09), the main effect of modality on d’ scores was not significant once 
                                                          
4
      See supplementary materials for full results of covariate analysis. 
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age and gender had been accounted for, F(1, 33) = 0.00, p = .984, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00. Mean d’ 
scores were higher for the positive, druid clip (M = 1.73, SE = 0.09) than for the 
negative, monster clip (M = 1.22, SE = 0.08), but the main effect of valence was not 
significant, F(1, 33) = 0.07, p = .792, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00. The interaction between valence and 
modality was also non-significant, F(1, 33) = 0.28, p = .599, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01. The main effect 
of rotation was not significant, F(1, 33) = 3.39, p = .063, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .10, and it did not interact 
significantly with modality, F(1, 33) = 0.28, p = .599, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, valence, F(1, 33) = 0.87, 
p = .357, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, or modality × valence, F(1, 33) = 0.04, p = .847, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00. 
Response bias: Criterion C analysis. Response bias has been calculated as 
described in Chapter I (see section on Recognition Memory Methodology). C scores 
were significantly lower than 0 in the positive narrative condition, (M = −0.23, SE = 
0.06), t(36) = −3.67, p = .002, 95% BCa CI [−0.35, −0.12], d = 1.23, and in the negative 
visual condition, (M = −0.22, SE = 0.07), t(36) = −3.41, p = .005, 95% BCa CI [−0.35, 
−0.09], d = 1.14, indicating liberal response bias. Scores were not significantly different 
to 0 in the positive visual condition, (M = 0.01, SE = 0.06), t(36) = −0.09, p = .925, 95% 
BCa CI [−0.12, 0.12], d = 0.03, or the negative narrative condition, (M = −0.06, SE = 
0.08), t(36) = −0.85, p = .407, 95% BCa CI [−0.21, 0.09], d = 0.28, indicating no 
response bias. C scores are shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Interaction effects between type of clip and type of modality on response bias rates  
(C scores). Error bars show standard error. 
Age, gender and trait anxiety were not significantly related to response bias (ps 
= .999, .924 and .766, respectively).
5
 Therefore, the main analysis was simply a 2 × 2 × 
2 (Clip valence [positive, negative], Modality [visual, narrative], Rotation [positive clip 
first, negative clip first]) mixed ANOVA. There was no significant difference in 
response bias between the positive (M = −0.11, SE = 0.05) and negative clip (M = 
−0.14, SE = 0.06), F(1, 35) = 0.38, p = .543, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  .01, or between narrative (M = −0.15, 
SE = 0.06) and visual items (M = −0.12, SE = 0.06), F(1, 35) = 0.41, p = .528, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  .01. 
The main effect of rotation was not significant, F(1, 35) = 0.23, p = .634, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, and 
rotation did not significantly interact with valence, F(1, 35) = 0.05, p = .831, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00, 
or modality, F(1, 35) = 1.46, p = .235, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .04. The valence × modality interaction was 
significant, F(1, 35) = 13.44. p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .28, but this effect was superseded by a 
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significant three-way interaction between valence, modality and rotation effects on C 
scores, F(1, 35) = 4.87, p = .034, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .12.  
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA showed that for children who viewed 
the negative clip first there were no significant main effects of valence, F(1, 17) = 0.37, 
p = .554, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02, or modality F(1, 17) = 0.14, p = .717, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, on response bias, but 
the valence by modality interaction was significant, F(1, 17) = 14.58, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .46. 
Paired t-tests showed significantly greater liberal response bias for the negative visual 
items than for the positive visual items, t(17) = 3.57, p = .007, 95% BCa CI [0.16, 0.58], 
d = 0.83, and significantly greater liberal response bias for the positive narrative than 
negative narrative items, t(17) = −2.30, p = .041, 95% BCa CI [−0.52, −0.01], d = 0.59. 
For those who viewed the positive clip first, there were no significant main effects of 
valence, F(1, 18) = 0.08, p = .785, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00, or modality, F(1, 18) = 2.09, p = .165, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 
.10, and the valence by modality interaction was not significant, F(1, 18) = 1.28, p = 
.274, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .07.  
Recall task 
Children’s recall of the clips was transcribed verbatim from audio recordings of 
their responses. Utterances were chunked and coded according to a pre-defined coding 
scheme. The narrative of each story was coded into propositional chunks. This acted as 
a checklist to match each utterance to. Each utterance was categorized in three different 
ways: 
(1) Type of utterance had four possible codes: Factual, emotional, repetition or 
other. Factual utterances were propositions related to a specific action or 
utterance by a character. Emotional utterances were those relating to 
participants’ emotions evoked by the clips. Repetition utterances were recorded 
where children recalled the same factual material more than once. Other 
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utterances included anything unrelated to the presented clip, or where there was 
not enough information to otherwise code it accurately. Only factual utterances 
were further coded for accuracy and valence for subsequent analysis. 
(2) Accuracy had two possible codes: True or false. Responses were coded by 
analysts consulting the detailed written descriptions of the clips and revisiting 
the clips where necessary.  
(3) Valence had two possible codes: Positive or negative. Although the overall clips 
had been designated as either positive or negative in the recognition task, it was 
recognized during transcription that there were a minority of positive scenes in 
the negative clip, and negative scenes in the positive clip. Utterance valence was 
therefore determined based on the valence of the scene to which the utterance 
pertained. The coding scheme specified which scenes were designated as 
positive and negative, and their relevant timings from each clip. The Druid clip 
contained 287 s (139 chunked items) of positive and 111 s (44 chunked items) of 
negative scenes. This equates to 75.96% positive, and 24.04% negative items, 
and a total of 183 chunked items. The Monster clip contained 364 s (106 
chunked items) of negative and 34 s (31 chunked items) of positive scenes. This 
equates to 77.37% negative, and 22.63% positive items, and a total of 137 
chunked items.  
Reliability of the code scheme was tested by an independent observer coding data 
for 20% of participants (N = 8). There was 91.20% agreement (P0) between observers 
for utterance type (κ = 0.58), 94.87% agreement for accuracy of factual utterances (κ = 
0.35), and 95.26 % agreement for valence of true, factual utterances (κ = 0.91). P0 
indicates very high agreement between observers for the three sets of coding. The kappa 
statistic for valence indicates almost perfect reliability. However the kappa statistics 
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indicate borderline weak/ moderate reliability for utterance type, and minimal reliability 
for accuracy (Landis & Koch, 1977). Low kappa scores are expected when there is a 
lack of balance across observational categories. It is unsurprising that utterance type and 
accuracy kappas are low, because the majority of utterances are expected to be factual 
and true, due to the nature and instruction of the task (Feinstein & Cicchetti, 1995). P0 is 
therefore considered a better indicator for reliability. True and false memories were 
analysed with a one-way (Clip: druid vs. monster) repeated measures ANCOVA; 
consistent with earlier analyses, age, gender, and trait anxiety were initially entered as 
covariates, but were retained in the final model only if they significantly predicted 
memory scores.  
False memories. Data from one participant were excluded due to the number of 
false memories recalled in one condition exceeding 3 SDs of the mean. The number of 
false memories reported increased significantly with age, F(1, 37) = 4.23, p = .047, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  
.10, r = .34. Gender and trait anxiety did not significantly predict the number of false 
memories recalled (ps = .461 and .465, respectively).
6
 A 2 × 2 (Valence [positive, 
negative], Rotation [positive clip first, negative clip first]) mixed ANCOVA with age 
entered as a covariate revealed no significant main effect of rotation order, F(1, 37) = 
2.24, p = .143, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  .06. There was no significant difference between the amount of 
false memories recalled in the monster (M = 0.60, SE = 0.17) compared to the druid 
condition (M = 0.55, SE = 0.13), F(1, 37) = 2.77, p = .104, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  .07. However, the clip 
by rotation interaction was significant, F(1, 37) = 5.37, p = .026, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .13. 
Paired sample t-tests showed for those who saw the druid clip first, they recalled 
significantly more false memories from the monster (second) clip (M = 0.62, SE = 
0.26), than from the druid clip (M = 0.14, SE = 0.08), t(20) = −2.02, p = .056, 95% BCa 
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See supplementary materials for full results of covariate analysis. 
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CI [−0.95, −0.10], d = 0.60. For those who saw the monster clip first, there was no 
significant difference between number of false memories from the druid (second clip) 
(M = 0.95, SE = 0.25) and monster clip (M = 0.58, SE = 0.23), t(18) = 1.10, p = .286, 
95% BCa CI [−0.33, 1.02], d = 0.25. However, significantly more false memories were 
recalled for the druid clip when it was viewed second, than when it was viewed first, 
t(21.58) = −3.10, p = .005, 95% BCa CI [−1.34, −0.27], d = 1.01, but false memories of 
the monster clip did not differ significantly depending on whether they were viewed 
first or second, t(38) = 0.11, p = .910, 95% BCa CI [−0.68, 0.75], d = 0.04.  
True factual memories. The number of utterances correctly recalled from the 
positive and negative scenes from each story was divided by the total number of 
positive and negative items in the code scheme to calculate a proportion of material 
recalled. Data from one participant were excluded due to the proportion of material 
recalled in the positive druid, and negative druid condition exceeding 3 SDs of the 
mean. On average, the highest proportion of true material was recalled from the 
negative portions of the monster (mostly negative) clip (M = 0.11, SE = 0.01). The next 
highest proportion recalled was from the negative scenes of the druid (mostly positive) 
clip (M = 0.07, SE = 0.01). The lowest proportions of material were recalled from the 
positive scenes of the monster clip (M = 0.05, SE = 0.01) and positive scenes of the 
druid clip (M = 0.05, SE = 0.01).  
Age, gender, and trait anxiety scores were not significantly related to the 
proportion of true material recalled (ps = .099, .776, and .324, respectively).
7
 However, 
age did interact significantly with valence of material, F(1, 37) = 8.02, p = .007, 𝜂𝑝
2   = 
.18. The proportion of true negative material recalled increased with age at a level 
approaching significance, r = .30, p = .058. The proportion of true positive material 
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recalled did not change with age, r = −.06, p = .706. The difference in proportion of 
positive compared to negative material recalled increased significantly with age (r = 
.44, p = .006). Trait anxiety also interacted significantly with valence by clip on the 
proportion of material recalled, F(1, 36) = 9.72, p = .004, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .21. The proportion of 
true material recalled increased with levels of trait anxiety for positive scenes from the 
druid clip (r = .42, p = .007), and for the negative scenes of the monster clip (r = .30, p 
= .058). The proportion recalled from the negative scenes in the druid clip (r = −.05, p = 
.755) and positive scenes in the monster clip (r = −.01, p = .974) did not change 
significantly depending on levels of trait anxiety. Age and trait anxiety were therefore 
retained as covariates. 
A 2 × 2 × 2 (Clip [druid, monster], Valence [positive, negative], Rotation order 
[druid clip first, monster clip first]) mixed ANCOVA was run with age and trait anxiety 
scores included as covariates. There were no significant differences in recall depending 
on whether the positive (M = 0.06, SE = 0.01), or negative clip (M = 0.08, SE = 0.01) 
was shown first, F(1,36) = 2.67, p = .110, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .07, between the druid (M = 0.06, SE = 
0.01), and monster clip (M = 0.08, SE = 0.01) clip, F(1,36) = 0.45, p = .505, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .01, 
or for positive (M = 0.05, SE = 0.01), compared to negative scenes (M = 0.09, SE = 
0.01), F(1,36) = 1.68, p = .204, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .04, after accounting for age and levels of trait 
anxiety.  
The two-way interactions between clip and rotation, F(1, 36) = 0.20, p = .660, 
𝜂𝑝
2   = .01, valence and rotation, F(1, 36) = 3.46, p = .071, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .09, and clip and 
valence, F(1, 36) = 1.66, p = .207, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .04, were all non-significant after accounting 
for age and trait anxiety levels. The three-way interaction between clip, valence, and 
rotation on proportion of material recalled was also non-significant, F(1, 36) = 1.28, p = 
.266, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .03, after accounting for age and trait anxiety levels.   
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Discussion 
The stimuli had high ecological validity, compared to many previous emotional 
memory studies with children. However, this meant it was difficult to ensure 
comparative proportions of valenced materials were included in each clip; the 
predominantly negative (monster) clip contained a higher proportion of negative 
material than the proportion of positive material in the predominantly positive (druid) 
clip. As a consequence of the clips containing a mixture of valenced material, of uneven 
proportions; the main manipulation of valence appeared unsuccessful. This meant that 
observed findings provide only weak evidence to consider, in response to the research 
aims.  
Despite clip valence not being successfully manipulated, some significant 
differences between the two clips were found in response bias and false recall rates. The 
clips were designed to be as similar as possible in other key respects; for example, 
length, TV series, main characters, number of additional characters, and dates originally 
aired. It is possible that the measures of internalization and happiness were not sensitive 
enough to identify a difference in valence, but it could also be the case that some other 
difference between the two clips resulted in the observed differences in memory 
performance.  
This work could be extended by including a neutral control condition to allow 
emotional memory theories to be tested more fully. The clips were edited directly from 
TV episodes of Merlin, which is written as an adventure TV series. This left little scope 
to include a neutral control clip, or to edit neutral portions of narrative material into the 
clips for comparison. Positivity and negativity preferences in memory could not be 
explored, because there were no baseline measures. Comparisons were therefore limited 
to relative differences in memory performance between positive and negative stimuli. 
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Experiment 2: Children’s Memories of Emotional Images and Stories 
Experiment 2 is intended to improve upon the design of Experiment 1, whilst 
maintaining the use of naturalistic stimuli. The same two clips from Experiment 1 are 
used as a basis for the visual and narrative stimuli, but two versions of each story have 
been written to accompany a set of still images taken from each clip. This has resulted 
in two positive and two negative stories, and 15 positive and 15 negative images. The 
aim of this is to ameliorate the effects of any extraneous variables which may not have 
been otherwise accounted for. This should help to ensure that any observed effects are 
due to valence, rather than other factors (e.g. salience). The two versions of each story 
share some neutral narrative content so that memory of both positive and negative 
content can be compared to that of the neutral content. This provides a baseline measure 
to explore positivity and negativity preferences. An equal amount of valenced material 
is also included within each story pair, whereas the amount of positive to negative 
material in each clip of Experiment 1 was unbalanced.    
This methodology is similar to the famous ‘slides procedure’ utilised by Cahill, 
Prins, Weber, and McGaugh (1994) to study emotional memory in adults. In Cahill et 
al’s experiment, 12 slides were presented, paired with either a ‘neutral’ or ‘arousing’ 
(negative) narrative. One sentence was presented with each slide. The first four slides 
and the final slide were paired with identical narratives. The remaining seven slides 
used similar sentences but varied key phrases between the two versions. Whilst the 
study was testing the effect of Propranolol on emotional memory, results from the 
placebo group suggest that recognition scores (percent correct) were higher across all 
slides in the arousing (negative) compared to the neutral group. Additionally, both 
groups had the highest recognition for slides 5-9, followed by slides 10-12. Reported 
results do not indicate whether these effects are statistically significant. It is difficult to 
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draw any hypotheses for the current study based on these findings because the 
experiment included adults rather than children, compared a negative to neutral story, 
rather than a negative to positive story, and did not draw a firm distinction between 
arousal and valence in the negative condition.  
Method 
Participants 
Students from two schools in East Sussex, England participated in the study. 
Fifty-nine parents of children in school years 3-6 returned opt-in consent forms. Three 
children did not complete the interview in its entirety and were excluded from all 
analyses. Thirty-three boys (58.93%) and 23 girls (41.07%) completed the experiment. 
Ages ranged from 7 years, 1 month to 11 years, 1 month (M = 8 years, 11 months, SD = 
13.79 months). All spoke English as their first language and none had any formal 
diagnosis of behavioural, developmental or educational disorders based on parental 
report. All children had normal or corrected to normal hearing and vision. The group 
was ethnically, culturally and socio-economically diverse including pupils from a mixed 
Community State School and a mixed voluntary aided Church of England School. One 
school was average size, whilst the other was larger than average. The majority of 
pupils at both schools were White British, but one school reported 15 different 
additional languages spoken throughout the school. Both schools had a lower than 
average proportion of students eligible for pupil premium and were rated as ‘good’ by 
Ofsted. Children took part voluntarily and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. 
They were entered into a voucher prize draw on completion.  
Materials 
Trait anxiety. The MASC-10 (March, Parker, Sullivan, Stallings & Conners, 
1997) was used to measure levels of trait anxiety (see Experiment 1). The scale showed 
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poor internal consistency in the current sample, = .54 (Bland & Altman, 1997). 
Although lower alphas can result from shorter scale length and a narrower scale of 
responses, this is shown to have a more noticeable effect for scales with fewer than 7-
items, and response scales narrower than 4-points (Cronbach, 1951; Voss, Jr, & 
Fotopoulos, 2000). The MASC consists of 10 items and a 4-point response scale, so a 
higher alpha is expected. The MASC was deemed unreliable and scores excluded from 
analysis.  
In addition, the Spence Children's Anxiety Scale - SCAS (Spence, 1997; 1998) 
was administered. The SCAS is a 45-item scale measuring six domains of anxiety, and 
including six filler items. Muris et al. (2000) found evidence to support the 
psychometric properties of the SCAS in 7-11 year olds, indicating its suitability within 
this experiment. Items were read aloud to children, who were asked to circle how often 
they experienced each one on a 4-point scale (never = 0, sometimes, often, or always = 
3). A total score was calculated by summing responses of the 39 anxiety items, and 
converting to t-scores. The SCAS had good internal consistency in the current sample, 
 
Emotional stimuli. The same episodes of Merlin (Hawes et al., 2009) were used 
as in Experiment 1 to create the four sets of experimental stimuli (see Appendix: 
Experiment 2). An emotionally ‘positive’ set of 15 still images were taken from Episode 
8, "The Beginning of the End" and is referred to as the ‘Druid’ story condition 
throughout, regardless of the paired story valence. Images included some boots standing 
behind a pillar, some keys hovering in the air, a bowl of soup with keys in them, and a 
boy being hugged by his parents. Fifteen emotionally ‘negative’ images were taken 
from Episode 3 “The Mark of Nimueh”, referred to as the ‘Monster’ story condition 
throughout. It included images of a witch, an animal growing inside a glowing sphere, 
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characters visiting dark caves with swords, and a monster appearing from a water pool. 
Each image set was made into a Powerpoint presentation, with each image presented 
full screen on a laptop for 20 s. Original stories from the Merlin episodes were adapted 
to provide an emotionally positive, and emotionally negative version of narrative to be 
matched with each image set. A substantial portion of the positive and negative versions 
of each story was neutral and identical, with key phrases changed to alter the valence of 
the story.  
In the positive druid boy story, a boy is in Camelot with his family to pick up 
supplies and plays a game with the other children to see who can get back home the 
fastest without being spotted. Merlin and Prince Arthur help the boy get home and he 
wins for the first time. In the negative version, the druids are in Camelot to kill the 
King. The boy gets lost and is hiding so he will not be imprisoned or killed. Eventually 
Prince Arthur helps the boy escape back to his family, where they continue to plot 
against Camelot.  
In the positive monster story, a nice witch creates an animal to live in the caves 
below Camelot to help her look after the villagers who keep falling asleep in the 
daytime, after drinking the village water. The animal works out there is a bug in the 
water making them sleepy, and helps the witch clean the water. In the negative version, 
the witch creates the monster to poison the water and kill the people in Camelot. Some 
villagers are found dead, so Merlin and the doctor search for the monster. The Prince 
tries to kill it, unsuccessfully.   
The stories were an average of 837 words long, with a difference of eleven 
words in length between the positive and negative druid boy story, and a difference of 
six words between the positive and negative version of the monster story. The stories 
120 
 
were audio recorded, and inserted into the image presentations. An average of 4-5 
sentences were heard whilst each image was presented.  
The same character introduction and distraction tasks from Experiment 1 were 
used. The same recall and recognition tasks were also used, with some minor wording 
alterations between positive and negative versions (such as the use of ‘monster’ or 
‘animal’) to match the phrasing used in the respective stories. As in Experiment 1, 
participants rated emotions evoked by each set of images and each audio story, and 
were asked the same questions regarding their viewing habits and preferences in relation 
to Merlin. 
Design 
A mixed design was used. There were three independent variables in the 
recognition task, all with two levels: Story (monster, druid), Congruency of image/ story 
valence (congruent, incongruent), and Modality of information (visual, narrative).
8
 
Story and modality were within-participants variables, and congruency was a between-
participants variable. In the congruent condition, children viewed the druid (positive) 
images with the positive version of the druid story, and the monster (negative) images 
with the negative version of the monster story. The images were paired with the 
mismatched valenced story in the incongruent condition. The two dependent variables 
in the recognition task were hit and false alarm rates, used to calculate d’ and criterion C 
scores.  
Within the recall task, false memories, true visual memories, and true narrative 
memories were analysed separately. Across all analyses there were two independent 
variables: Story (monster, druid), and Congruency of image/ story (congruent, 
incongruent). Story was a within-participant variable and congruency was a between-
                                                          
8
       Because rotation would be too highly correlated with congruency, it has not been entered 
as a fixed effect in analysis. 
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participant variable. For true narrative recall there was a third, within-participant 
independent variable: Material type (emotional, neutral). The dependent variables were 
measured by the number of utterances which related to false, or true visual content from 
the code scheme. For true narrative recall, the dependent variable was calculated as 
proportions of valenced and neutral material correctly recalled from the story, calculated 
by referring to a code scheme. As with Experiment 1, a series of mixed ANCOVAs was 
run for each dependent variable. Age, gender and trait anxiety scores were added as 
covariates in separate steps, and retained in subsequent steps only where they 
significantly predicted outcome measures.   
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the addition of the 
SCAS completed immediately after the MASC-10, and the omission of individual clip 
introductions immediately prior to each clip. 
Results 
Familiarity with Merlin 
The majority of children (n = 39 [69.95%]) had viewed Merlin on TV or DVD 
prior to the experiment, but were naïve to specific episodes from which the images were 
taken; only 15 children (26.79%) reported that they could recall seeing any part of the 
episode the monster images were taken from, and 9 children (16.07%) recalled any part 
of the episode the druid images were from. 
Trait Anxiety 
SCAS anxiety scores matched those from the normal population for 8-11 year 
olds (Spence, 1998), with normed t-scores ranging from 37-66 (M = 51.47, SE = 1.01, 
95% BCa CI [49.25, 53.41]). There was no significant difference between male (M = 
51.67, SE = 1.32) and female anxiety scores (M = 51.43, SE = 1.62), t(54) = 0.11 p = 
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.904, 95% BCa CI [−3.78, 4.34], d = 0.03, and age was not significantly correlated with 
anxiety, r = −.23, p = .094, 95% BCa CI [−0.47, 0.03].  
Emotion Ratings 
Children rated scores of happiness, sadness and fear for the images and 
narratives separately. A 2 (valence) × 2 (modality) × 2 (congruency) mixed ANOVA 
revealed that happiness ratings were significantly higher in the druid (M = 2.31, SE = 
0.13), than the monster (M = 1.73, SE = 0.14) conditions overall, F(1, 53) = 11.70, p = 
.001,  𝜂𝑝
2  = .18, and for the narrative (M = 2.18, SE = 0.11) than the image stimuli (M = 
1.87, SE = 0.13), F(1, 53) = 8.80, p = .005, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .14. A 2 (valence) × 2 (modality) × 2 
(congruency) mixed ANOVA revealed that internalization ratings (sadness and fear 
combined) were significantly higher in the monster (M = 0.80, SE = 0.08), than the 
druid (M = 0.65, SE = 0.09) conditions overall, F(1, 52) = 6.29, p = .015,  𝜂𝑝
2  = .11.
9
 
Recognition Task 
Data from two children were removed from recognition analysis because their 
non-response rate was more than 2 SDs above the mean, the same approach as used in 
Experiment 1. There was no significant difference in response rates between the druid 
(M = 0.86, SE = 0.01) and monster conditions (M = 0.98, SE = 0.01), F(1, 52) = 0.42, p 
= .522, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .01, or between the congruent (M = 0.87, SE = 0.02), and incongruent 
conditions (M = 0.86, SE = 0.02), F(1, 52) = 0.07, p = .794, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00. Table 1 shows the 
mean number of items recognized for each clip by memory type and modality.   
 
  
                                                          
9
      All other effects on happiness and internalization scores were non-significant and are 
reported in supplementary materials.  
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Table 1  
Mean number of items recognized for each clip by memory type, modality and congruency of 
image and story valence, out of a maximum score of 6. 
 Congruent  
Druid 
Incongruent  
Druid 
Congruent  
Monster 
Incongruent  
Monster 
 M SE M SE M SE M SE 
True         
     Visual 3.93 0.23 3.65 0.22 4.14 0.18 3.69 0.26 
     Narrative 4.64 0.19 4.69 0.19 5.39 0.14 5.15 0.21 
False         
     Visual 3.82 0.33 3.69 0.28 2.46 0.26 2.57 0.22 
     Narrative 3.68 0.38 3.80 0.28 4.39 0.27 4.46 0.24 
 
Data from a third participant were removed because their d’ score in the 
negative visual condition was more than 3 SDs lower than the mean, the same approach 
used as in Experiment 1. A total of n = 33 boys and n = 22 girls were included in the 
recognition analysis, with n = 27 in the congruent conditions and n = 26 in the 
incongruent.  
Sensitivity: d’ analysis. There was a high level of discrimination overall, with 
one sample t-tests showing that children could discriminate at better-than-chance levels 
in all conditions, with d’ scores significantly greater than 0. The following results were 
obtained in the congruent condition: druid visual t(26) = 10.27, p < .001, 95% BCa CI 
[1.16, 1.73], d = 4.02, druid narrative t(26) = 8.56, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [1.22, 1.92], d 
= 3.36, monster visual t(26) = 8.80, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [0.66, 1.02], d = 3.45, and 
monster narrative t(26) = 13.34, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [1.67, 2.30], d = 5.23.  
In the incongruent condition, the following results were obtained: druid visual 
t(25) = 7.13, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [0.82, 1.37], d = 2.85, druid narrative t(25) = 13.14, 
p < .001, 95% BCa CI [1.72, 2.31], d = 5.26, monster visual t(25) = 6.92, p < .001, 95% 
BCa CI [0.62, 1.09], d = 2.77, and monster narrative t(25) = 10.76, p < .001, 95% BCa 
CI [1.31, 1.90], d = 4.30. 
124 
 
Age was significantly related to d’ scores, F(1, 50) = 6.84, p = .012, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .12 
and interacted significantly with story type, F(1, 50) = 6.69, p = .013, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .12. In the 
druid condition, discrimination increased with age for visual (r = .26, p = .062), and 
narrative stimuli (r = .41, p = .002), though the increase was only significant for 
narrative items. There was no significant effect of age on discrimination in the monster 
condition for visual (r = −.03, p = .848) or narrative stimuli (r = .12, p = .411). Gender 
and trait anxiety were not significantly related to d’ scores (ps = .403 and .743). 10 
The resulting mixed 2 × 2 × 2 (Story [druid, monster], Modality [visual, 
narrative], Congruency [congruent, incongruent]) ANCOVA,
11
 with age entered as a 
covariate, showed that children were significantly better at discriminating targets in the 
druid (M = 1.53, SE = 0.08) than the monster condition (M = 1.33, SE = 0.07), F(1, 50) 
= 5.16, p = .027, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .09. The difference between discrimination of narrative (M = 
1.80, SE = 0.08), compared to visual targets (M = 1.06, SE = 0.07) was not significant, 
F(1, 50) = 0.15, p = .702, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00, and neither was the interaction effect between story 
and modality, F(1, 50) = 0.33, p = .857, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00.   
There was no significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 50) = 0.76, p = .388, 
𝜂𝑝
2   = .012, and no significant two way interactions between congruency and story, F(1, 
50) = 1.11, p = .297, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .02, or congruency and modality, F(1, 50) = 0.99, p = .324, 
𝜂𝑝
2   = .02. However, there was a significant story × modality × congruency interaction 
effect on d’ scores, after accounting for age, F(1, 51) = 9.46, p = .003, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .16.  
Figure 3 shows that in the congruent conditions, d’ scores were highest for the 
monster (negative) narrative, (M = 2.02, SE = 0.15). The druid (positive) narrative (M = 
1.61, SE = 0.16) and druid visual d’ scores (M = 1.48, SE = 0.14) were similar to each 
                                                          
10
      See supplementary materials for full results of covariate analysis. 
11
      Rotation was not entered as a fixed effect due to high levels of inter-correlation with 
congruency. 
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other, and the d’ scores for the monster visual items (M = 0.84, SE = 0.11) were 
considerably lower. Paired t-tests revealed that the druid visual and narrative d’ scores 
were not significantly different from each other, t(26) = −0.56, p = .583, 95% BCa CI 
[−0.48, 0.22], d = 0.12. However, in the monster condition, visual d’ scores were 
significantly lower than narrative scores, t(26) = −8.08, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [−1.45, 
−0.89], d = 1.82. Children exhibited significantly higher levels of discrimination for 
druid compared to monster visual items, t(26) = 3.46, p = .002, 95% BCa CI [0.22, 
1.00], d = 0.77, but no significant difference in discriminability was shown for druid 
compared to monster narrative items, t(26) = −1.97, p = .059, 95% BCa CI [−0.87, 
0.02], d = 0.39. 
In the incongruent condition, d’ scores were highest in the druid (negative) 
narrative (M = 1.98, SE = 0.16), followed by the monster (positive) narrative (M = 1.59, 
SE = 0.15), then druid visual (M = 1.07, SE = 0.14) and monster visual condition (M = 
0.86, SE = 0.11). Paired t-tests revealed that druid (negative) narrative d’ scores were 
significantly higher than druid (positive) visual d’ scores, t(25) = −5.58, p = .001, 95% 
BCa CI [−1.23, −0.60], d = 1.08, and monster (positive) narrative d’ scores were 
significantly greater than monster (negative) visual d’ score, t(25) = 3.88, p = .001, 95% 
BCa CI [0.35, 1.16], d = 0.76. There was no significant difference in discrimination 
between the druid and monster visual conditions, t(25) = 1.33, p = .195, 95% BCa CI 
[−0.12, 0.57], d = 0.26, but children were significantly better at discriminating druid 
(negative) compared to monster (positive) narrative items, t(25) = 2.31, p = .030, 95% 
BCa CI [0.09, 0.77], d = 0.45.   
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Figure 3. Interaction effects between type of clip and type of modality on discriminability for 
congruent and incongruent conditions (d’ scores). Error bars show standard error.  
Response bias: Criterion C analysis. In the congruent condition, C scores were 
significantly lower than 0 for monster visual, t(26) = −3.53, p = .002, 95% BCa CI 
[−0.48, −0.14], d = 1.38, and monster narrative items, t(26) = −2.97, p = .006, 95% BCa 
CI [−0.35, −0.08], d = 1.16, but not significantly different from 0 for the druid visual, 
t(26) = 0.66, p = .516, 95% BCa CI [−0.15, 0.27], d = 0.26, and druid narrative items, 
t(26) = −1.74, p = .093, 95% BCa CI [−0.41, 0 .02], d = 0.68. In the incongruent 
condition, they were also significantly lower than 0 for incongruent monster visual t(25) 
= −3.07, p = .005, 95% BCa CI [−0.43, −0.08], d = 1.23, monster narrative, t(25) = 
−1.96, p = .061, 95% BCa CI [−0.33, −0.00], d = 0.78, and druid narrative items, t(25) = 
−1.92, p = .067, 95% BCa CI [−0.28,  −0.01], d = 0.77, when inspecting confidence 
intervals in addition to p values. C scores for druid visual items were not significantly 
different from 0, t(25) = 0.21, p = .838, 95% BCa CI [−0.17, 0.19], d = 0.08. This 
indicates liberal response bias for negative narratives, and negative images in both the 
congruent and incongruent condition, in addition to the positive narrative in the 
incongruent condition.  
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Figure 4: Interaction effects between clip modality on response bias, for congruent and 
incongruent conditions (C scores). Error bars show standard error. 
Neither age, gender, nor trait anxiety were included as covariates in the main 
analysis because they did not significantly predict C scores (ps = .138, .180, and .566, 
respectively).
12
 Criterion C scores for visual and narrative items across each story and 
congruency condition are shown in Figure 4. A 2 × 2 × 2 (Story [druid, monster], 
Modality [narrative, visual], Congruency [congruent, incongruent]) mixed ANOVA 
showed significantly greater liberal bias (bias towards answering ‘yes’) in the monster 
(M = −0.23, SE = 0.05) compared to the druid condition (M = −0.06, SE = 0.06), F(1, 
51) = 16.21, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .24. There was no significant difference in bias between 
narrative (M = −0.17, SE = 0.05) or visual items (M = −0.12, SE = 0.05), F(1, 51) = 
1.27, p = .266, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02, but the interaction effect between story × modality on bias 
scores was significant, F(1, 51) = 8.92, p = .004, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 0.15. Children exhibited 
significantly greater liberal response bias for visual monster (M = −0.28, SE = 0.06), 
than for visual druid items (M = 0.04, SE = 0.07), t(52) = 2.24, p = .029, 95% BCa CI 
[0.27, 0.53], d = 0.62, whereas levels of bias for narrative druid (M = −0.16, SE = 0.07) 
                                                          
12
      See supplementary materials for results of full covariate analysis. 
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and narrative monster items (M = −0.18, SE = 0.05) did not differ significantly, t(52) = 
−1.06, p = .295, 95% BCa CI [−0.38, 0.13], d = 0.04. 
There was no significant difference in response bias between the congruent (M = 
−0.16, SE = 0.07) and incongruent condition (M = −0.13, SE = 0.07), F(1, 51) = 0.08, p 
= .776, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and congruency did not significantly interact with story, F(1, 51) = 
0.37, p = .548, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, modality, F(1, 51) = 0.27, p = .603, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, or story × 
modality, F(1, 51) = 0.26, p = .612, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. 
Recall Task 
Recall was transcribed verbatim from audio recordings of participants’ 
responses. A code scheme was devised whereby the four narratives were chunked into 
distinct propositional items, in line with the approach used in Experiment 1. The three 
main visual features from each image were also included as items on the code scheme. 
This served as a checklist to calculate the proportion of emotional and neutral narrative, 
and visual material recalled from each story. Utterances were chunked and categorized 
using the following codes: 
(1) Type of utterance: Narrative, visual or other. Each narrative item listed in the 
code scheme corresponded to a distinct proposition presented in the narrative, 
relating to an action, outcome, or unit of speech. The three main visual features 
for each picture were also listed as separate visual items within the code scheme. 
Other utterances included repetition, or anything unrelated to the narrative of the 
story or images viewed. 
(2) Accuracy of narrative and visual utterances: True or false. This was determined 
by researchers consulting the narrative scripts and visual features included in the 
code scheme. Items were considered correct if they provided enough 
information to be matched against an item in the code scheme, without 
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containing false information. If they could not be matched to an item, or could 
be matched but contained faulty information, they were considered false. 
(3) Valence of true narrative utterances: Emotional or Neutral. The two versions of 
stories for each set of images shared some identical narrative content (designated 
as neutral), and some unique valenced material. The unique, valenced text was 
highlighted on each script. The druid stories contained 71 neutral (shared) 
narrative items, with 55 valenced items in the positive, and 58 in the negative 
version. The monster stories contained 48 neutral items, with 71 valenced items 
in the positive, and 71 in the negative version.  
Reliability of the code scheme was tested by an independent observer coding data for 
six children in the congruent and six children in the incongruent condition (21.43% of 
the sample). There was 88.94% inter-observer agreement (P0) for utterance type (κ = 
0.69), 93.35% for accuracy (κ = 0.50), and 89.49 % for valence of true, narrative 
utterances (κ = 0.79). Substantial Kappas are shown for both utterance type and valence 
(Landis and Koch, 1977), along with high P0 values for all three categories. Although 
the Kappa coefficient for accuracy is only moderate, it is likely that the substantial 
imbalance in frequency of observed codes resulted in a disproportionately lowered κ 
(Feinstein & Cicchetti, 1990). The code scheme is therefore deemed reliable.  
False memory utterances. Data from one participant were excluded due to the 
number of utterances exceeding three SDs of the mean in the druid condition. Age, 
gender and trait anxiety did not predict number of false memory utterances, so were not 
retained as covariates in the main analysis (ps = .446, .941 and .736, respectively).
13
 
The resulting 2 × 2 (Story [druid, monster], Congruency [congruent, incongruent]) 
mixed ANOVA revealed that frequency of false memory recall was not significantly 
                                                          
13      
See supplementary materials for full results of covariate analysis. 
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different between the druid (M = 1.06, SE = 0.16) and monster story (M = 1.12, SE = 
0.16), F(1, 51) = 0.27, p = .604, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, or between the congruent (M = 0.87, SE = 
0.21) and incongruent condition (M = 1.31, SE = 0.21), F(1, 51) = 2.16, p = .148, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 
.04. The story × congruency interaction was not significant, F(1, 51) = 0.27, p = .604, 
𝜂𝑝
2  = .01.  
Visual utterances. There were also very few visual utterances across all 
conditions. As with false memory utterances, age, gender and trait anxiety did not 
predict the proportion of visual items correctly recalled, so were not retained in the main 
analysis (ps = .690, .819 and .290, respectively).
14
 A 2 × 2 (Story [druid, monster], 
Congruency [congruent, incongruent]) mixed ANOVA revealed that the proportions of 
visual material correctly recalled for the druid (M = 0.19, SE = 0.05) and the monster 
condition (M = 0.24, SE = 0.07) were not significantly different, F(1, 52) = 0.81, p = 
.372, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  .02. There was no significant difference between the proportion of visual 
material correctly recalled in the congruent (M = 0.20, SE = 0.08) and incongruent 
conditions (M = 0.22, SE = 0.08), F(1, 52) = 0.03, p = .865,  𝜂𝑝
2  =  .00. The story × 
congruency interaction was also non-significant, F(1, 52) = 0.81, p = .372, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  .02.  
True narrative utterances. Data from two participants were excluded; 
proportion of material recalled for one participant exceeded 3 SDs of the mean for 
neutral, and for valenced material, across both stories. Proportion of recall for neutral 
material in the druid story exceeded 3 SDs of the mean for the other. The proportion of 
true narrative material recalled from the valenced and neutral portions of each story is 
shown by congruency condition in Figure 5. 
                                                          
14
      See supplementary materials for full covariate analysis. 
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Figure 5: Interaction effects between clip and type of memory on percentage of true narrative 
items recalled in the congruent and incongruent conditions. Error bars show standard error. 
Age, gender, and trait anxiety scores were not significantly related to the 
proportion of material recalled (ps = .097, .187, and .433, respectively).
15
 A 2 × 2 × 2 
(Clip [druid, monster], Material type [emotional, neutral], Congruency [congruent, 
incongruent]) mixed ANOVA was conducted. Overall, a significantly higher proportion 
of true narrative material was recalled from the monster (M = 0.13, SE = 0.01) than 
druid story (M = 0.10, SE = 0.01), F(1,52) = 16.86, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .25. A significantly 
higher proportion was recalled from the neutral, shared portions of the stories (M = 
0.13, SE = 0.01) than from the emotional portions (M = 0.11, SE = 0.01), F(1,52) = 
7.86, p = .007, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .13. However, the interaction effect between story and material 
type was not significant, F(1,52) = 0.11, p = .738, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00.  
The main effect of congruency on recall was not significant, F(1, 52) = 0.69, p = 
.410, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .01, but did significantly interact with story, F(1, 52) = 16.83, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2   = 
.24, and material type on proportion of material recalled, F(1, 52) = 14.62, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2   
= .22. Follow up analyses revealed that when the story and pictures were congruent in 
valence, recall was significantly greater in the monster (negative) (M = 0.12, SE = 0.01) 
                                                          
15
      See supplementary materials for full covariate analysis. 
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than druid (positive) story condition (M = 0.09, SE = 0.01), t(27) = 2.24, p = .033, 95% 
BCa CI [0.01, 0.05]. When the story and pictures were incongruent, recall was 
significantly greater in the negative druid (M = 0.11, SE = 0.01), than the positive 
monster condition (M = 0.10, SE = 0.01), t(26) = −2.76, p = .010, 95% BCa CI [−0.01, 
−0.00]. When looking at which portions of the story were best recalled across both 
stories, there was no significant difference between the proportions of emotional (M = 
0.12, SE = 0.01), and neutral material recalled (M = 0.11, SE = 0.01) when the images 
and story were congruent in valence, t(27) = 1.21, p = .235, 95% BCa CI [−0.01, 0.03]. 
In the incongruent condition, a significantly larger proportion of neutral material was 
recalled (M = 0.12, SE = 0.01), than emotional material (M = 0.11, SE = 0.01), t(26) = 
−5.79, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [−0.01, −0.01]. The three way interaction between story, 
material type and congruency on proportion of material recalled was not significant, 
F(1, 52) = 0.14, p = .712, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00.  
Discussion 
Because valence was not successfully manipulated in Experiment 1 the clips are 
referred to as the ‘monster’ and ‘druid’, rather than negative and positive clips 
throughout the discussion. This aligns with the ‘story’ variable in Experiment 2, also 
referred to as the monster and druid story condition. The effects of Clip (Exp 1) and 
Story (Exp 2) on mood are discussed before moving onto the effects of valence and 
modality in memory, along with their interaction, and potential moderators of emotional 
memory. Implications and directions for future research are then considered.  
Effects of Stimuli on Mood 
To address the first two research questions, discrimination and recall 
performance for negative compared to positive materials is discussed. Valence was not 
successfully manipulated in Experiment 1, but the manipulation of valence was partially 
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successful in Experiment 2. Overall, the druid condition evoked significantly greater 
happiness and lower internalizing emotions than the monster condition in Experiment 2. 
A significant three-way interaction would have been expected, should the manipulation 
have been fully successful. In each congruent condition, the paired image set and 
narrative should have been of equal valence, whilst the druid condition should have 
scored significantly higher on happiness and lower on internalization than the monster 
condition. In the incongruent condition, the image sets were paired with stories 
designed to be mismatched in valence, so the narrative in the druid condition should 
have been rated significantly lower on happiness and higher on internalization than the 
narrative in the monster condition (the opposite pattern to the congruent conditions). 
However, it was expected that the images would be rated the same between the 
congruent and incongruent conditions. None of these interactions were observed, which 
means that any memory effects resulting from an interaction between story condition, 
and modality or congruency are difficult to interpret.  
It is possible that emotional rating scores were inaccurate because children rated 
the stories and images after completing the recall task for each condition. This resulted 
in a lag between presentation and self-report. Children were presented with the second 
set of materials before completing the recall and emotion rating tasks for the first set of 
presented materials, followed by the recall and emotion rating tasks for the second set of 
materials presented. Likewise, the fact that the two stimuli sets (narrative and image 
sets) were presented simultaneously is likely to have impacted overall emotion evoked 
in the condition, possibly confounding results for the individual components. Power is 
also likely to have been an issue, with fewer than 30 children each in the congruent and 
incongruent condition. The individual narratives and image sets should have been 
presented singularly to a different sample of children, for valence ratings to be obtained 
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prior to use in the main experiment. Because these ratings may not be fully reliable, 
modality and congruency effects have been interpreted as originally intended, with the 
incongruent druid narrative labelled as negative, and the incongruent monster narrative 
labelled as positive.  
Additionally, it should also be noted that happiness ratings were significantly 
lower for images than narratives for both story conditions, although the effect of this 
was much larger for the druid condition. Ideally, strength of valence should be equal for 
images and narratives to compare the effect of valence between modalities.  
Valence Effects on Memory  
Findings relating to research aims (1) identify any differences between true and 
false memories for negative and positive materials in children; and (2) explore whether 
any differences in true and false memories for valenced material vary, depending on 
type of stimulus, are discussed in this section, along with the interaction between 
valence effects and context on memory. Overall, no significant effects on recognition or 
correct recall were observed in Experiment 1. The significant valence effects in 
Experiment 2 are as follows: (1) a significant interaction effect of valence and modality 
on memory, with more accurate discrimination and higher correct recall for negative 
than positive narrative material; (2) a significant interaction effect of valence, modality, 
and congruency on discrimination, with higher accuracy for positive than negative 
visual stimuli in the congruent condition only; and (3) lower rates of recall for 
emotional than neutral narrative material, significantly so when the story and images 
were incongruent.  
Finding (1) carried across recognition and recall tasks, as well as the congruent 
and incongruent conditions. No differences in response bias for negative and narrative 
content were observed, either in the congruent or incongruent condition. This finding 
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further highlights that there is a genuine difference in children’s ability to discriminate 
both positive and negative stimuli from noise effectively. The valence effect on 
discrimination was larger in the congruent than incongruent condition. In the 
incongruent condition, it is possible that the difference between the valence of the image 
set and its matched narrative is decreased, with valence ratings becoming relatively 
more similar to each other, because the images appear to show a similar outcome to the 
story. This is known as acquired equivalence, where generalization is increased between 
two superficially dissimilar stimuli (or antecedents) that have previously been 
associated with similar outcomes (or consequents) (Meeter, Shohamy, & Myers, 2009). 
Where this has happened, the valence of the narratives in the congruent conditions will 
have become weaker, resulting in a potentially weaker effect of a difference between 
them. 
  Greater discrimination for positive, than negative visual stimuli was only 
identified in the congruent condition. The same effect was not found for recall of visual 
items. Nevertheless, it was a medium effect size and can be interpreted in the context of 
response bias. Children showed lower levels of liberal response bias towards the 
positive than negative visual stimuli. This means that as well as being able to better 
detect signals from noise, they were less likely to be biased by another decision 
criterion. Despite a lack of valence or modality effects on discrimination in Experiment 
1, the same pattern of response bias was found for visual items, though only when the 
negative clip was viewed first.   
Findings (1) and (2) are broadly consistent with previous, but sporadic research 
findings of higher discrimination for positive than negative material of a less complex 
nature (Brainerd et al, 2010; Moradi et al., 2000), and greater recall for negative 
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compared to positive material of a complex nature (Baltazar et al., 2012; Miller & 
Sperry, 1988; Van Bergen et al., 2015).  
However, congruency also appears to interact with modality (independently of 
valence). When incongruent images and stories were presented, discrimination was 
greater for the narratives than images, regardless of what valence the narratives were. 
Presenting contradictory valenced material simultaneously could have triggered 
cognitive dissonance, resulting in a state of mental stress or discomfort (Festinger, 
1957). Threat processing literature shows three main categories of coping behaviour 
during a stressful situation; blunting (including reappraisal, cognitive distraction and 
behavioural distraction), monitoring (including mentally focusing on aspects of the 
threat situation, attending to threat cues and seeking information) and seeking support/ 
comfort (Hoffner, 1993; Miller, 1987). When presented with stressful stories, children 
of a similar age most commonly report mentally focusing on aspects of the threat 
situation (Hoffner, 1993). Despite this being the most reported individual behaviour; 
blunting behaviours were reported more frequently when combined into one 
overarching category. It is possible that children were employing some of these 
strategies in Experiment 2. Children may have been less inclined to perform cognitive 
distraction because they were told they would be discussing the stories afterwards, and 
therefore needed to pay attention to the presented stories and images. There was also 
limited opportunity for behavioural distraction because there were no other children or 
materials to engage with nearby. There was little opportunity to seek comfort or support 
as only the interviewer and child were present, and the children were wearing 
headphones. This means that a monitoring coping style may have been adopted more 
frequently, with children focusing more on particular details of the story, seeking 
information and attending to the threat cues in the narratives over the visuals. As 
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outlined by Kensinger, (2004) an increase in attention to valenced stimuli can increase 
memory performance. Measures of attention would need to be included should this be 
experiment be replicated or extended upon in the future, to explore this hypothesis.    
It is surprising that the effect of stimulus modality on discrimination or recall 
had not also been found in Experiment 1, because the same narrative and visual 
questions were used with the clips containing visual (moving) images, and narrative 
material (including speech from the characters). However, visual and narrative items 
may not always have been completely distinct. For example, where you could both see a 
character perform an action and the characters were talking about the action.  
Further, negativity and positivity preferences could be tested in Experiment 2 
with the addition of neutral portions of narrative. The recall task showed a preference 
away from emotional narrative material, but only in the incongruent condition. 
Although several existing papers also report a preference away from negative and 
positive words (Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010; Moradi et al., 2000), these all used 
word lists. This finding is therefore surprising, given Van Bergen et al (2015) found a 
preference toward negative and positive, compared to neutral material when stories 
were used.  
Evolutionary theories that postulate only threatening material is privileged (for 
example, Ӧhman & Mineka, 2001; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990) cannot be tested in 
Experiment 1, due to the lack of a neutral condition. There was also limited scope for 
testing in Experiment 2 because the neutral material was integrated into both positive 
and negative narratives, rather than including a discrete neutral condition. The same 
discrimination questions were used between Experiment 1 and 2, which means 
discrimination was not tested for neutral portions of the story.  
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The general pattern of valence effects does not lend support to evolutionary 
models which propose that all evolutionarily advantageous material is privileged in 
cognitive processing (for example, Capiaoppo et al, 1997;1999; Hamann, 2001), or 
cognitive models proposing all valenced material is processed preferentially, for 
example the Network Affect Model (Bower & Cohen, 1982), or cognitive elaboration 
models (Kensinger, 2004).  
False Recall 
The number of false memories recalled in Experiment 1 also differed 
significantly between clips, although this depended on which clip was presented first; 
no such differences were observed in Experiment 2. In both presentation orders, the 
second clip elicited greater false recall than the first (regardless of which valence clip 
was presented second). This medium effect was only significant when the druid clip 
was presented first, with more false memories of the monster clip recalled. 
This initially suggests a genuine interaction effect, reflecting an aspect of 
memory distinct from emotional memory, such as a recency effect. Existing literature 
has identified serial position effects in false memory recall but found that a recency 
effect was observed only in specific circumstances; for phonologically, but not 
semantically related lists of words, and that this effect was diminished when a delay was 
added into the paradigm (Lane, 2010; Zucker, 2010). Within this task, material was 
semantically related and a delayed recall task was employed, which does not agree with 
previous findings. However, the stimuli type is not comparable and it is possible that 
another aspect of the clips may be moderating the serial position effects. Additionally, 
rates of false recall for the monster clip did not vary between presentation order, but 
there was a large effect of presentation order on rates of false recall for the druid clip. It 
therefore appears only false memories for the druid clip were susceptible to presentation 
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order. Any unintentional difference between the clips would have impacted these 
results. This would warrant further investigation to ascertain which unintentional 
differences are evident between the two clips, and whether these had an effect on false 
recall rates and the apparent recency effect. Despite the large effects, the rate of false 
recall was comparatively low when examining true recall rates. Without further analysis 
it is unclear whether rates of false recall would affect recall accuracy rates,
16
 as 
determined by dividing the frequency of correct items recalled by the total number of 
items recalled (Jou, 2008). 
Moderators of Emotional Memory 
Moving onto research aim (3) age, gender, and trait anxiety were explored in 
regards to their overall relationship with memory performance, and to identify whether 
this differed between valence and stimulus type. In general, there was some evidence of 
memory performance increasing with age, whilst only one effect of gender, and one 
interaction effect of trait anxiety was observed across all analyses. 
Age. Overall discrimination and true narrative recall for negative material 
increased with age in Experiment 1, with medium effect sizes observed. A smaller 
positive age effect on discrimination was observed in the druid condition of Experiment 
2. A positive relationship is in line with existing research and theories asserting that 
long term memory ability increases with age from early childhood into adolescence, 
although the rate of development starts to slow down from around age 7 years 
(Gathercole, 1998). In addition, a small positive effect of age on number of false 
memories was observed in Experiment 1. These findings are all in line with results from 
other emotional memory experiments with children (Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010, 
                                                          
16
      False recall is measured in number of utterances for each clip overall, whereas true recall 
is measured as a proportion of material recalled from positive and negative scenes of each 
clips. False recall items would therefore need to be re-coded as belonging to negative or 
positive scenes, and weightings applied to account for different proportions of materials 
presented in positive and negative scenes in each clip.  
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2009; Howe & Wilkinson, 2011). An increase in recognition and recall was expected 
for all conditions and tasks, across both experiments. It is unclear why this effect wasn’t 
found reliably across Experiment 2, particularly as the sample size was larger than 
Experiment 1. There were at least 26 participants per cell, above the minimum 
suggested by Simmons et al. (2011) but still marginally below the figure suggested by 
Cohen (1988).   
Gender. Gender co-varied with levels of recognition in Experiment 1 with 
males discriminating correct answers more accurately than females. However, the 
reason for this gender effect is not immediately clear. Merlin is a fantasy TV show; the 
fantasy genre is typically thought of as appealing more to boys than girls (Streicher & 
Bonney, 1974). Although both stimuli sets were derived from the same TV show, 
Experiment 1 used clips edited directly from the episodes, which were more in keeping 
with the original programme format. The clips may therefore have a stronger fantasy 
element than the stimuli used in Experiment 2, explaining why this effect was not 
replicated. Gender effects were not found in response bias or recall, and there were no 
significant gender differences reported in frequency of viewing Merlin at home, how 
much boys and girls liked watching Merlin, or levels of excitement after viewing the 
clips in Experiment 1,
17
 suggesting that gender effects were not due to a male 
preference for fantasy TV. Previous literature suggests females tend to have a slight 
memory advantage in general, the opposite to that which was found here (Herlitz et al., 
1997). In addition, no effect of gender has been identified on recognition scores in child 
DRM studies (Cordon et al., 2013; Howe et al., 2010; Howe & Derbish, 2010). Gender 
did not interact with valence effects and so is not a central finding to the thesis. This 
effect has not been further explored, and is treated as a spurious finding.   
                                                          
17
      See supplementary materials for excitement ratings analysis for Experiments 1 and 2. 
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Trait anxiety. Trait anxiety interacted with valence and clip on the proportion 
of true material recalled in Experiment 1. Recall of material from the dominantly 
valenced portion of each clip increased with age, whilst there was no difference for the 
minority portions. This did not match the expected interaction, whereby recall would 
increase with trait anxiety for the negative clip, but decrease with trait anxiety for the 
positive clip in line with adult research (Mitte, 2008). This finding was not seen across 
other analyses, and due to both experiments being underpowered to a greater or lesser 
extent, it is difficult to ascertain whether there is a genuine null effect of trait anxiety on 
memory for emotionally negative stimuli, or stimuli in general. Future research should 
seek to achieve an appropriate level of power to determine whether reliable true effects 
of anxiety do in fact exist. Consequently, it was not possible to test predictions of 
developmental theories of fear acquisition (Field & Lester, 2010). Comparisons to 
previous empirical findings were also limited. 
Conclusions 
There were several key findings in relation to the original research aims. Aim (1) 
was to identify any valence effects on true and false memories in typically developing 
children. Memory performance was generally better for negative than for positive 
narrative material. This effect may signify a plausible mechanism behind the 
internalizing effects of scary TV on children’s emotions, although future studies should 
seek to include separate, piloted, positively and negatively valenced, and neutral TV 
clips, to provide more robust evidence of this.  
Research aim (2) was to explore whether valence effects in memory differed 
depending on stimulus modality. Discrimination was greater for narrative than visual 
items in all conditions, with an interaction observed between modality and valence. 
Effects of modality were stronger when at least a portion of the material presented was 
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negative. One plausible explanation for this is that children employed a monitoring 
coping style response, with children seeking information from the richest source 
available when faced with a stressful event or situation (Hoffner, 1993; Miller, 1987). 
This was paired with a preference away from valenced material, and towards recalling 
more neutral material in the incongruent conditions. This could suggest that children 
seek to process the neutral portions of the story to a greater extent to gain further 
information, in order to ease the state of cognitive discomfort caused by cognitive 
dissonance. When considering TV viewing, this suggests that children are likely to 
remember story lines more than images. Parents should ensure that this particular aspect 
of viewing is closely monitored to prevent their children from viewing material that 
they might find distressing.  
Although the interaction between modality and story was part of a three-way 
interaction with congruency, it is difficult to ascertain what the congruency effect really 
means because emotional ratings did not differ between these conditions as anticipated.   
None of the moderators explored appeared to interact with valence (research aim 
3), despite a tendency for general memory performance for true and false recall, and 
recognition to increase with age. Trait anxiety and gender effects were limited, and 
considered potentially unreliable. 
Future experiments should ensure that all stimuli sets are piloted thoroughly 
with the target audience and adapted accordingly, should seek to explore what feature, 
or features of the clips were interacting with modality and presentation order to produce 
these effects and ensure adequate power by running power calculations in advance 
where possible. The interaction effects with congruency would be a theoretically 
interesting next step for research.   
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Chapter IV 
Effects of Emotional Context and Valence on Children’s True and False Memories 
 
Abstract 
The role of emotional context and valence on children’s true and false memories was 
examined using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. Eighty-four 7-11 year old 
children had an emotionally positive, neutral or negative story presented to them as a 
mood inducer. Lists of emotionally positive, neutral and negative words were then 
presented, each followed by an immediate recognition task. Contrary to previous 
findings, discrimination was greater for emotionally negative than positive words; only 
when they were presented first. A corresponding decrease in conservative response bias 
was observed for emotionally negative words in these conditions. Discrimination was 
expected to be greater for the word lists which matched the valence of the story, but this 
effect was not borne out. Discrimination findings are likely due to differences in arousal 
and age of acquisition between word lists, and methodological differences between the 
current and previous experiments. Consequently, limited conclusions can be drawn.  
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Effect of Emotional Context and Valence on Children’s True and False Memories 
For many years, theories regarding the processing of emotional material have 
pointed towards a phenomenon known as the positive-negative asymmetry (Lewicka et 
al., 1992). Positivity offset refers to the tendency to evaluate situations or stimuli 
positively, particularly if they are presented in a neutral light; in addition to a preference 
towards mildly positive, compared to mildly negative stimulus within cognitive 
processing such as memory and attention (Czapiński, 1982). Negativity ‘bias’ 
(preference) results because the activation function for negative stimuli has a higher 
gain than the activation function for positive stimuli, meaning this preference is shown 
for more strongly emotional stimuli. Negativity preference can be broken down into 
affective and informational sub-types. Affective negativity preference means that 
negative stimuli will have a larger impact on affect and behaviour than positive stimuli 
of the same intensity, whereas cognitive negativity preference means a higher level of 
cognitive elaboration is seen for negative than positive stimuli of the same intensity 
(Lewicka et al., 1992).  
Negativity preferences in recognition (younger adults) and recall (younger and 
older adults), and positivity preferences in recall (younger and older adults) are evident 
across the general population, based on the results of a meta-analysis (Murphy & 
Isaacowitz, 2008). The negativity effects are larger than the positivity effects. The 
opposite effect is generally found in children when a DRM paradigm is used with word 
lists; preferences away from negative and positive words are observed in both recall and 
recognition tasks (Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010; Moradi et al., 2000; Neshat-Doost et 
al., 1998). There is only one notable exception to this; when images are used instead of 
word lists, negativity and positivity preferences are shown in recall memory (Cordon, 
2013; Van Bergen et al., 2015). As with adults, negativity preferences are also larger 
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than positivity preferences in recall (Baltazar et al., 2012; Miller & Sperry, 1988; Van 
Bergen et al., 2015). This indicates the pattern for recall of narrative items may be 
generally similar between children and adults, but differ for recognition.    
The majority of experiments exploring children’s emotional memory are DRM 
studies using word lists, and do not often include positive stimuli. Experiments 1 and 2 
of this thesis therefore sought to: (1) compare memory performance for negative and 
positive material directly; (2) attempt to replicate previous findings using narrative and 
visual stimuli; and (3) explore age, gender, and trait anxiety as potential moderators of 
valence effects on memory. TV clips were used in Experiment 1. Due to a desire to keep 
the stimuli as naturalistic as possible with a coherent storyline, each valenced clip 
contained a small portion of its counterpart. Valence was not successfully manipulated, 
and these aims could not be tested. Experiment 2 attempted to build on this design by 
using still images from the clips in Experiment1, and including both a positive and 
negative narrative for each. This aim of this was to reduce the confounding variables by 
including two instances of each valence story. In line with previous research, negative 
narrative material was discriminated at a greater rate than positive. However, when the 
valence of the images and narrative was incongruent, narrative material was also 
recognized more accurately than visual, regardless of the valence. Conversely, positive 
visual material was discriminated more successfully, significantly more so when 
valence of images and narrative was congruent. This is also in line with previous 
findings.  
Context Effects on Emotional Memory 
In addition to differences in memory performance based on modality and 
complexity of stimuli, the context surrounding encoding, and recognition or recall must 
also be considered as a moderating factor. This is especially important when 
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considering naturalistic studies, where single effects cannot be studied in isolation. 
Bower’s Network Theory of Affect specifies that memory performance is enhanced 
when mood at learning or encoding matches that at retrieval (mood dependent memory), 
when the stimulus valence matches mood during learning, and when stimulus valence 
matches mood during retrieval (mood congruent memory) (Singer & Salovey, 1988). 
 Many studies into mood-state and mood congruency have been conducted in 
both clinical and non-clinical adult samples. Meta-analyses including non-clinical adult 
samples have shown that memory performance is significantly enhanced when positive 
mood (Ucros, 1989) and negative mood (Matt, Vázquez, & Campbell, 1992; Ucros, 
1989) is induced at both encoding and retrieval, although a review reports that this 
effect is not reliably found in children (Blaney, 1986). In its simplest form, this provides 
evidence of environmental context-dependent memory, where affect is part of the 
learning environment (Smith & Vela, 2001). However, it could also be interpreted as 
state-dependent learning, where memory performance is enhanced when physiological 
state is the same at encoding and retrieval (Petersen, 1979). For example, happiness, 
sadness, anger and fear were all shown to affect systolic and diastolic blood pressure, 
and heart rate differentially after exercise (Schwartz, Weinberger, & Singer, 1981). 
An early meta-analysis which included mostly non-clinical adults found a 
significant effect of mood-state congruency on retrieval performance, when comparing 
congruent contexts where output and item valence match, to incongruent contexts, z = 
0.44, CI
18
 [0.26, 0.62] (Ucros, 1989). There was a significantly stronger effect in 
positive than negative mood-congruent conditions. When effects are broken down by 
study design, the mood congruency effect was biggest for lived-events, followed by 
intentional and then incidental learning. A subsequent meta-analysis including mostly 
                                                          
18
      Size of confidence was not reported by Ucros (1989). 
147 
 
non-clinical adult samples also found a small but significant effect of better recall of 
positive than negative stimuli overall, weighted mean effect 𝑑 h = 0.15, 90% CI [0.08, 
0.22] (Matt et al., 1992). When depressed mood was induced, d = −0.12, 90% CI 
[−0.19, −0.04], and when elated mood was induced, d = 0.08, 90% CI [0.01, 0.05]. The 
effect size was larger for depressed mood, and confidence intervals suggest the true 
population mean was likely not to be 0 for negative-mood congruency only. This 
analysis suggests a significant mood-congruency effect for negative but not positive 
mood congruency, contrary to findings by Ucros (1989).  
A limited number of studies with child and adolescent samples have been 
published. Amongst them, Bartlett, Burleson and Santrock (1982) compared 
congruency of stimulus valence and mood at recall and found that children recalled 
more happy words when they were happy during recall, compared to when they were 
sad at recall. There was no significant difference between the frequencies of sad words 
children recalled depending on whether they were happy or sad during recall. Nasby and 
Yando (1982) also found a significant interaction between mood at recall and word 
valence. Children who were happy at recall retrieved more happy words than those who 
experienced a neutral mood, and those who were sad at recall retrieved fewer happy 
words.  
More recently, the effects of input-mood and item-valence congruency on recall 
has been studied in children (Bishop, Dalgleish, & Yule, 2004). A non-clinical sample 
of children was split into low and high depressed groups based on the Depression Self 
Report Scale (DSRS; Birleson, 1981). Positive, neutral and negative versions of three 
stories were presented followed by a recall task. Children in the low depressed group 
recalled significantly more from the positive than neutral story, and more in the negative 
than neutral story, with the difference approaching significance. There was no 
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significant difference between the amounts of information recalled from the negative 
compared to the positive stories though. However, children in the high depressed group 
recalled significantly more from the negative than the positive or neutral stories. From 
this study, it is suggested that a depressed mood at input leads to a preference for recall 
of congruently valenced, negative material in children. It is arguable whether children 
who were categorized as high on a depression scale would necessarily be in a negative 
emotional mood specifically during the experiment, however.  
Most previous emotional memory studies have focused on memory preferences 
in anxious or depressed samples. Negativity preferences have been shown in clinically 
and non-clinically anxious and depressed children and adolescents in the majority of 
existing literature (Bishop et al., 2004; Daleiden, 1998; Dalgleish et al., 2003; Dalgleish 
et al., 2001; Ladouceur et al., 2005). However, results are mixed in control samples of 
children, with a negativity preference shown in one study (Baltazar et al., 2012), a 
positivity preference in other studies (Bishop et al., 2004; Ladouceur et al., 2005) and a 
preference away from emotionally negative stimuli in some existing DRM studies 
(Howe et al., 2010; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Previous studies employed a variety 
of paradigms and contexts, which may explain some of these inconsistencies. Baltazar 
et al. (2012) used photographs of characters that had good or bad actions or attributes 
associated with them. During the recognition phase, children were asked closed 
questions about the characters or events. In contrast, Bishop et al. (2004) used a 
valenced story as stimuli but employed a recall task rather than a recognition task, and 
the Ladouceur et al. (2005) study employed an E-n-back task, which focused on 
working memory rather than short or long term memory. Finally, Howe et al. (2010) 
and Roediger and McDermott (1995) employed a DRM paradigm utilizing single word 
items without any social context or images attached to them. It may be that a negativity 
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bias is shown more in a social context with recognition tasks, positivity bias during 
working memory and for recall tasks, but a bias away from emotional content when 
stimuli consists purely of singular words with no visuals or social context. 
The current study aims to improve and extend on existing studies into children’s 
memory for emotionally salient stimuli by exploring negativity and positivity 
preferences in an immediate recognition task, and to further explore context effects 
between mood (induced by a valenced story) and discrimination for valenced word lists 
in a non-clinical child sample. Children will complete immediate recognition tasks after 
viewing positive, neutral and negative emotional DRM lists. This allows for both true 
and false memory to be measured. Positive lists are included to tease apart the 
relationship between positivity and negativity preferences.  
Prior to the recognition tasks, positive, neutral or negative affect will be primed 
using the nine versions of valenced stories created by Bishop et al. (2004) to explore the 
effect of the congruency of input mood and stimulus affect. Using valenced stories to 
provide an emotional context will enable exploration of the effects of context on 
emotional processing bias. In Bishop et al.’s original study, the stories were not used to 
manipulate mood; children were split into low and high depressed groups based on 
whether their self-report scores of depression were above or below the median score 
within the sample. This method of forming groups for comparison is not ideal because it 
relies on self-report which can be especially unreliable in younger children (Schwab-
Stone, Fallon, Briggs, & Crowther, 1994). Younger children may also lack a frame of 
reference to compare mood or symptoms to normative characteristics (Tarullo, 
Richardson, Radke-Yarrow, & Martinez, 1995). The focus of the Bishop et al (2004) 
study was also slightly different; the authors were interested in examining emotional 
memory specifically in relation to depression, rather than mood congruency. 
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Consequently, there was no neutral or positive mood comparison group and no 
guarantee than those scoring high on depression were currently experiencing a negative 
state.  
As in Experiments 1 and 2 of this thesis, age, gender and trait anxiety will be 
explored as potential moderators of emotional memory. Trait anxiety will also be 
measured using the SCAS (Spence, 1997; 1998). Bishop et al. (2004) found an effect of 
levels of depression on mood congruency and emotional processing bias, in a non-
clinical sample of children. Inclusion of the SCAS will allow comparison of the effects 
of anxiety levels on mood congruency and emotional processing bias in a non-clinical 
sample. Word list order of presentation was rotated as a counterbalance measure but 
included in analysis as a fixed effect because Experiment 1 identified some potential 
differences in memory performance based on rotation order. In Experiment 1, there was 
significantly greater liberal bias for the negative visual items compared to positive 
visual items, but greater liberal bias for the positive narrative items than negative 
narrative items, only when the negative clip was presented first. Additionally, 
significantly more false memories of the monster (negative) than the druid (positive) 
clip were recalled, when the druid clip was presented first. 
The aims of this experiment are: (1) to explore negativity and positivity 
preferences in an immediate recognition task; (2) to explore context effects between 
mood (induced by a valenced story) and discrimination for valenced word lists; and (3) 
to explore potential moderators of emotional memory in children (age, gender, trait 
anxiety).  
Based on previous research, it is hypothesized that: (1) negative words will be 
discriminated at a lower rate than neutral words; (2) words matching the valence of the 
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story will be discriminated at a higher rate than those that do not; (3) discrimination will 
increase with age; and (4) there will be no gender effect on discrimination.  
Method 
Participants 
Three schools in East Sussex and Surrey, England participated in the study. 
Ninety-four opt-in consent forms were returned by parents of children in school years 3-
6 (age 7-11 years). Inclusion criteria required all children to speak English as their first 
language because the memory tasks used English words as stimuli, and additional 
languages are processed differently to primary languages (Hahne, 2001). Parents were 
asked not to return consent forms if their child had a formal diagnosis of behavioural, 
developmental or educational disorders, to limit any undue task difficulty or stress felt 
by participants. All children were also required to have normal, or corrected to normal 
hearing and vision because stimuli was presented visually and aurally. Only one child 
per family was allowed to participate to limit shared sources of variance between 
participants. Seven children were excluded because their siblings had taken part, one did 
not provide assent, one requested to leave the interview mid-way and one did not meet 
inclusion criteria based on teacher report. A total of 84 children completed the 
experiment. Forty participants (47.62%) were boys and 44 (52.38%) were girls. Ages 
ranged from 7 years, 6 months to 11 years, 6 months (M = 9 years, 5 months, SD = 
13.08 months). The group was ethnically, culturally and socio-economically mixed. 
Pupils were recruited from a mixed Community State School with a lower than average 
proportion of pupils eligible for the pupil premium, a larger proportion of White British 
pupils, and an Ofsted rating of ‘requires improvement’, a mixed voluntary aided 
Catholic School with a lower than average proportion of pupils eligible for the pupil 
premium, a higher than average proportion of pupils from a minority ethnic background 
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and an Ofsted rating of ‘good’, and a mixed academy primary school. Children took 
part voluntarily and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. Children were entered 
into a voucher prize draw on completion.  
Materials  
As with Experiment 2, The SCAS (Spence, 1997; 1998) was administered to 
measure levels of trait anxiety. The SCAS is a 45-item scale measuring six domains of 
anxiety, and includes six filler items. Muris et al. (2000) found evidence to support the 
psychometric properties of the SCAS in 7-11 year olds. Items were read aloud to 
children, who were asked to circle how often they experienced each one on a 4-point 
scale (never = 0, sometimes, often or always = 3). A total score was calculated by 
summing responses of the 39 anxiety items and converting them into a t-score using a 
chart provided by the author. The SCAS appeared to have good internal consistency in 
the current sample, = 89 
Nine variations of narratives, based on three stories were audio recorded for use 
in the study (Bishop et al., 2004). The three stories were about a child at the beach, a 
child at the park, and a child coming home from school. There were three versions of 
each story; a positive, neutral and negative version. A male and female version of each 
of the nine story variants was recorded with different character names and pronouns 
used, as well as a matching male or female narrator, to match the gender of the 
participant it was being presented to. The stories consisted of 7 cartoon images, each 
displayed for 23 s with the narrative recording played through headphones 
simultaneously. The stories were presented in MS PowerPoint using a laptop. The 
images remained the same for each valenced version of the same story, and consisted of 
the same narrative for the first three slides with the narrative for the last four slides 
varying between versions. The three versions of the beach story averaged 428 words in 
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length, the three versions of the park story averaged 455 words, and the three version of 
the coming home story averaged 396 words. All visual and audio files were played at a 
standardized brightness and volume through the same laptop. A practice story 
consisting of three cartoon images was also prepared for presentation prior to the 
experimental story. The practice images were each displayed for 23 s, with a recording 
of a narrative describing some children picking apples. 
There were six DRM stimuli lists, each consisting of 14 items (see Appendix: 
Chapter IV, V – Stimuli). Items were taken from 12 previously established backwards 
associative strength (BAS) DRM stimuli lists, with items 2-8 from each list included in 
the experimental stimuli lists. List A and B were made of positive items (A [‘Sweet’ 
and ‘Love’], B [‘Soft’ and ‘Music’]), C and D from neutral items (C [‘Green’ and 
‘Chair’], D [‘Fruit’ and ‘Foot’]) and E and F of negative items (E [‘Cry’ and ‘Thief’], F 
[‘Anger’ and ‘Sick’]). The lists Sweet, Chair, Fruit, Foot, and Cry were sampled from 
lists used by Budson et al. (2006), The lists Love, Soft, Music, Green, Thief, Angry, and 
Sick were sampled from the Cornell/ Cortland emotion lists (Brainerd et al., 2010). 
There was no overlap between items across lists.  
The order of items was randomized within each of the 12 previously established 
lists, with items from each list pair presented alternately to make the final six lists. The 
order of item presentation in each list remained fixed for all children. Each item was 
presented in bold black font, size 115 on a beige background, with a recording of the 
word read out via headphones. Each item was displayed for 2 s. Each recognition task 
list consisted of a presentation of 20 items. Two were the not-presented critical lures 
from the stimuli lists, two were the first items from each established DRM list which 
had not been presented (related lures), 10 were unrelated distractors from alternate 
DRM lists of the same valence and six were target items (items from position 3, 5 and 7 
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in each presented DRM stimuli list). The order of items was randomized and presented 
in a fixed order. Each item was displayed on screen in bold black font, size 115 with a 
recording of the word played over headphones. Children were asked to say ‘yes’ out 
loud if they remembered the word appearing on the previous list or ‘no’ if they did not. 
The researcher recorded their response and displayed the next item. 
Children rated emotions before and after listening to the story on a 4-item self-
report questionnaire using a 5-point Likert Scale to state how strongly hey felt each 
emotion, from ‘0’ (Not at all) to ‘4’ (Very, very much). The four emotional responses 
recorded were: feeling scared, happy, sad and excited. They were also asked whether 
they enjoyed the story, and found it interesting, using the same scale.  
Design 
First, manipulation checks for mood induction by the story were conducted. 
Story type (beach, park, coming home), and Story valence (positive, neutral, negative) 
were the independent variables. Both of these were between-participant variables. The 
dependent variables in the manipulation checks were ratings of happiness, and ratings of 
internalization. Because there were no significant differences in scores of happiness, 
and scores of internalization depending on story type, scores were collapsed across the 
three positive, three neutral, and three negative conditions. Story type was therefore not 
entered as a variable in the main recognition analyses.   
A mixed design was used for the main recognition analyses. Each of the two 
independent variables had three levels: Valence of story (positive, neutral, negative), 
and Valence of word lists (positive, neutral, negative). Rotation order of word lists (1-6) 
was also entered as a fixed effect in analysis. Valence of story was a between-
participant variable; valence of word list was within-participant. The two dependent 
variables for recognition analysis were hit and false alarm rates, used to calculate d’ and 
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C scores. Gender, age, and trait anxiety scores were included as covariates in separate 
steps, but retained only if they significantly affected recognition scores. 
Procedure 
Interviews were conducted individually in a quiet space at the child’s school, 
away from their classroom. Children had the interview procedure and confidentiality 
information outlined to them. They were given a chance to ask questions and assent was 
attained. For all self-report measures the researcher read the questions out loud, and the 
children circled their response on the answer sheet. Children were able to ask questions 
if they did not understand any of the items.  
Children completed the SCAS. They watched the practice story followed by one 
experimental story, and then rated emotions evoked by the story. Order of story 
presentation was rotated through the nine story versions, by story type (beach, park, 
coming home) and valence (positive, neutral, negative). For example, the first child was 
shown the positive-beach story, the next child was shown the neutral-beach, and the 
next the negative beach story, before moving through the three park, and then three 
coming home story versions. The male version of the respective experimental story was 
presented to boys, and the female version was presented to girls.  
Each word list was presented in turn, immediately followed by the relevant 
recognition task. This was repeated for the six word lists. Pairs of word lists of the same 
valence were blocked, with the order within pairs counterbalanced; A-B, C-D, E-F. The 
order of presentation was also rotated by valence; positive, neutral, negative. Finally, 
children were asked how much they enjoyed the story and found it interesting, were 
debriefed, thanked, awarded a sticker, and given the option of viewing the correct 
recognition answers before returning to class.  
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Children were monitored closely for any signs of distress, such as covering eyes 
or engaging in distraction behaviours. No children showed any visible signs of distress, 
but if they had, the interview would have been terminated immediately with children 
being given the choice of reading an age appropriate book before returning to class. 
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Results 
Trait Anxiety 
SCAS anxiety scores matched the normal population for 8-11 year olds (Spence, 
1998) with normed t-scores ranging from 30-68 (M = 50.00, SE = 1.00, 95% BCa CI 
[47.95, 51.81]). A 2-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference between male (M 
= 51.53, SE = 1.51) and female SCAS scores (M = 48.84, SE = 1.43), F(1,78) = 1.47, p 
= .229, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.02, or between SCAS scores in each story type condition, F(2, 78) = 
0.45, p = .630, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.01. Scores were similar for the beach (M = 48.77, SE = 1.77), 
coming home (M = 51.08, SE = 1.79), and the park story (M = 50.44, SE = 1.84). The 
interaction between gender and age was also non-significant, F(2, 78) = 0.04, p = .961, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. Age was significantly correlated with SCAS scores, r = −.26, p = .019, 95% 
BCa CI [-0.50, −0.02], indicating that trait anxiety decreased significantly with age. 
Emotion Ratings 
Happiness. There was a significant main effect of the valence of story on 
happiness ratings, F(2, 75) = 7.44, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.17. Bonferroni post hoc tests 
revealed that children reported significantly greater levels of happiness in the positive 
condition (M = 3.27, SE = 0.18) compared to the negative condition (M = 2.35, SE = 
0.18), p = .004, 95% BCa CI [0.31, 1.53], d = 0.88, and in the neutral condition (M = 
3.08, SE = 0.18) compared to the negative condition, p = .003, 95% BCa CI [0.11, 
1.35], d = 0.85. Although greater levels of happiness were reported in the positive 
compared to the neutral condition, this difference was not significant, p = .419, 95% 
BCa CI [−0.30, 0.65], d = 0.23. There was no significant effect of story type, F(2, 75) = 
0.30, p = .740, 𝜂𝑝
2   = 0.01 or interaction between story type and valence, F(4, 75) = 0.99, 
p = .419, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.05. 
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Internalization. There was a significant main effect of the valence of story on 
internalization ratings (fear and sadness combined), F(2, 75) = 13.90, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2   = 
.27. Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that children reported significantly greater levels 
of internalization in the negative condition (M = 1.15, SE = 0.14) compared to the 
neutral condition (M = 0.26, SE = 0.14), p = .001, 95% BCa CI [0.52, 1.23], d = 1.22, 
and compared to the positive condition (M = 0.27, SE = 0.14) p = .001, 95% BCa CI 
[0.48, 1.24], d = 1.14. The difference between internalization ratings in the neutral and 
positive conditions was not significant, p = .948, 95% BCa CI [−0.34, 0.34], d = 0.03. 
The main effect of story type was not significant, F(2, 75) = 0.14, p = .871, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, 
nor was the interaction between story type and valence, F(4, 75) = 1.10, p = .363, 𝜂𝑝
2   = 
.06. 
Properties of DRM Lists 
A series of Bonferroni adjusted ANOVAs was run to test whether words lists 
differed across each property. Valence and arousal norms were taken from the Warriner, 
Kuperman, and Brysbaert norms for 13,915 English lemmas (2012). Most research uses 
norms from Bradley and Lang’s (1999) Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW). 
However, this contains only 1,034 words, including 12 from the negative, 8 from the 
neutral, and 13 from the positive lists. In comparison, the Warriner at el norms included 
27 of the negative, and 27 of the neutral, and all 28 of the positive words presented. 
Ratings could range from 9 (happy; excited) to 1 (unhappy; calm). Mean valence and 
arousal scores for each list, and each critical lure (unpresented list name) are shown in 
Table 1, in addition to combined scores for each valence.  
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Table 1 
Mean valence and arousal ratings for presented word lists and unpresented critical lures.  
Valence  Valence Arousal 
     List N List  
M (SD) 
Critical Lure  
M (SD) 
List  
M (SD) 
Critical Lure  
M (SD) 
      
Negative 27 3.28 (1.24)  4.90 (1.08)  
     Thief 7 2.79 (0.60) 2.32 (1.34) 5.32 (1.11) 6.05 (2.38) 
     Anger 7 2.78 (0.69) 2.50 (1.36) 5.86 (0.64) 5.93 (2.77) 
     Sick 6 3.81 (1.71) 2.29 (1.38) 4.49 (0.53) 4.67 (2.58) 
     Cry 7 3.83 (1.50) 3.22 (2.41) 3.88 (0.73) 5.45 (2.82) 
Neutral 27 5.90 (0.66)  3.55 (0.71)  
     Foot 6 5.18 (0.48) 4.68 (1.42) 3.73 (0.99) 2.77 (1.57) 
     Chair 7 5.82 (0.45) 5.88 (1.33) 3.00 (0.36) 2.86 (2.01) 
     Green 7 6.07 (0.67) 6.29 (2.33) 3.61 (0.70) 4.07 (2.59) 
     Fruit 7 6.41 (0.44) 7.00 (1.97) 3.87 (0.51) 4.09 (2.49) 
Positive 28 6.84 (0.79)  4.20 (0.96)  
     Music 7 6.42 (0.42) 7.67 (1.82) 4.17 (0.68) 5.57 (3.09) 
     Soft 7 6.43 (0.71) 7.13 (1.66) 3.24 (0.38) 3.04 (2.46) 
     Love 7 7.68 (0.30) 8.00 (1.39) 4.81 (1.18) 5.36 (3.23) 
     Sweet 7 6.84 (0.90) 7.77 (1.38) 4.57 (0.65) 4.14 (2.92) 
Note: The words ‘sandals’ from the ‘Foot’ list, and ‘ill’ from the ‘Sick’ lists were not included in the 
database. The word ‘colour’ from the ‘Green’ list was listed as ‘color’, and the word ‘tears’ from the 
‘Cry’ list was listed as ‘tear’.  
Positive lists (M = 6.87, SE = 0.18) were rated as significantly more positive 
than neutral words on average (M = 5.90, SE = 0.18), p = .001, 95% BCa CI [0.57, 
1.34], d = 1.30, which were rated as significantly more positive than negative words on 
average (M = 3.28, SE = 0.18), p < .001, 95% BCa CI [2.05, 3.18], d = 2.62, F(2, 79) = 
107.00, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.73. There was also a significant difference in arousal scores, F(2, 
79) = 14.27, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.27. Negative words (M = 4.90, SE = 0.18) were rated 
significantly higher on arousal than positive (M = 4.20, SE = 0.18) p = .019, 95% BCa 
CI [0.09, 1.32], d = 0.69, which were in turn rated significantly higher on average than 
neutral words (M = 3.55, SE = 0.18), p = .034, 95% BCa CI [0.04, 1.26], d = 0.77.      
Norms and values for a number of other properties of words were acquired from 
N-Watch; a program for deriving neighbourhood size and other psycholinguistic 
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statistics (Davis, 2005). These properties can affect reaction times, lexical decision 
making, word identification, perceptual identification and semantic categorisation; 
potential confounds in memory recognition tasks (Atkinson & Juola, 1971; Brown & 
Watson, 1987; Carroll & White, 1973; James, 1975; Luce & Pisoni, 1998; Morrison & 
Ellis, 1995; Whaley, 1978). 
Overall average word frequency (per million words), mean word length 
(characters per word), spoken, written, and subjective word frequency, phoneme and 
syllable length, neighbourhood size, subset and superset frequency scores did not differ 
significantly between word lists.
19
 
However, average subjective ratings of familiarity did differ between lists 
significantly, F(2, 65) = 3.51, p = .036, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.10. Familiarity was measured on a scale of 
100 (very unfamiliar) to 700 (very familiar). These were scaled up from Likert scale 
responses of ‘1’ to ‘7’. Pairwise comparisons revealed that neutral words (M = 563.64, 
SE = 9.20, 95% BCa CI [545.00, 581.93]) were rated as significantly more familiar, on 
average, than negative words (M = 529.10, SE = 10.03, 95% BCa CI [504.63, 553.53]), 
p = .022, d = 0.71. However, their confidence intervals overlap, suggesting their true 
means could be of a similar value. There was no significant difference between the 
positive (M = 556.91, SE = 9.80, 95% BCa CI [540.65, 571.57]) and negative words, p 
= .625, d = 0.16, and positive and neutral words were not rated as significantly different, 
p = .064, d = 0.60.  
Average age of acquisition differed significantly between the three lists, F(2, 47) 
= 6.14, p = .005, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.21. Scores also ranged from 100 to 700, and had been scaled up 
from responses of ‘1’ to ‘7’ representing years of age at acquisition. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the neutral words (M = 253.79, SE = 13.64, 95% BCa CI 
                                                          
19
      Full means and ANOVA statistics for each property are reported in the Appendix, along 
with further detail on corpus databases.  
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[229.14, 282.90]) were rated as having an earlier mean age of acquisition than the 
negative words (M = 323.38, SE = 14.87, 95% BCa CI [293.58, 354.92]), p = .002, d = 
1.19. The positive words (M = 274.07, SE = 15.36, 95% BCa CI [243.11, 307.49]) also 
had an earlier age of acquisition on average than negative words, p = .040, d = 0.79, but 
with overlapping confidence intervals around their means. There was no significant 
difference between positive and neutral words, p = .352, d = 0.35. 
Average imageability ratings also differed significantly between the three lists, 
F(2, 65) = 3.89, p = .025, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.11. Scores could range from 100 to 700, with a higher 
score indicating greater ease in forming a mental image from the word. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the neutral words (M = 581.60, SE = 14.21, 95% BCa CI 
[557.88, 604.38]) had higher average ratings of imageability than the negative words (M 
= 523.00, SE = 15.50, 95% BCa CI [488.08, 555.85]), p = .006, d = 0.87. The positive 
words (M = 556.73, SE = 15.14, 95% BCa CI [520.94, 589.54]) were not scored 
significantly differently to the negative, p = .164, d = 0.43, or neutral words, p = .228, d 
= 0.36. 
Recognition Task 
Children’s hits and false alarms across lists of the same valence were summed, 
and converted into hit and false alarm rates. The method outlined in Chapter I was used 
to calculate d’ and C scores. Two participants were excluded from recognition analysis 
because at least one of their d’ scores were less than 3 SDs below the mean. Table 2 
shows the hit rates and false alarm rates across each condition. False alarm rates are 
broken down for critical lures, related distractors and unrelated distractors.   
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Table 2  
Mean proportion of hits and false alarms by valence. 
 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Response rates M SE M SE M SE 
Hits  0.89 0.01 0.83 0.01 0.86 0.01 
False alarms 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 
     Critical lures 0.22 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.17 0.03 
     Related distractors 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.28 0.03 
     Unrelated distractors 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 
 
Sensitivity: d’ analysis. There was a high level of discrimination overall, with 
one sample t-tests showing that participants could discriminate at better-than-chance 
levels in all conditions, with all d’ scores significantly greater than 0. For the positive 
lists t(81) = 33.11, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [2.29, 2.58], d = 7.36, neutral lists t(81) = 
31.94, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [2.40, 2.74], d = 7.10, and for negative lists t(81) = 33.66, 
p < .001, 95% BCa CI [2.47, 2.81], d = 7.48.  
A 3 × 3 × 6 (Story valence [positive, neutral, negative], DRM list valence 
[positive, neutral, negative], Rotation order [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]) mixed ANOVA was run.
 20
 
The main effects of rotation order, F(5, 64) = 1.79, p = .127, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .12, and story 
valence, F(2, 64) = 1.68, p = .194, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .05, on d’ scores were non-significant. The 
rotation × story valence interaction was also non-significant, F(10, 64) = 0.70, p = .722, 
𝜂𝑝
2   = .10.  
There was a significant main effect of list valence on d’ scores, F(2, 128) = 4.31, 
p = .015, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .06. Children could discriminate negative signals from noise (M = 2.65, 
SE = 0.08) significantly better than positive signals from noise (M = 2.44, SE = 0.07), p 
= .010, 95% CI [−0.15, 0.31], d = 0.23. There was no significant difference in 
                                                          
20
      Analysis was run with age, gender and trait anxiety scores entered as covariates. None 
were found to significantly predict d’ scores or interact significantly with independent variables, 
so were not retained in the final analysis. Results from the covariate analysis can be found in 
the supplementary material.  
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discriminability between negative and neutral signals (M = 2.58, SE = 0.08), p = .173, 
95% CI [−0.51, 0.43], d = 0.08, or between neutral and positive signals, p = 1.000, 95% 
CI [−0.31, 0.15], d = 0.16.  However, the interaction between rotation order and DRM 
list valence was significant, F(10, 128) = 2.83, p = .003, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .18. A series of repeated 
measures ANOVAs revealed that for those who received the lists in the negative-
positive-neutral order, there was a significant difference between d’ scores depending 
on list valence, F(2, 28) = 4.11, p = .027, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .23 (see Figure 1). Discrimination scores 
were significantly greater for negative items (M = 3.09, SE = 0.15) than for positive 
items (M = 2.39, SE = 0.17), p = .003, 95% CI [0.25, 1.16], d = 1.09. Neutral d’ scores 
(M = 2.52, SE = 0.20) did not differ significantly from negative, p = .194, 95% CI 
[−1.35, 0.20], d = 0.27, or positive d’ scores, p = 1.000, 95% CI [−0.71, 0.98], d = 0.11. 
There was also a significant effect of valence on d’ scores for those in the negative-
neutral-positive order of presentation, F(2, 20) = 5.93, p = .010, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .37, again with 
significantly greater scores for the negative items (M = 2.74, SE = 0.24) compared to the 
positive items (M = 1.82, SE = 0.21), p = .021, 95% CI [0.14, 1.70], d = 1.04, and no 
significant difference between neutral d’ scores (M = 2.35, SE = 0.29) and negative d’ 
scores, p = .447, 95% CI [−1.11, 0.33], d = 0.48, or positive d’ scores, p = .265, 95% CI 
[−0.27, 1.32], d = 0.59. There were no significant differences by valence within the 
positive-neutral-negative, F(2, 28) = 1.55, p = .231, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .10, positive-negative-neutral, 
F(2, 26) = 0.35, p = .711, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .03, neutral-positive-negative, F(2, 24) = 1.13, p = .340, 
𝜂𝑝
2   = .09, or neutral-negative-positive order of presentation, F(2, 26) = 0.65, p = .529, 
𝜂𝑝
2   = .05.  
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Figure 1. Line chart showing d’ scores (discrimination) for positive, neutral and negative stimuli 
by order of presentation. Bars show standard error.   
The list valence × story valence interaction was not significant, F(4, 128) = 0.85, 
p = .494, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .03, nor was the three-way interaction between presentation order, list 
valence and story valence, F(20, 128) = 0.98, p = .488, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .13.  
Response bias: Criterion C analysis. C scores were significantly greater than 0 
in the positive list condition, t(81) = 4.70, p = .001, 95% BCa CI [0.10, 0.23], d = 1.04, 
and neutral list condition, t(81) = 6.94, p = .001, 95% BCa CI [0.17, 0.32], d = 1.54. 
This indicates a conservative response bias, meaning that children were more prone to 
responding ‘false’ over ‘true’. They would therefore miss more items that had been 
presented, compared to falsely recognizing items that had not been presented. However, 
in the negative list condition, C was not significantly different to 0, t(81) = 2.01, p = 
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.053, 95% BCa CI [−0.00, 0.19], d = 0.45. This indicates no significant bias in 
responding with ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  
As with d’ scores, a 3 × 3 × 6 (Story valence [positive, neutral, negative], DRM 
list valence [positive, neutral, negative], Rotation order [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]) mixed 
ANOVA using Bonferroni corrections was conducted with C scores as the dependent 
variable.
21
 There was a significant difference in C scores by list valence, F(2, 128) = 
7.35, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .10. Neutral C scores (M = 0.22, SE = 0.03) were significantly 
higher than negative C scores (M = 0.07, SE = 0.05), p = .003, 95% CI [−0.27, −0.04], d 
= 0.38, indicating greater conservative bias for neutral than negative list items. There 
was no significant difference between negative and positive (M = 0.17, SE = 0.04), p = 
.056, 95% CI [−0.20, 0.00], d = 0.20, or neutral and positive C scores, p = .375, 95% CI 
[−0.03, 0.14], d = 0.23.  
However, the interaction between list valence and rotation order was also 
significant, F(10, 128) = 3.12, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .20 (see Figure 2). For the positive-
neutral-negative order of presentation there was a significant effect of list valence on C 
scores, F(2, 28) = 5.73, p = .008, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .29, with significantly greater conservative bias 
towards the neutral (M = 0.37, SE = 0.08) than the positive items (M = 0.13, SE = 0.06), 
p = .005, 95% CI [0.07, 0.42], d = 1.03. The differences in C scores between negative 
(M = 0.36, SE = 0.08) and positive, p = .063, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.48], d = 0.68, and 
between negative and neutral items, p = 1.000, 95% CI [−0.25, 0.23], d = 0.03, were not 
significant. There was a significant effect of list valence on C in the negative-neutral-
positive condition, F(2, 20) = 7.78, p = .003, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .43 with significantly greater 
conservative bias towards the neutral (M = 0.13, SE = 0.12), and liberal bias towards the 
                                                          
21
      As with discrimination scores, age, gender and trait anxiety scores were entered as 
covariates and not found to significantly predict C scores or significant interact with independent 
variables. Results of this analysis can be found in the supplementary materials.  
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negative items (M = −0.26, SE = 0.12), p = .010, 95% CI [0.10, 0.70], d = 1.15, but no 
significant differences between the negative and positive (M = 0.02, SE = 0.12), p = 
.064, 95% CI [−0.58, 0.02], d = 0.82, or positive and neutral items, p = .873, 95% CI 
[−0.41, 0.18], d = 0.34. There was also a significant effect of list valence on C scores in 
the negative-positive-neutral condition, F(2, 28) = 8.42, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .38 with 
significantly greater conservative bias towards positive (M =  0.32, SE = 0.05) and 
neutral (M = 0.43, SE = 0.06), compared to negative items (M = 0.06, SE = 0.09), p = 
.036, 95% CI [0.02, 0.49], d = 0.82; and p = .021, 95% CI [0.05, 0.69], d = 1.44, 
respectively. The difference between positive and neutral items was not significant, p = 
.256, 95% CI [−0.29, 0.06], d = 0.65.  
 
 
Figure 2. Line chart showing response bias (C scores) for positive, neutral, and negative stimuli 
by order of presentation. Bars show standard error. 
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List valence did not significantly affect C scores in the positive-negative-neutral, 
F(2, 26) = 1.09, p = .351, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .08, neutral-positive-negative, F(2, 24) = 0.70, p = .508, 
𝜂𝑝
2   = .06, or the neutral-negative-positive condition, F(2, 26) = 0.55, p = .586, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .04. 
There was no significant main effect of rotation order, F(5, 64) = 2.30, p = .056, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.15, or story valence, F(2, 64) = 0.41, p = .667, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01 on C scores. The rotation × 
story valence interaction was non-significant, F(10, 64) = 1.06, p = .404, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .14, as 
was the story valence × list valence interaction, F(4, 128) = 0.12, p = .974, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and 
the three-way interaction between story valence, list valence, and rotation, F(20, 128) = 
1.09, p = .372, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .15.  
Discussion 
This experiment had several aims: (1) to explore negativity and positivity 
preferences in an immediate recognition task; (2) to explore context effects between 
mood (induced by a valenced story) and discrimination for valenced word lists; and (3) 
explore potential moderators of emotional memory in children (age, gender, trait 
anxiety).  
It was hypothesised that: (1) negative words would be discriminated at a lower 
rate than neutral words; (2) words matching the valence of the story would be 
discriminated at a higher rate than those that do not; (3) discrimination would increase 
with age; and (4) there would be no gender effect on discrimination. 
There was no subsequent main effect of mood on recognition rates. There was a 
large effect of valence of word list, with negative words discriminated significantly 
more successfully than positive words, but only when they were presented first. This 
was mirrored by response bias, where lower levels of conservative response bias were 
observed for negative than positive and neutral words, when negative words were 
presented first. Lower levels of conservative bias were also observed for positive words 
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when positive words were presented first, and negative presented last. There were no 
apparent context or moderator effects on discrimination.   
Effects of Mood on Memory for Valenced Words 
Those in the negative story condition reported significantly lower levels of 
happiness, and higher levels of internalizing ratings than those in the neutral and 
positive story conditions, whose ratings did not differ significantly. Because the 
manipulation of story valence was only partially successful, it is not possible to say with 
certainty whether there was genuine lack of mood priming effect, or whether the 
positive stories were not sufficiently emotive to bring out a strong enough effect on 
memory to reach significance. The negative stories evoked significantly lower levels of 
happiness (medium effect) and higher levels of internalization (large effect) than the 
positive and neutral stories. The difference in happiness ratings between the positive 
and neutral stories did not reach significance and was slightly below the cut off for a 
small effect (Morris & Fritz, 2013), though nevertheless, was in the right direction.  
The stories had previously been used in an experiment by Bishop et al. (2004) as 
valenced stimuli, where all three had been rated as differing significantly on happiness 
in the expected directions. However, the stories were rated by a small number of adults 
rather than children, who may report that different materials evoke greater happiness, 
compared to adults.  
Valence Effects of DRM List on Memory 
Overall, children could discriminate negative signals from noise significantly 
better than positive signals from noise. However, there were no significant differences 
in discriminability between negative and neutral signals, or between positive and neutral 
signals. These findings tentatively suggest no negativity or positivity preference in 
recognition memory for word lists, in opposition to hypothesis (1). The valence effect 
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between negative and positive words was significant and large, in both conditions where 
the negative words were presented first, suggesting genuine effects. In addition, this 
valence effect in discrimination was mirrored by a valence effect in response bias 
analysis; where less conservative bias was observed for negative, than positive and 
neutral words, when negative words were presented first. This means children were both 
more easily able to discriminate signals from noise, and less biased in responding 
according to some other criterion for negative words. Additionally, there was less 
conservative bias for positive words than neutral, in the condition where positive words 
were presented before neutral and then negative words. This means that in three of the 
four conditions where emotional words were presented first, children were less likely to 
‘miss’ items for the first block. This advantage was not evident for neutral words, when 
they were presented as the first block.  
Only a small number of previous experiments compare recognition of positive 
and negative words using a DRM paradigm in non-clinical samples of children, with 
mixed findings. Results of the current experiment do not fit with previous findings, 
where positive words were recognized more accurately than negative (Brainerd et al., 
2010; Moradi et al., 2000), or no difference was observed (Neshat-Doost et al., 1998; 
Quas et al., 2015).  
However, a stronger negativity than positivity preference is shown in 
recognition tasks in adults (Murphy & Isaacwitz, 2008). Neurological evidence suggests 
that explicit memory for both pleasant and unpleasant emotional stimuli can be 
enhanced through modulation of encoding and consolidation processes. Hamann (2001) 
reviewed evidence of neuroimaging studies, finding reports of increased amygdala 
activity when emotional film, positively and negatively valenced images, and negative 
photographs were presented, compared to neutral counterparts. Converging evidence is 
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also presented from neuropsychological studies, whereby emotional memory 
enhancement is no longer found after damage to the amygdala. However, when word 
list stimuli were used, there was still an increase in amygdala activity, but this did not 
correspond with recognition scores for negative words. Hamann postulates that there 
may be a minimum threshold of emotional arousal below which memory enhancement 
will not be observed. 
Findings are in line with Experiment 2, where negative narrative (verbal) 
material was discriminated more accurately than positive. Although the current 
experiment employed a different type of stimuli, narratives were presented to children, 
prior to the word lists. Although care was taken to ensure that none of the words from 
the lists were included in the stories, it is possible that the word lists may have been 
processed differently simply by following the presentation of a more complex narrative 
stimulus. For example, they may have acted as a mood primer, thus increasing arousal 
for the first set of word seen, with this effect wearing off for subsequent word lists. This 
could account for the rotation effects observed.  
Alternatively, Haviland and Clark (1974) theorize that in comprehending a 
sentence, individuals first search their memory for antecedent information that matches 
information in the current sentence. Memory is then revised by attaching the new 
information. Their experiment showed that including a preceding sentence of the same 
context increased speed of comprehension. In the current experiment, the preceding 
story did not provide contextual semantic information, and it is possible that 
comprehension of the words would therefore be slower whilst recent memory was being 
unsuccessfully searched. Previous research did not include any contextual information, 
such as a narrative prior to presenting word lists (Brainerd et al., 2010; Moradi et al., 
2000; Neshat-Doost et al., 1998; Quas et al., 2015).   
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Previous DRM experiments with neutral and negative word lists have 
consistently found a preference away from negative words relative to neutral words, 
with lower hit rates and higher false alarm rates (Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010, Exp 2, 
4, and 5) and lower discrimination for negative words (Moradi et al., 2000; Neshat-
Doost et al., 1998). This difference in findings could be due to methodological 
differences between the current and previous experiments. In all of Howe’s studies, a 
distraction task was administered followed by a recall task after each word list. When 
all lists had been presented, the recognition task was administered with emotional and 
neutral words presented randomly within one block. Similarly, in the other two studies 
(Moradi et al., 2000; Neshat-Doost et al., 1998) all words were presented in one list 
prior to a single distraction task, recall task, and recognition task with one mixed block 
of emotional and neutral words. The current experiment did not integrate a recall or 
distraction task, and the test phase was conducted separately for each block of word 
lists. The addition of the recall task previously could have impacted performance on the 
subsequent recognition task. Previous research shows children were less likely to report 
as many details after an emotionally negative experience when asked open ended 
questions, compared to more direct questions (Quas et al., 1999). The recall task in both 
studies could be conceptualised as an open-ended question, meaning that children are 
less likely to report as many items from the negative condition than neutral condition. 
The recall task would then act as an extra step of rehearsal, with increased rehearsal 
shown to systematically increase recognition rates (Woodward Jr., Bjork, & Jongeward 
Jr., 1973). As more words would likely be rehearsed in the neutral condition via recall, 
this could have led to the higher recognition rates of neutral words in the subsequent 
recognition task.  
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Even fewer studies analyse or report response bias in emotional memory studies; 
however, Brainerd et al. (2010) found that bias scores were lower (more conservative) 
for negative than positive words. Again, this was the reverse of the pattern observed in 
the current experiment. This is to be expected, given the reverse findings for 
discrimination.  
Both confounding variables and power must be considered when interpreting the 
discrimination and response bias effects. As well as differing on valence, negatively 
valenced word lists were significantly more arousing than the positive lists, which in 
turn were significantly more arousing than the neutral words used in this study. Arousal 
positively predicts memory performance (Lang, Dhillon, & Dong, 1995), fitting with 
the higher rate of discrimination for negative lists observed in the current experiment, 
but not the comparison between positive and neutral words. Age of acquisition was 
significantly later for the negative than neutral and positive word lists, upon inspection 
of both the p value and confidence intervals. Age of acquisition has been show to 
positively predict recognition memory (Cortese, McCarty, & Schock, 2014), with this 
pattern observed in the current experiment. The word lists also differed significantly on 
ratings of imageability, with negative words scoring significantly lower than neutral 
words, but no different to positive words. Imageability positively predicts recognition 
memory (Cortese et al, 2014), meaning the neutral words should have been 
discriminated more accurately than the positive and negative words. However, this 
pattern was not observed. Cortese, Khanna, & Hacker (2010) found that age of 
acquisition was a much stronger predictor than imageability, which provides a possible 
explanation for discrimination results not matching that predicted by imageability 
scores. It is likely that the effects of valence, arousal, age of acquisition, and 
imageability interacted within the current experiment. Differences in arousal, and age of 
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acquisition in particular could be driving the observed findings. Future experiments 
would need to ensure word lists were controlled on all characteristics except valence to 
test valence effects in isolation, successfully.      
Sample sizes were too small to achieve a reasonable level of power once rotation 
order had been included as a fixed effect, in line with previous analysis designs used 
within this thesis. Other true effects may therefore have been missed, resulting in 
acceptance of the null hypothesis (a Type II error, or false negative). When only story 
and list valence were included, nearly 30 observations were observed per cell (26-28); 
once rotation was also included this greatly reduced power, with only 3-6 observations 
per cell. There are two alternative methods of analysis which could be considered; (1) 
removing story valence as an independent variable (due to the manipulation not being 
fully successful); or (2) removing rotation as a fixed effect (because it lowers power too 
much, and its inclusion was more exploratory, based on evidence from the previous two 
experiments reported in this thesis). The first approach is not generally advisable 
because it is considered bad practice to remove variables from analysis that were part of 
the original design. Guidelines for authors advise that all experimental conditions, 
including failed manipulations, be reported to ensure that false positives are not reported 
(Simmons et al., 2011). Removing the story valence (mood) condition would also not 
increase power substantially, resulting in an average of only 14 observations per cell. 
Additional analysis excluding rotation as a fixed effect found no significant mood, 
valence of word list, or context (interaction) effects.
22
 Results of this experiment should 
be interpreted with caution, because the likelihood that a statistically significant result 
reflects a true effect is reduced in underpowered experiments (Button et al., 2013).  
                                                          
22
      Additional analysis is included in the appendix. 
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Models of emotional preferences propose that either all emotional material or 
just emotionally negative material is privileged in cognitive processing, compared to 
neutral material. Because no differences in discrimination between emotional and 
neutral words were identified in this experiment, support for either of these types of 
models is limited. Overall, discrimination was higher for negative than neutral words, 
but did not reach statistical significance. Despite this, a large effect was still observed. 
This effect is characteristic of a negativity preference. Taken with the large effect of 
valence between negative and positive words on discrimination, these two effects would 
support evolutionary models where threat related material is preferentially privileged, 
such as the evolved module of fear (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). However, on balance, 
when confounding variables differing between word lists, a lack of power, and previous 
experimental findings are considered, this support is considerably weaker, or indeed 
reversed.   
It is not clear why order effects were observed within this experiment. Although 
rotation effects were also observed within Experiment 1 of this thesis, findings were 
mixed with geater liberal response bias for negative than positive visual items, but 
greater liberal response bias for the positive than negative narrative items when negative 
items were presented first; and more false memories recalled for the monster (negative) 
clip when the druid (positive) was presented first. However, no effects of rotation on 
discrimination were found in Experiment 1, and valence effects on discrimination do 
appear to vary substantially depending on stimulus type, making it hard to compare 
across experiments. These effects are inconsistent with previous research findings, 
which found no difference in discrimination depending on whether neutral or valenced 
lists were presented first (e.g. Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010).  
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Effects of Context on Recognition 
Although the positive and neutral stories were not rated significantly differently 
to each other, the negative stories did evoke lower levels of happiness and higher levels 
of internalizing emotions than the others. Some of the expected effects could therefore 
still be tested; those who were presented with the negative story were still expected to 
show lower recognition than the other two groups, and to recognize the negative words 
more accurately than the positive and neutral.  
The lack of any significant context effects is inconsistent with previous research 
(e.g. Bishop et al., 2004), and does not support hypothesis (2). One explanation for the 
failure to replicate these effects could be the study design. A repeated measures design 
was employed to allow children to participate in all three valence conditions of the 
recognition task. Bishop et al (2004) employed a between-participants design, whereby 
children where either in a low or high depressed group. In the current study, the valence 
of the first and second set of lists could have caused interference with any effect of 
context on subsequent lists. Additional analysis was therefore conducted on the effect of 
congruency of story valence and the valence of the first list on discrimination rates for 
the first block only, with the hypothesis that discrimination should be higher in the 
congruent condition (at least for negative words). However, there were still no 
significant effects of context or valence on recognition.
 23
 The lack of significant context 
effects can therefore not be explained by interference from multiple conditions.  
The inconsistencies between previous and current findings could also be due to a 
focus on depression in previous studies, but anxiety in the current study. Mood-
congruency memory effects have previously been found in non-clinical samples of 
children based on completion of the Depression Self Report Scale (Birleson, 1981). 
                                                          
23
      Additional analysis on effects of congruency of story valence and the valence of the first 
list presented on discrimination is included in supplementary material. 
176 
 
Williams et al. (1997) report that mood congruent memory preferences are reasonably 
well established in depression (but not in anxiety), whereas mood congruent attentional 
preferences are well established in anxiety (but not in depression). The current study 
employed a memory rather than attentional task, with the negative stories designed to 
evoke mild anxiety. It is therefore not surprising that a mood-congruency effect was not 
found. Although measures of anxiety and depressed mood (fear and sadness) were 
combined to include internalization as a moderator, neither measure predicted levels of 
discrimination nor interacted significantly with list valence, when two separate analyses 
were run. Alternatively, it is likely that the study was underpowered and may not have 
identified any true effects. 
Moderators of Emotional Memory 
Age, gender and trait anxiety were investigated as potential moderators of 
memory effects. With respect to age, the existing literature is unambiguous in the 
assertion that phonological short-term memory abilities develop rapidly through the 
early and middle childhood years (Gathercole, 1998). Previous research has also found 
an increase in hit rates for negative and neutral words with age (Howe, 2007; Howe et 
al, 2009, Howe et al; 2010) and for net accuracy and discrimination (Brainerd, 2010; 
Quas, 2013). Likewise, discrimination increased significantly with age in Experiment 1 
of this thesis, and in the positive condition of Experiment 2. Support for hypothesis (3) 
was not found. Children in the current experiment showed higher levels of correct 
recognition and lower levels of false recognition than those in Howe’s studies, with 
discrimination reaching a near ceiling effect. This near-ceiling effect implies that the 
task may have been too easy, and did not allow any main effect of age to be borne out. 
Additionally, competing models predict either an increase, decrease or no change in 
negativity preference with age (Field & Lester, 2010). The lack of a significant 
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interaction between the effects of age and stimulus valence on discrimination could 
mean that: (1) children are born with varying levels of fear, and associated processing 
preferences that remain stable (Field & Lester, 2010); (2) negativity bias develops prior 
to 7 years of age and remains fairly stable over time (Martin, Horder, & Jones, 1992); or 
(3) that any developmental changes are simply obscured due to the near ceiling effect. 
The non-significant effects of gender are in-line with existing DRM experiments 
using word lists (e.g. Howe, 2007; Howe et al, 2009; Howe et al., 2010; Quas, 2015) 
and  images (Cordon, 2013), along with Experiment 2 of this thesis, and support 
hypothesis (4). Although a main effect of gender was observed in Experiment 1, this 
was thought likely a spurious result.   
Finally, trait anxiety did not significantly moderate discrimination scores on the 
recognition tasks. This finding is unsurprising given that previous studies reporting a 
negativity bias in anxious children are based on clinical samples, and featured 
attentional tasks (Dalgleish et al., 2003; Dalgleish et al., 2001). The current experiment 
specifically excluded children with a formal diagnosis of any emotional disorders, with 
trait anxiety scores mirroring those seen in the normal range in same-age samples, and 
included a memory task rather than attentional task. This finding is also in line with 
Experiment 2 of this thesis.  
Conclusions 
In relation to the experimental hypotheses: (1) the expected finding of lower 
discrimination for negatively valenced compared to neutral words was not observed; (2) 
there was no evidence that words matching the valence of a previously presented story 
were discriminated more easily; (3) there was no evidence of the expected increase in 
discrimination with age; and (4) support for a null effect of gender was observed. 
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The present study found that children could discriminate negative signals from 
noise more accurately than positive signals from noise, with this finding only significant 
when negative lists were presented first. There was also significantly less conservative 
bias for negative than positive and neutral words when negative words were presented 
first, implying that children were also using an alternative decision criterion. Results do 
not match findings from existing DRM studies using negative and neutral words with 
children. This could be due to the addition of the story prior to word presentation in the 
current experiment, or due to the confounding variables of increased arousal, and later 
age of acquisition for the negative words; both of which positively predict 
discrimination rates. Context effects were not borne out in the expected manner; this 
could be due to the partial failure to manipulate mood with the stories, or ceiling effects 
in the discrimination task. Additionally, effects of rotation were observed on 
discrimination and bias. The experiment was underpowered, and observed effects do not 
match previous findings. They are therefore considered spurious.  
In future experiments, test materials should be piloted with the appropriate age 
range prior to running the experiment, to ensure they achieve the desired manipulation 
effect and are suitable for the age range. Any presentation stimuli such as word lists 
should be standardized on as many variables as possible, to limit confounds such as 
arousal effects. Methods of decreasing the ceiling effect should also be sought, such as 
increasing task difficulty, or including a distractor task, for example. It would also be of 
theoretical interest to explore potential mechanisms of valence effects on memory, for 
example by manipulating explicit elaboration.   
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Chapter V 
Explicit Elaboration and Valence Effects on Children’s Emotional Memory 
 
Abstract 
The roles of elaboration and valence on children’s true and false memories were 
examined using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. One-hundred and thirty 7-
10 year old children were shown blocked negative-emotional or positive-emotional, and 
neutral word lists. Children rated words on ease of spelling (shallow encoding) or 
valence (deep encoding) during the presentation phase, then completed a distractor and 
recognition task. As in previous published experiments of a similar design, 
discrimination was significantly lower for negative than for neutral words. 
Discrimination was also lower for positive than neutral words, though not to a 
significant level. Significantly greater liberal bias was found for positive compared to 
neutral words, indicating a potentially underestimated measure of true sensitivity. 
Higher elaboration led to a greater propensity to respond positively, potentially 
reflecting greater activation of semantic networks. This did not interact with valence 
effects in the expected manner, but this is likely due to methodological differences to 
previous experiments and a lack of observed power in the current experiment. An 
interesting next step would be to replicate experiments with adults that have included 
unrelated and related valenced and neutral words, to explore the relative contributions 
of valence and semantic relatedness in children. 
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Explicit Elaboration and Valence Effects on Children’s Emotional Memory 
The reliability of children’s memories is often questioned, particularly in 
relation to real-life emotional situations. Many classic studies have reported that 
children’s memory is less accurate and more suggestible than adults when interviewed 
about a negative emotional event such as witnessing a kidnapping, being in a stressful 
medical setting or around sexual abuse (for a review see Bruck & Ceci, 1999). More 
recent studies report similar findings for less extreme emotional situations. For example, 
significantly more children recalled a false memory for a fictitious negative event than a 
fictitious neutral event within a school classroom setting, that they were questioned 
about (Otgaar, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2008).  
However, both positive and negative preferences in memory, and other forms of 
cognitive processing, are evident across a variety of settings. This phenomenon is 
known as the positive-negative asymmetry (Lewicka et al., 1992). A positivity ‘bias’ 
was originally defined as the tendency to evaluate situations or stimuli more positively 
than they actually are (Czapiński, 1982). An affective negativity ‘bias’ was originally 
defined as negatively valenced stimuli having a larger impact on mood than positive 
stimuli of equal intensity (Lewicka et al., 1992). However, Murphy and Isaacowitz, 
(2008) noted the inconsistent use of the term ‘bias’ within literature and more recently, 
the term ‘preference’ has been adopted by some psychologists to show an increase in 
performance towards a valenced stimulus compared to a neutral baseline stimulus 
across a measurable domain.  
This paper is primarily concerned with true and false memories of neutral, and 
positively and negatively valenced stimuli in children. An attentional preference 
towards negatively valenced material in both clinically anxious, and non-clinically 
anxious children has been shown in a meta-analysis (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). This 
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preference has been characterised by an initial avoidance of attending to negative 
stimuli (Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Remmerswaal, & Vreden, 2009) followed by a 
subsequent delay in disengaging from the stimuli (McKenna & Sharma, 2004). Within 
memory, an emotional preference would refer to a tendency to report a greater 
proportion of negative or positive, compared to neutral material, or to increased hit or 
discrimination rates for negative or positive, compared to neutral material. It can also be 
applied to false alarm rates.  
Some theoretical models propose that children are born with cognitive 
processing preferences towards negative stimuli. For example, Öhman and Mineka 
(2001) proposed a ‘fear module’ in mammals, preferentially activated by evolutionarily 
threatening stimuli such as spiders and snakes. Stimuli related to threats that are more 
difficult to survey, and movements that are difficult to predict, such as snakes and 
spiders generally have been shown to evoke alertness and wariness (Frijda, 1986). 
‘Integral bias’ models propose that children are born with varying levels of cognitive 
preferences towards negative stimuli, which remain constant over time, whilst 
‘moderation models’ of information processing are based on the assumption that 
children are born with a preference towards negative content and learn to moderate 
these biases to varying degrees as they develop with age (see Field & Lester, 2010; 
Hadwin & Field, 2010 for a review). 
Other theories hypothesize that all evolutionarily advantageous (positively and 
negatively valenced) material is privileged (for example, Caccioppo et al., 1997; 1999; 
Hamann, 2001). The Network Affect Model proposes that valenced material is stored as 
central nodes with higher numbers of connections to surrounding nodes compared to 
other materials (Bower & Cohen, 1988), or that valenced material tends to prompt 
greater semantic elaboration, and be more organizationally cohesive in nature 
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(Kensinger, 2004; Maratos, Allan, & Rugg, 2000; Phelps et al., 1998; Talmi & 
Moscovitch, 2004). These increases in connection, elaboration, or cohesiveness are 
proposed to lead to a memory advantage for emotionally valenced items. 
Despite these early findings and theories; findings from rigorously controlled 
laboratory experiments are limited and present inconsistent findings. The Deese–
Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) has become a 
popular method of testing memory accuracy. The majority of experiments using word 
lists as stimuli have found a preference away from negative words (Howe, 2007; Howe 
et al., 2010, Experiments 2, 4, and 5; Moradi et al., 2000; Neshat-Doost et al., 1998). In 
addition, children’s false alarm rates for negative-emotional material increased over 
time, whereas they remained constant for neutral items. This indicates that 
discrimination is likely to decrease at a faster rate for emotionally negative, than neutral 
materials over time. Fewer experiments include positive words, with two reporting a 
preference away from positive words (Moradi et al., 2000; Neshat-Doost et al., 1998).  
Evidence of a preference toward emotionally valenced words in immediate or 
short-term memory tasks is sparse; A DRM study in Chapter IV of this thesis 
(Experiment 3) was conducted with 7-11 year old children who had emotionally 
positive, negative and neutral lists of words presented visually and aurally, followed by 
an immediate recognition task after each presentation phase. A negativity preference 
was observed, with higher discrimination for negatively valenced words, but only when 
they were presented before the neutral and positively valenced words. A conservative 
response bias was also found in the neutral and positive conditions; meaning children 
were more likely to ‘miss’ items of that valence in the recognition task. The only other 
experiment reporting an emotional preference, found a negativity preference for picture 
stimuli (Cordon et al., 2013).  
183 
 
There were some important methodological differences between those studies 
which did, and did not find a negativity preference in DRM recognition tasks. Howe’s 
studies employed both a recall and recognition task, whereas those experiments finding 
a negativity bias employed only a recognition task. The recall task in Howe’s studies 
was completed prior to the recognition task; children have been shown to exhibit a 
preference to report fewer details after an emotionally negative experience when asked 
open ended questions, compared to more direct questions (Quas et al., 1999). The recall 
task could have acted as an extra stage of consolidation, which would have affected 
performance in the subsequent recognition task. Words were presented aurally in 
Howe’s studies, whereas pictures were used by Cordon et al. (2013) and words were 
presented both visually and aurally in Experiment 3 of this thesis. Experiment 2 
(Chapter III) of this thesis showed an interaction between stimulus modality and 
valence on discrimination rates, with items from the aurally presented narrative 
recognized more accurately than items from the accompanying images, when either 
stimulus sets were negatively valenced. This indicates a potential difference in the 
processing of emotionally negative visual and aural stimuli. Lastly, Howe presented 
items in order of backwards associative strength (BAS), whereas the lists were 
presented in a randomized order in Experiment 3, and Cordon et al. (2013) used images 
which were not connected by critical lures. Presenting items in order of increasing BAS 
has been shown to increase the number of lures or false memories recognized (Arndt, 
2013), which could potentially affect stimuli of different valences differently. In 
addition, near-ceiling effects were observed in Experiment 3 of this thesis, and the 
experiment was underpowered, which could have resulted in some effects not being 
borne out fully.  
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Processing models offer several possibilities for how and where emotional 
preferences in memory occur. According to a working memory model, audio targets are 
attended to and rehearsed by a phonological loop before being recognized as a word and 
stored in verbal working memory, and visual targets are stored within iconic memory 
before being moved into working memory; a process known as encoding (Baddeley, 
2000; Baddeley, Eysenck, & Anderson, 2009). There may be differences in the memory 
storage itself, such as whether information is stored in short or long term memory, and 
the capacity for storage. Maintenance rehearsal is required to keep information in 
working (short term) memory, whereas elaborative rehearsal is necessary to move 
information into long term memory, due to its depth of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972). Alternatively, a negativity preference could be associated with the act of 
retrieving encoded information from memory via recognition or recall, the final stage in 
memory processing (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968).  
Hamann (2001) presented a review of neuroimaging and neuropsychological 
evidence, suggesting that explicit memory for both pleasant and unpleasant emotional 
stimuli can be enhanced through modulation of encoding and consolidation processes. If 
the negativity preference in memory shown in some DRM recognition tasks (Cordon et 
al., 2013; Experiment 3, Chapter IV) is due to a higher level of elaboration for valenced 
words, then removing the natural advantage of elaboration for valenced words during 
encoding should diminish or extinguish any negativity or valence effects by offering the 
same level of elaboration to all three categories of words. In the current study, there will 
be a low and high elaboration condition. In the low elaboration condition, children will 
be asked to rate each word on how hard it is to spell, which does not require semantic 
elaboration. It is expected that a similar or slightly diminished negativity preference will 
be observed compared to Experiment 3 (Chapter IV) due to the introduction of an 
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encoding task. In the high elaboration condition, children will be asked to rate how each 
word makes them feel. Evaluating stimuli in relation to the self produces organized and 
elaborate processing, resulting in increased memory. A meta-analysis shows that this 
reliably increases memory performance; this is known as the self-reference effect 
(Symons & Johnson, 1997). Elaboration for both positive and neutral words is expected 
to increase in the high elaboration condition substantially, diminishing the valence 
effect even further. These two tasks were chosen because they could both be measured 
using a Likert scale, and varied in the level of semantic elaboration required. 
In an effort to reduce the ceiling effects observed in the previous chapter, a 
distraction task was introduced between each presentation and recognition phase of the 
task. This task consisted of simple addition and subtraction maths sums, designed to be 
used in a classroom setting for children aged 5 years and over. This activity should limit 
the possibility of rehearsal due to domain-general suppression of previous, distracting 
material, but not interfere with any effects of the experimental manipulation due to a 
different domain of skills being utilised (Craik, 2014). The task is also designed to be 
easy enough not to add stress to the task for any of the children. Any stress experienced 
between presentation and recognition phases could act as a mood inducer, and confound 
the effects of the experimental manipulation due to context effects (Matt et al., 1992; 
Ucros, 1989).  
The upper limit on the age range has also been lowered to 10 years of age to 
ensure that most children utilise as much of the spelling rating scale as possible by 
finding some of the words harder to spell than others. Lowering the maximum age 
should help to reduce ceiling effects because memory performance increases with age 
during childhood (Gathercole, 1998). 
186 
 
This experiment aims to explore mechanisms underlying observed negativity 
effects identified in Experiments 2 and 3 (Chapters III and IV) by manipulating 
elaboration levels. It is hypothesized that: (1) as levels of elaboration increase, the 
valence effect will diminish; (2) discrimination will increase with age; and (3) there will 
be no gender effects. Trait anxiety will not be included as a potential moderator due to a 
lack of significant findings in previous experiments, and a lower focus on anxiety in the 
experiment overall.  
Method 
Participants 
Five schools in East Sussex, West Sussex and Surrey, England participated in 
the study. One-hundred and forty-six opt-in consent forms were returned by parents of 
children in school years 3-5 (age 7-10 years). Nine children were excluded because their 
siblings had taken part, three did not provide assent, two were unavailable during the 
sessions, and one did not meet inclusion criteria due to an uncorrected hearing 
impairment. One-hundred and thirty children took part in sessions. Fifty-five children 
(42.30%) were boys and 75 (58.70%) were girls. Ages ranged from 7 years, 4 months to 
10 years, 3 months (M = 8 years, 9 months, SD = 8.91 months). All spoke English as 
their primary language, and none had a formal diagnosis of behavioural, developmental, 
or educational disorders based on parental report. All children had normal, or corrected 
to normal hearing and vision. The group was ethnically, culturally and socio-
economically mixed, including pupils from an Independent Girls’ School, three mixed 
Community State Schools, and a mixed voluntary aided Church of England primary 
school. Four of the five schools were smaller than average, with the remaining being 
much larger than average. All schools had a higher than average proportion of White 
British students, but report bilingual pupils and pupils of minority ethnicities. Four of 
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the schools had a lower than average proportion of pupils eligible for pupil premium, 
with the remaining school reporting a higher than average proportion. One school was 
rated as ‘requires improvement’, three ‘good’ and one ‘excellent’, in reports by Ofsted 
and ISI. Children took part voluntarily and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. 
Schools and children were entered into separate voucher prize draws on completion.  
Materials 
Ratings were recorded for how Happy, Sad, Excited and Scared children had felt 
that day on a 4-item self-report questionnaire using a 5-point Likert Scale from ‘0’ (Not 
at all) to ‘4’ (Very, very much).  
There were six DRM stimuli lists, each consisting of 14 items (see Appendix: 
Chapter IV, V – Stimuli). These were the same lists as used in Experiment 3 in this 
thesis. Items were taken from 12 previously established backwards associative strength 
(BAS) DRM stimuli lists, with items 2-8 from each list included in the experimental 
stimuli lists. List A and B consisted of positive items (A [‘Sweet’ and ‘Love’], B [‘Soft’ 
and ‘Music’]), C and D of neutral items (C [‘Green’ and ‘Chair’], D [‘Fruit’ and 
‘Foot’]), and E and F of negative items (E [‘Cry’ and ‘Thief’], F [‘Angry’ and ‘Sick’]). 
The lists Sweet, Chair, Fruit, Foot, and Cry were sampled from lists used by Budson et 
al. (2006), The lists Love, Soft, Music, Green, Thief, Angry, and Sick were sampled 
from the Cornell/ Cortland emotion lists (Brainerd et al., 2010). There was no overlap 
between items across lists. The order of items was randomized within each of the 12 
previously established lists, with items from each list pair presented alternately to make 
the final six lists. The order of item presentation in each list remained fixed for all 
children.  
The presentation paradigm was programmed in Matlab. A fixation point was 
displayed in the centre of the screen for 5 s prior to the trial commencing. Each item 
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was presented in large black font on a white background for 2 s. Contrast and brightness 
of the screen was standardized across children. As each word appeared, a recording of 
the word was played through headphones in a British female voice, at a standardized 
volume. Following each item, a screen then appeared with a question and horizontal 
ratings scale. In the low elaboration condition, children were asked to rate each word on 
ease of spelling on a horizontal slider scale. The scale included 5 references points from 
‘very easy’ (−400 from centre), to ‘very hard’ (400 from centre). In the high elaboration 
condition children were asked to rate how each word made them feel from ‘very bad’ 
(−400 from centre), to ‘very good’ (400 from centre). Once the participant clicked on 
the scale a blank screen with a fixation cross in the centre appeared for 2 s prior to the 
next item. The programme was set not to respond to any clicks on the scale made during 
the first 2 s of the question appearing, to avoid erroneous clicking, and children 
selecting the same answer without any thought.  
The recognition paradigm consisted of 20 items. Two items were the critical 
lures from the stimuli lists (not presented in the presentation paradigm), two were 
related lures (the first item from each original BAS DRM list, not presented in the 
presentation paradigm), 10 were unrelated distractors from alternate DRM lists of the 
same valence, and six were target items (items in position 3, 5 and 7 from each original 
BAS DRM last presented in the presentation paradigm). The order of items was 
randomized but remained fixed between children. The Matlab recognition paradigm was 
the same as the ratings/ presentation paradigm, but instead of rating each item, children 
were asked ‘Have you seen this word before?’ and were asked to click inside a ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ box as a forced choice answer. 
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Design 
A mixed design was employed. Type of word was a within-participants variable 
with two levels (neutral vs valenced), whilst Valence of emotive list, with two levels 
(positive vs negative) and Elaboration, with two levels (low vs high) were between-
participants variables. Children were assigned systematically to the four conditions; 
positive-low elaboration (n = 33), negative-low elaboration (n = 32), positive-high 
elaboration (n = 34) and negative-high elaboration (n = 32). The order of presentation 
was counterbalanced; half of the children in each condition were presented with the 
neutral lists first, half the valenced. Presentation order was included as a fixed effect in 
analyses. 
Within the ratings task, the dependent variable was difficulty in spelling (from 
‘very easy’ to ‘very difficult’) for the low elaboration group, and strength of emotion 
elicited (from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’) in the high elaboration groups. The dependent 
variables in the recognition tasks were hit and false alarm rates, used to calculate d’ 
prime and criterion C scores. For analysis of emotion and spelling ratings of words, d’ 
scores, and C scores, a series of mixed ANCOVAs with Bonferroni adjustments was 
conducted. Age was included as a covariate in the first step and gender in the second. 
Covariates were retained only where they significantly predicted the outcome variable 
or interacted significantly with other independent variables. 
Procedure 
Interviews were conducted individually in a quiet space at the child’s school, 
away from their classroom. Children had the interview procedure and confidentiality 
information outlined to them. They were given a chance to ask questions and assent was 
attained. For the self-report measures the researcher read the questions out loud, and the 
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children circled their response on the answer sheet. Children were able to ask questions 
if they did not understand any of the items.  
Each presentation paradigm was followed by one minute of simple maths sums 
as a distraction task, and then the matching recognition paradigm. This was repeated for 
the four word lists. Children were debriefed, thanked, awarded a sticker, and given the 
option of viewing the correct recognition answers before returning to class.  
Children were monitored closely for any signs of distress, at which point the 
interview would be terminated immediately and children would have the choice of 
reading an age appropriate book before returning to class. 
Results 
Children’s Mood Ratings 
An independent samples t-test revealed no significant differences in initial 
ratings of happiness between children in the positive (M = 3.32, SE = 0.11) and negative 
conditions (M = 3.53, SE = 0.08), t(128) = −1.55, p = .123, 95% BCa CI [−0.49, 0.03], d 
= 0.27. A second independent samples t-test revealed no significant differences in initial 
ratings of internalization (combined fear and sadness scores) between children in the 
positive (M = 0.92, SE = 0.18) and negative conditions (M = 0.63, SE = 0.12), t(110.15) 
= 1.38, p = .123, 95% BCa CI [−0.09, 0.69], d = 0.24. 
Properties of DRM lists 
Properties of the DRM lists were analysed and reported in Chapter IV. Positive 
lists (M = 6.87, SE = 0.18) were rated as significantly more positive than neutral words 
on average (M = 5.90, SE = 0.18), p = .001, 95% BCa CI [0.57, 1.34], which were rated 
as significantly more positive than negative words on average (M = 3.28, SE = 0.18), p 
< .001, 95% BCa CI [2.05, 3.18], F(2, 79) = 107.00, p <.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.73. There were no 
significant differences in word frequency, word length, or neighbourhood size subset or 
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superset frequency. However, there were significant differences in arousal scores, age of 
acquisition, and imageability between the word lists (p’s <.001, .005, .025, 
respectively). Full analysis is presented in Chapter IV and the Appendix (Chapter IV, V 
– Stimuli).   
Ratings of Words in DRM Lists  
Ease of spelling (low elaboration condition). Data from four children were 
excluded because their scores exceeded 3 SDs of the mean. Age was a significant 
predictor of spelling difficulty ratings, F(1, 55) = 12.47, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2    = .19, but did not 
interact significantly with word type, F(1, 55) = 0.01, p = .902, 𝜂𝑝
2    = .00. Spelling 
difficulty decreased as age increased for emotional (β = −5.82) and neutral words (β = 
−5.92). Gender scores did not significantly predict ease of spelling ratings (p = .838).24  
A 2 × 2 × 2 (Affect condition [positive, negative]), Word type [emotional, 
neutral], Rotation [emotional first, neutral first]) mixed ANCOVA with Bonferroni 
adjustments was conducted on spelling difficulty ratings, with age entered as a 
covariate. Overall, children did not report significantly different ratings of spelling 
difficulty in the positive affect (M = −248.69, SE = 21.37) compared to the negative 
affect condition (M = −205.25, SE = 20.66), F(1, 55) = 2.13, p = .150, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .04. There 
was no significant difference reported in the difficulty of spelling for affective words (M 
= −214.98, SE = 16.29) compared to neutral words (M = −238.96, SE = 14.47), F(1, 55) 
= 0.02, p = .893, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00. The interaction between the type of word and the affect 
condition on spelling ratings was not significant, F(1, 55) = 1.09, p = .302, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .02. 
The main effect of rotation on spelling ratings was not significant, F(1, 55) = 0.77, p = 
.368, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, and rotation did not interact significantly with word type, F(1, 55) = 
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      Full covariate analysis results are shown in supplementary materials. 
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1.96, p = .167, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, valence condition F(1, 55) = 3.46, p = .068, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .06, or word 
type × valence, F(1, 55) = 1.78, p = .188, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03. 
Emotion evoked (high elaboration condition). Data from six children were 
excluded due to scores lying outside 3 SDs of the mean. Age and gender scores did not 
significantly predict ratings of word valence (ps = .977, .940, respectively).
25
 A mixed 2 
× 2 × 2 (Affect [positive, negative], Word type [emotional, neutral], Rotation 
[emotional first, neutral first]) ANOVA with Bonferroni adjustments showed that 
overall, significantly greater positive ratings were reported for neutral (M = 72.96, SE = 
8.32) than for emotional words (M = 21.57, SE = 9.91), F(1, 55) = 44.65, p <.001, 𝜂𝑝
2    = 
.45. Children in the positive affect group rated words as eliciting significantly greater 
positive emotions (M = 132.03, SE = 11.24) than ratings in the negative affect condition 
(M = −37.50, SE = 12.22), F(1, 55) = 104.24, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2    = .66. There was also a 
significant interaction between the type of word, and affect condition on mean emotion 
ratings, F(1, 55) = 301.12, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2    = .85. Scores were highest (most positive) for 
the emotional words in the positive affect group (M = 172.98, SE = 14.75), and lowest 
(most negative) for the emotional words in the negative affect group (M = −130.31, SE 
= 8.35). The neutral words were rated as significantly more positive in the positive 
affect (M = 90.35, SE = 13.38) than in the negative affect condition (M = 55.06, SE = 
8.35), t(50.69) = 2.24, p = .026, 95% BCa CI [8.09, 66.87.54], d = 0.57. Paired t-tests 
also showed significant differences in average ratings between neutral and emotional 
lists in the positive affect condition, t(31) = 7.79, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [62.32, 103.19], 
d = 1.49, and negative affect condition, t(26) = −16.71, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [−207.92, 
−163.84], d = 3.36.  
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      Full covariate analysis results are shown in supplementary materials. 
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The main effect of rotation on valence ratings was not significant, F(1, 55) = 
0.31, p = .582, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, and rotation did not interact significantly with word type, F(1, 
55) = 0.11, p = .743, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, valence condition F(1, 55) = 0.02, p = .877, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or 
word type × valence, F(1, 55) = 2.28, p = .137, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04. 
Recognition Task 
Children’s correct hits (H) and incorrect false alarms (F) across lists of the same 
valence were summed and converted into hit and false alarm rates. Discrimination (d’) 
and criterion C scores were calculated for sensitivity and response bias analysis, as 
outlined in Chapter I. Data from three children were excluded from the recognition 
analysis due to missing trials resulting from software issues. Data from eight children 
were excluded from recognition analysis due to outlying d’ or C scores (more than 3 
SDs above or below the mean).  
Sensitivity: Type I d’ analysis. There was a high level of discrimination 
overall, with one sample t-tests showing that children could discriminate at better-than-
chance levels for all word lists with d’ scores significantly greater than 0. For the 
positive lists, t(59) = 28.45, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [2.52, 2.93], d = 7.41, neutral lists in 
the positive condition, t(59) = 26.86, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [2.64, 3.06], d = 6.99, 
neutral lists in the negative condition, t(58) = 33.72, p = <.001, 95% BCa CI [2.82, 
3.18], d = 8.80, and negative lists t(58) = 34.56, p < .001, 95% BCa CI [2.37, 2.66], d = 
7.65.  
Discrimination (d’) scores increased significantly with age, F(1, 110) = 6.37, p = 
.013, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .06, for neutral words, β = .01 and for emotional words, β = .02. There was 
no significant interaction between age and word type on d’ scores, F(1, 110) = 1.18, p = 
.278, 𝜂𝑝
2  =.01. Gender did not significantly predict d’ scores (p = .958).26 A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 
                                                          
26
      Full covariate analysis is shown in the supplementary materials. 
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(Word type [emotional, neutral], Affect [positive, negative], Elaboration [low, high], 
Rotation [emotional first, neutral first]) mixed ANCOVA using Bonferroni adjustments 
was conducted on d’ scores, with age entered as a covariate.  
Mean d’ scores were not significantly different in the low (M = 2.75, SE = 0.08) 
and high elaboration condition (M = 2.81, SE = 0.08), after accounting for age, F(1, 
110) = 0.24, p = .623, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00, or in the positive (M = 2.79, SE = 0.08) compared to the 
negative affect condition (M = 2.77, SE = 0.08), F(1, 110) = 0.04, p = .845, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00. 
The interaction effect between elaboration and affect condition on d’ scores was not 
significant, F(1, 110) = 1.21, p = .273, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .01. There was no significant difference in 
d’ scores between neutral (M = 2.93, SE = 0.07) and emotional words (M = 2.63, SE = 
0.06), F(1, 110) = 2.17, p = .143, 𝜂𝑝
2 
 
= .02. However, word type and word affect did 
interact significantly, F(1, 110) = 8.03, p = .005, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .07 (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Clustered bar chart showing discrimination (d’ scores) for emotional and neutral words 
in the positive and negative conditions. Bars show standard error.   
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Mean d’ scores were higher for neutral words than emotional words in both 
conditions; mean d’ scores for neutral words did not differ significantly between the 
negative condition (M = 3.00, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [2.81, 3.20]), and the positive 
condition, (M = 2.85, SE = 0.10, 95% CI [2.66, 3.05]), t(118) = −1.07, p = .275, 95% 
BCa CI [−0.41, 0.12], d = 0.20. Mean d’ scores for positive words (M = 2.72, SE = 0.09, 
95% CI [2.55, 2.90]) were only slightly, and not significantly lower than for the neutral 
words in the positive condition, t(59) = −1.46, p = .145, 95% BCa CI [−0.30, 0.05], d = 
0.16. The mean d’ for the negative words (M = 2.47, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [2.29, 2.64]) 
was significantly lower than for the neutral words in the negative condition, t(59) = 
−5.38, p = .001, 95% BCa CI [−0.73, −0.31], d = 0.80. Discrimination was not 
significantly different for negative compared to positive words, t(117) = 1.80, p = .074, 
95% BCa CI [0.01, 0.50], d = 0.45.   
There was no significant interaction between elaboration and word type on d’ 
scores, F(1, 110) = 0.47, p = .493, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00, nor was there a significant 3 way 
interaction between elaboration, word type and affect condition, F(1, 110) = 0.12, p = 
.734, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00. The main effect of rotation on d’ was not significant, F(1, 110) = 0.62, p 
= .431, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, nor did it interact significantly with affect condition, F(1, 110) = 0.27, 
p = .604, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or elaboration, F(1, 110) = 0.09, p = .760, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00. The three-way 
interactions between rotation × affect condition × elaboration, F(1, 110) = 0.10, p = . 
753, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, rotation × word type × elaboration, F(1, 110) = 1.43, p = .235, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, 
and rotation × word type × affect condition, F(1, 110) = 0.66, p = .417, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, were 
all non-significant, as was the four way interaction, F(1, 110) = 0.40, p = .530, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00. 
Response Bias: Criterion C analysis. C scores were not significantly different 
to 0 when lists were examined by type or valence condition (see Table 1). This indicates 
no significant bias in responding with ‘yes’ or ‘no’. However, significant conservative 
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response bias was shown for neutral words in the positive, low elaboration condition, 
(M = 0.21, SE = 0.06), t(28) = 3.36, p = .002, 95% BCa CI [0.09, 0.32], d = 0.53, and 
negative words in the low elaboration condition (M = 0.15, SE = 0.06), t(29) = 2.65, p = 
.013, 95% BCa CI [0.04, 0.26], d = 0.70. In the high elaboration condition, significant 
liberal bias was shown for positive words, (M = −0.20, SE = 0.06), t(30) = −3.57, p = 
.001, 95% BCa = [−0.32, −0.09], d = 0.87. 
Table 1. 
Mean C scores by list type and valence condition with t-test showing whether C scores differ 
significantly from 0. 
Age and gender scores did not significantly predict response bias (ps = .891, and 
.479, respectively).
27
 A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 (Word type [emotive, neutral], Affect [positive, 
negative], Elaboration [low, high], Rotation [emotional first, neutral first]) mixed 
ANOVA with Bonferroni adjustments was conducted on C scores.  
Response bias for emotive words (M = −0.03, SE = 0.03) was not significantly 
different than for neutral words (M = 0.03, SE = 0.03), F(1, 111) = 2.87, p = .093, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.03. There was no significant difference in C scores between positive (M = −0.02, SE = 
0.04) and negative affect conditions (M = 0.02, SE = 0.04), F(1, 111) = 0.44, p = .508, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .00. However, word type and affect did interact significantly, F(1, 111) = 5.24, p = 
.024, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05, with a slight liberal response bias (more likely to respond ‘yes’ than 
‘no’) for positive words (M = −0.08, SE = 0.05), and a conservative response bias (more 
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      Full covariate analysis is shown in supplementary materials. 
Word Type/ 
Condition 
Criterion C 
M (SE) 
95% BCa 
CI lower 
95% BCa 
CI upper 
t df p d 
Emotional −0.03 (0.03) −0.10 0.04 −0.96 118 .339 0.15 
   Positive 0.09 (0.05) −0.18 0.01 −1.84 59 .070 0.43 
   Negative 0.02 (0.05) −0.08 0.12 0.17 58 .614 0.09 
Neutral 0.03 (0.03) −0.03 0.08 0.83 118 .409 0.16 
   Positive  0.04 (0.04) −0.05 0.13 1.01 59 .318 0.39 
   Negative 0.01 (0.04) −0.07 0.09 −0.51 58 .900 0.09 
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likely to respond ‘no’ than ‘yes’) for neutral words in the positive affect condition (M = 
0.05, SE = 0.04). A paired t-test showed that this difference was significant, t(59) = 
−3.26, p = .002, 95% BCa CI [−0.22, −0.05], d = 0.40. The difference between negative 
(M = 0.03, SE = 0.05) and neutral words (M = −0.01, SE = 0.04) in the negative affect 
condition was not significant, t(58) = 0.35, p = .730, 95% BCa CI [−0.09, 0.14], d = 
0.11.  
Elaboration instruction significantly affected response bias, F(1, 111) = 19.23, p 
= .000, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .15, with conservative bias observed in the low elaboration (M = 0.11, SE = 
0.04) and liberal bias in the high elaboration condition (M = −0.11, SE = 0.04). 
Elaboration instruction did not significantly interact with word type, F(1, 111) = 0.49, p 
= .485, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or affect condition, F(1, 111) = 0.98, p = .323, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. The 
elaboration × affect condition × word type interaction was also not significant, F(1, 111) 
= 2.64, p = .107, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02.  
Rotation order did not significantly affect response bias, F(1, 111) = 0.24, p = 
.623, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and did not significantly interact with affect condition, F(1, 111) = 0.01, 
p = .905, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or elaboration instruction, F(1, 111) = 0.35, p = .553, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00. 
However, the interaction between rotation order and word type condition was 
significant, F(1, 111) = 5.52, p = .021, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05. For those who received the emotional 
words first, there was no significant difference in bias between emotional words (M = 
0.02, SE = 0.05) and neutral words (M = 0.00, SE = 0.04), t(57) = 0.47, p = .640, 95% 
BCa CI [−0.06, 0.11], d = 0.07. However, those who viewed the neutral words first 
showed a significant difference in bias between word types; with a tendency towards a 
liberal response bias for emotional words (M = −0.08, SE = 0.05) and towards a 
conservative response bias for neutral words (M = 0.06, SE = 0.04), t(60) = −2.88, p = 
.005, 95% BCa CI [−0.23, −0.05], d = 0.36. 
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The three-way interactions between rotation × affect condition × elaboration, 
F(1, 111) = 3.63, p = .059, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, rotation × word type × elaboration, F(1, 111) = 
1.32, p = .254, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, and rotation × word type × affect condition, F(1, 111) = 0.22, p 
= .640, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, were non-significant, as was the four way interaction, F(1, 111) = 
0.12, p = .725, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00. 
Discussion 
This experiment aimed to explore mechanisms underlying observed negativity 
effects identified in Experiments 2 and 3 (Chapters III and IV) by manipulating 
elaboration levels. It was hypothesized that: (1) as levels of elaboration increase, the 
valence effect will diminish; (2) discrimination will increase with age; and (3) there will 
be no gender effects.  
Key findings showed: (1) a significant effect of valence on levels of 
discrimination; (2) a significant effect of valence on levels of response bias; (3) a 
significant interaction effect of word type and rotation on response bias; (4) a significant 
effect of semantic elaboration on response bias; and (5) a significant relationship 
between age and discrimination. The effects of valence on memory will first be 
considered, followed by a discussion of the effects of manipulating levels of semantic 
elaboration on emotional memory. A brief discussion of moderators follows, with 
considerations of implications and suggestions for future exploration. 
Valence Effects on Recognition  
Valence was successfully manipulated between the DRM lists. The lists have 
previously been validated as positive, neutral and negative in valence (Brainerd, Stein, 
Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008; Budson et al., 2006). Valence scores taken from 
the Warriner, Kuperman, and Brysbaert norms for 13,915 English lemmas (2012), and 
children’s word rating scores collected within the high elaboration condition show that 
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the emotionally positive, neutral, and negative word lists are significantly different from 
each other in the expected directions.  
A significant, medium sized effect of valence on discrimination was observed as 
a preference away from negative words; evidenced by the interaction between word 
type and valence condition. This supports findings from previous studies using similar 
DRM paradigms with children (Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010, Experiment 2, 4, and 5; 
Moradi et al., 2000; Neshat-Doost, et al., 1998). No significant preference toward or 
away from positive words was shown, although there was a tendency away from 
positive words, in line with Moradi et al., (2000) and Nehsat-Doost et al. (1998).  
There was also a difference in response bias between negative and neutral 
words. Where neutral words were presented first there was a slight conservative bias 
shown towards the neutral words, but a slightly higher liberal bias shown towards the 
emotional words. This liberal response bias would have resulted in a higher amount of 
false alarms for the emotional that neutral words, in line with previous findings (Budson 
et al., 2006; Howe et al., 2010). There was no significant difference in response bias 
between the neutral and emotional words when emotional words were presented first. 
Together with discrimination results, this shows that children are both more inclined to 
respond positively (say they have seen emotional words before), in particular for 
positive words, or when they follow neutral words, and this is a separate effect than the 
lower accuracy seen for negative compared to neutral words. It would thus appear that 
negative stimuli are processed less effectively within memory, whereas children are 
more likely to report positive memories, regardless of whether they are accurate.   
There was a small, but non-significant effect of valence on discrimination 
between positive and negative words, with positive discriminated more accurately than 
negative. This is in line with findings of a significant effect reported by Brainerd et al 
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(1998), Moradi et al. (2000), and for visual stimuli when presented with a congruent 
story in Experiment 2 (Chapter III). There was no valence effect on response bias in this 
cell of comparison.  
Children exhibited slight liberal bias towards positive items, and conservative 
bias towards neutral items. Although the difference between positive and neutral words 
was significant, significant levels of response bias were not observed in either condition 
independently. Additionally, those who viewed the neutral words first showed a 
significant difference in bias between word types; with a tendency towards a liberal 
response bias for emotional words and towards a conservative response bias for neutral 
words. 
The difference in findings between Experiment 3 and 4 could be due to several 
reasons. Firstly, the near ceiling effect appeared even greater in Experiment 4 than in 
Experiment 3, despite a distractor task being introduced in an attempt to increase task 
difficulty. This effect held across the positive and neutral conditions. This could be due 
to children completing the recognition tasks for fewer lists, and so becoming less 
fatigued or bored. Alternatively, it could be due to the different procedure; there was a 
central fixation point displayed between each word, meaning words were presented at a 
slower rate, and words were displayed for 2 s in the initial presentation phase before 
children could click to rate the words on ease of spelling or emotion evoked. Words 
continued to be displayed until children had clicked their spelling of emotion rating 
after this initial 2 s, meaning they were displayed for longer, overall in Experiment 4, 
than Experiment 3. Additional rehearsal could have been taking place during this extra 
time. Response speeds were not recorded, but it was evident during sessions that 
children routinely attempted to respond within the first 2 s of words being displayed, 
and therefore had to continue looking at the screen and wait until they were allowed to 
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respond in accordance with the programming design. As discussed in Chapter IV, the 
paradigm in Experiment 3 also included presentation of a story prior to viewing words. 
This could have led to a difference in processing as children sought to match up the 
words with contextual information from the stories in Experiment 3, but not in the 
current experiment (Haviland & Clark, 1974). Lastly, Experiment 3 was likely much 
more underpowered than Experiment 4.  
The limitations with the word lists discussed in Experiment 3 also apply when 
interpreting the findings within this chapter; there are several significant differences 
between the word lists, other than valence, which present as confounding variables; 
word lists differed significantly in arousal, age of acquisition, and imageability. All of 
these are characteristics are likely to have affected discrimination. Although arousal 
positively predicts memory performance (Lang et al., 1995), this was not observed in 
the current study with the least arousing neutral words discriminated most accurately, 
followed by positive words, with the most arousing negative words discriminated least 
accurately. Age of acquisition also positively predicts recognition memory (Cortese, 
McCarty, & Schock et al, 2014). Findings of this experiment do not match existing 
literature, with negative words (acquired the latest) discriminated the least accurately.  
Imageability positively predicts recognition memory (Cortese et al, 2014). 
Negative words scored significantly lower than neutral words on imageability, but no 
different to positive words, meaning the neutral words should have been discriminated 
more accurately than the negative words. This pattern was observed, with significantly 
higher discrimination observed for neutral than negative words. A trend for higher 
discrimination for neutral, compared with positive words was also observed, in line with 
a trend for lower imageability scores for positive, compared with neutral words. This 
means that imageability could be driving the findings of the current experiment, in 
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combination with, or instead of valence (as opposed to arousal and age of acquisition in 
Experiment 3). These particular word lists were chosen to extend on Experiment 3, but 
in future studies, word lists should be controlled on all characteristics except valence, to 
truly tease these findings out. Further research should be carried out to establish why 
arousal and age of acquisition appeared to drive discrimination effects in Experiment 3, 
but imageability in Experiment 4.  
Effects of Semantic Elaboration on Emotional Memory 
It was hypothesized that as explicit elaboration increased, valence effects would 
decrease (hypothesis 1). Semantic elaboration levels did not significantly affect 
discrimination rates, contrary to the hypothesis and findings from a previous DRM 
experiment, where more correct items were recalled in an immediate free recall task 
when word lists were encoded semantically compared to non-semantically (Toglia, 
Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999). However, children did exhibit significantly more liberal 
response bias in the high elaboration condition, and conservative bias in the low 
elaboration condition. This effect was driven by significantly conservative bias for 
neutral words in the low elaboration, but significantly liberal bias for the negative words 
in the high elaboration condition. Where response bias is observed, true sensitivity is 
underestimated (Georgeson, n.d.). Taken with low power (around 15 observations per 
cell), it is likely that any true effects of level of elaboration were obscured in the current 
experiment.   
Differences in findings between the current experiment and findings of Toglia et 
al. (1999) could be explained by experimental design differences. Firstly, the current 
experiment included children, whereas Toglia et al. (1999) used an adult sample. 
Research has shown a cognitive shift in false memory occurs somewhere between 7-11 
years of age (Brainerd et al., 2010). Secondly, Toglia et al (1999) employed a free recall 
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design, where participants were instructed not to guess, whereas the current study 
utilised a recognition task. Differences between rates of false alarms in recognition tasks 
and false recall have previously been reported (Howe et al., 2010). Recall tasks activate 
four separate brain areas more fully than recognition tasks (Cabeza et al., 1997), 
possibly indicating that these additional steps of accessing information could be where 
semantic elaboration has an effect on false memories.  
In the low elaboration condition, children were instructed to rate words based on 
the difficulty of spelling each word. This required children to access lexical and 
phonological information about each word, which would activate only other words with 
similar spellings or sounds. This is equivalent to a shallow level of encoding. In the high 
elaboration condition, children were instructed to rate how the word made them feel. 
This required children to think about the meaning of the word, and in what situation or 
context they would encounter the word. This process would have activated a much 
wider network of other related words and concepts in their memory, and may have 
increased feelings of recognition for words in the recognition task that had not been 
presented in the learning phase, encouraging a ‘yes’ response more frequently (Demb et 
al., 1995), accounting for the increase in liberal bias.   
Moderators of Emotional Memory 
As expected, rates of discrimination increased with age (hypothesis 2). Working 
memory becomes more efficient through childhood, resulting in a greater working 
memory span and the ability to successfully encode and remember more items 
(Gathercole, 2004). These age effects are in line with findings of other similar DRM 
studies (Brainerd, 2010; Howe, 2007; Howe et al, 2009, Howe et al; 2010; Quas, 2013).  
There were no interactions between age and valence effects on discrimination or 
response bias, as in Experiment 3 of this thesis. However, in Experiment 2 of this thesis, 
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as well as in existing literature (Brainerd et al., 2010), recognition increased with age 
for the emotionally positive material at a faster rate than for the emotionally negative 
material. Additionally, recognition for negative pictures was found to increase as age 
increases, but remain stable for neutral images (Cordon et al., 2013). The mixed pattern 
of results provides inconclusive evidence as to the precise relationship between age and 
valence effects, and under what circumstances this effect is borne out. 
In line with hypothesis 3, gender was not significantly associated with 
discrimination or response bias, as in Experiments 2 and 3, and in line with previous 
research using word list (e.g. Howe, 2007; Howe et al, 2009; Howe et al., 2010; Quas, 
2015) and  images (Cordon, 2013). Although a gender effect was identified in 
Experiment 1 of this thesis, this is thought a spurious result; no explanation with a firm 
theoretical underpinning could be identified.  
Conclusions 
The present experiment provides support for existing findings of a preference 
away from negative stimuli in discrimination, when presented as word lists in a DRM 
paradigm. A tendency for lower discrimination for positive than neutral, and for 
negative than positive words was also found, in line with previous findings. 
Discrimination increased with age, but no differences were found between gender 
(hypotheses 2, and 3). Neither interacted with valence effects. The processing of 
emotional words is thought to result in increased activation of semantic networks in 
memory (Demb et al., 1995), triggering an increase in false memories for related words 
or words of a similar valence. It was hypothesized that increasing explicit semantic 
elaboration would lower valence effects by ‘evening the playing field’, as it were 
(hypothesis 1). Although no effects of elaborative instruction were seen on 
discrimination, deeper encoding led to a higher liberal response bias, with bias differing 
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by valence, depending on elaboration condition. This interaction can be explained by a 
positive-negative asymmetrical bias in information processing (Lewicka et al., 1992).  
In future experiments, longer word lists should be utilised, with a faster 
presentation speed, and no central fixation point displayed between each item. These 
changes would reduce the amount of time available for active rehearsal, to reduce near-
ceiling effects. Word lists should also be matched on other aspects such as arousal, 
imageability and age of acquisition. Increasing power and implementing a much longer 
distraction task would also make it more likely that valence effects would reliably be 
found in the control conditions; given a minimum delay of 20 minutes is typically 
needed to produce emotional enhancement effects in memory (Kleinsmith and Kaplan, 
1963). Including lists of related and unrelated emotional and neutral words would also 
allow differential effects of cohesiveness and semantic relatedness to be teased apart 
more fully.   
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Chapter VI: Discussion 
Aims and Methodologies 
The aims of this thesis were: (1) to explore whether environmental influences 
(specifically “scary” TV) are a plausible explanation for increasing levels of anxiety in 
typically developing children; (2) to explore the relationship between trait anxiety and 
emotional preferences in memory; and (3) to explore whether typically developing 
children show a preference for emotionally valenced stimuli in long term memory. A 
secondary line of enquiry was to explore age and gender as potential moderators of 
emotional memory biases, and to investigate potential interaction effects of stimulus 
types and context of presentation. 
This conclusion chapter first provides a brief recap of the design of the meta-
analysis and four experiments in this thesis. It proceeds to first discuss the internalizing 
effects of scary TV from Chapter II (research aim 1) and how these might relate to 
emotional memory preferences, followed by a discussion of the effects of emotionally 
valenced stimuli identified within the experimental chapters (research aim 3). 
Interactions between context and stimulus types are considered alongside these findings, 
followed by a discussion of depth of encoding as a potential mechanism for valence 
effects on memory as secondary lines of enquiry. Age, gender, and trait anxiety 
(research aim 2) are presented separately because these were not manipulated as part of 
the experimental design. Finally, contributions and limitations of the experiments, and 
thesis as a whole are discussed, along with future directions for research.  
Meta-analysis Design 
The first aim was addressed by conducting a meta-analysis of the effects of 
scary TV on internalizing emotions, including fear/ anxiety, sadness/ depression and 
PTSD amongst others, in children (Chapter II). Experimental and correlational studies 
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were included; experimental studies were included only when the study design 
incorporated a control group of no TV viewing, or baseline measures. This allowed a 
weighted, standardized effect size to be calculated, to complete a systematic review of 
existing literature exploring these effects. In addition, ten potential moderators were 
entered into the analysis as a multi-level nested model, based on theoretical hypotheses 
and previous experimental findings. These were grouped into study characteristics, 
individual characteristics, and media characteristics.  
Experimental Designs 
Experiments 1-3 addressed the second research aim by measuring levels of trait 
anxiety (one of the internalizing outcomes in the meta-analysis), and exploring whether 
the relationship between anxiety and memory performance differed between materials 
of positive, neutral or negative valence. Trait anxiety was not measured in Experiment 4 
because no reliable effects had been borne out in the previous experiments. All 
experiments explored research aim 3, although only a comparison between negatively 
and positively valenced materials could be made in Experiment 1, and the recognition 
task in Experiment 2. The recall task in Experiment 2, and Experiments 3 and 4 also 
included comparisons between valenced and neutral stimuli to explore negativity and 
positivity preferences. 
Experiment 1 (Chapter III) explored the effects of valenced TV clips on memory 
performance. Interaction effects of stimulus type were also explored. An emotionally 
positive and an emotionally negative clip were shown to typically developing primary 
school aged children, followed by a free and prompted recall task, and a recognition 
task. However, the main manipulation of valence was unsuccessful, in addition to the 
inclusion of only one exemplar of each valence, and no neutral comparison condition. 
Conclusions based on findings from Experiment 1 were therefore limited. 
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Experiment 2 (Chapter III) built on the design and trends identified in 
Experiment 1 by presenting still images from each clip, paired with either a positively 
or negatively valenced version of the narratives adapted from the same TV clips. 
Children were assigned to either a congruent condition, where the images from each clip 
were presented with a narrative that matched the valence of the images, or an 
incongruent condition. This assignment allowed the effects of stimulus modality, and 
congruency/ context on differently valenced materials to be tested. It also permitted for 
a portion of the positively and negatively valenced version of each narrative to consist 
of shared, neutral text. This allowed negativity and positivity preferences in recall 
memory to be explored (Research aim 3).  
Experiment 3 (Chapter IV) was designed to further explore the context effects 
seen in Experiment 2. Children were shown a valenced or neutral story, followed by 
emotionally negative, neutral and positive DRM word lists. The story valence provided 
emotional context, to compare to performance on recognition for word lists of the same 
or different valence.  
Experiment 4 (Chapter V) was designed to test the role of elaboration in 
memory preferences, as a possible mechanism for the effects apparent in Experiments 
1-3. The word lists from Experiment 3 were used for continuity, and level of elaboration 
was manipulated using ratings tasks. Children rated words on ease of spelling in the low 
elaboration condition, and depth of positive or negative feeling evoked in the high 
elaboration condition.  
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Internalizing Effects of “Scary” TV 
Chapter II presented a meta-analysis examining the internalizing effects of scary 
TV on children. The meta-analysis found a small but consistent effect of scary TV on 
children’s internalizing responses. This finding is in line with Twenge (2000), who 
hypothesized that an increase in TV viewing could be leading to an increased perception 
of overall threat in the world, due to the amount of threat content regularly broadcast. 
The implications of these findings may apply to policy makers, clinicians and parents; 
ratings guidelines should be updated to consider how much ‘scary’ content is included 
in TV aimed at both children and adults, in addition to violent content. Parents may also 
wish to consider more carefully, what content they consider suitable for their child. 
Children, particularly those aged under 10 years, should be monitored for signs of 
internalizing emotion (for example, fear/ anxiety, sadness, sleep disturbances) during 
and after viewing. Content causing symptoms such as these may not be suitable, and it 
is not recommended that parents expose children to any content they find highly 
distressing. Although systematic desensitization or graded exposure therapy can be 
effective forms of treatment to reduce anxiety caused by a particular stimulus or 
environment (Powers & Emmelkamp, 2008), therapies should only be administered by 
qualified professionals.  
Anxiety has been linked to distortions in attention, interpretation and memory 
(Muris & Field, 2008). Whilst attention and interpretation effects have been fairly well 
established, the link between memory and anxiety is more tenuous. The effect of 
valence on memory was therefore explored in the experimental chapters, as a potential 
cognitive mechanism leading to greater fear for negative stimuli.     
Moderator analysis in the meta-analysis revealed that experimental designs 
resulted in a significantly larger effect size than correlational studies. Experimental 
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paradigms were therefore employed in Chapters III-V, as this would enable the 
mechanisms behind the effect to be studied more easily. A significantly larger effect 
size was also reported when all children in the study sample were less than 10 years of 
age. For this reason, Experiments 1-4 included primary school aged children (7-11 year 
olds). Existing literature has shown that children of this age process information more 
visually, and are more easily scared by mythical or magical content (Harrison & Cantor, 
1999). For this reason, TV clips of a programme based in a fictional, magical land were 
chosen for Experiments 1 and 2, with memory scores split into visual and narrative 
categories.        
Valence Effects on Memory 
Positivity and Negativity Preferences 
No preferences toward positive or negative, compared to neutral stimuli were 
observed in any of the experiments, in recognition or recall tasks. This was somewhat 
surprising where pictorial or narrative stimuli were used, given previous research 
(Cordon et al., 2013; Van Bergen et al., 2015).  
A preference away from emotional (toward neutral) stimuli was found in the 
recall task where the two sources of information were incongruent (Experiment 2), and 
a preference away from negative words was found in the DRM paradigm that included 
the use of an encoding task (Experiment 4). These were medium sized effects, with no 
response bias evident. Valence was successfully manipulated in Experiment 4 and the 
manipulation was partially successful in Experiment 2. Taken with the effect size, 
significance of findings, and lack of response bias, this indicates they are likely to be 
genuine effects.  
However, this valence effect was not consistent across all four experiments, so 
cannot be considered a general effect of valenced material. There is no obvious 
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similarity between the designs of these two experiments. It is unlikely due to an 
extraneous variable relating to the properties of the stimuli (such as level of arousal), 
because the same effect was not found in Experiments 3, which used the same word 
lists as Experiment 4, whilst the stimuli in Experiment 2 and 4 were markedly different 
from each other. Nonetheless, there were limitations with both stimulus sets in regards 
to extraneous variables.  
The image sets in Experiment 2 were taken from the clips in Experiment 1. 
These were from the same TV show, and were matched on several other key variables 
such as arousal,
28
 main characters, and length, for example. There may have also been 
other key differences between stimuli sets in Experiment 2 not considered during design 
such as novelty and cohesiveness, which can influence memory performance (Keenan, 
Baillet, & Brown, 1984; Kishiyama & Yonelinas, 2003). Crucially, valence ratings did 
not differ significantly between the two versions of each story, or between each set of 
images, resulting in only a partially successful manipulation of valence. However, they 
differed significantly for the ‘druid’ versus ‘monster’ condition overall, in the direction 
expected according to the valence of images, which remained constant regardless of 
congruency condition. It is possible that presenting two sets of stimuli simultaneously 
affected their ratings due to contextual cues. For example, children reported feeling 
significantly more positive towards neutral words when they were presented alongside 
positive words, than when identical neutral words were presented alongside negative 
words in Experiment 4. The absence of the expected interaction effects of story 
condition, modality, and valence is not considered to negate preference away from 
emotional material outlined above, however. Two other consistent patterns of findings 
were observed, showing valence effects between positive and negative stimuli, and an 
                                                          
28
      See Appendix for analysis of excitement ratings for Chapter III, Experiments 1 and 2. 
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interaction effect between modality and congruency on memory. The experiment may 
have lacked enough power to identify any true interaction effects in valence ratings. 
  As discussed in Chapters IV and V, word list stimuli in Experiment 3 and 4 
were more highly controlled on valence and other word characteristics such as length 
and frequency, but the lists did vary on some key characteristics; arousal, age of 
acquisition, and imageability. All three of these characteristics are related to 
performance on recognition tasks, and therefore could be partially driving the effects 
which were found (Cortese et al., 2010; Lang et al., 1995). The pattern of results does 
not match that expected if arousal or age of acquisition were driving the effect. And, as 
already highlighted, results differed between Experiments 3 and 4, meaning these other 
list traits may take on varying roles depending on other experimental factors. 
These significant findings on discrimination correspond to the majority of 
previously published research (Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010; Moradi et al., 2000; 
Neshat-Doost et al., 1998). Howe (2007) suggested a potential cognitive mechanism 
which children may employ, resulting in this valence effect in recall; children might use 
an ‘editing function’ for negative but not neutral information whereby they can filter out 
both true and false negative items. This is consistent with literature reporting that 
children are often reluctant to talk about negative events, and are less likely to assent 
that negative false events occurred than to assent that positive or neutral false events 
occurred (Bruck & Ceci, 1999).  
Experiment 4 incorporated a recognition rather than recall task, limiting the 
explanatory power of Howe’s theory (2007). Furthermore, negative material tends to be 
more semantically dense than neutral material (Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). If negative 
emotional items are more interrelated than neutral items, they may be processed with 
greater depth or richness (e.g., Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Ochsner, 2000), increasing 
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relational processing. This would lead to an increase in discriminability as semantic 
relatedness increases (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Ochsner, 2000; Talmi, Luk, et al., 
2007a; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004; Talmi, Schimmack, et al., 2007). It is unclear why 
this was not found in the current experiments, but could potentially be due to other 
factors in the experiment such as alternative characteristics of the word lists which can 
impact memory performance, and differences in study design and methodology.  
Response bias. There were also some effects of valence on response bias, 
independent of the valence effects outlined above. Children exhibited a higher 
propensity to respond with 'yes', or lower propensity to respond with 'no' for 
emotionally valenced, compared to neutral words in both experiments that included a 
neutral group (3 and 4). This effect was not observed for both positive and negative 
words in every cell of the highest order interactions, but was fairly consistent. The effect 
was small for positive, but large for negative words. This means children are using a 
criterion other than genuine discrimination to make decisions. An increased bias 
towards responding ‘yes’ can result in higher false alarms, which may have driven any 
subsequent discrimination effects. False alarms are not analysed separately throughout 
the thesis, but it is possible that an increase in false alarms can lower overall 
discrimination enough that differences between conditions are no longer significant, 
even if one condition has a significantly greater hit rate. This is an alternative 
explanation for the lack of observable negativity and positivity preferences within 
discrimination.  
Positive vs. Negative Stimuli 
Overall, memory performance for negative stimuli exceeded that for positive, 
across the experiments presented within this thesis. This effect was evident only for 
narrative or verbal items, but not visual items, indicating that modality interacts with 
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valence effects on memory. This was reliably demonstrated in Experiment 2 across 
recognition and recall, for both the congruent and incongruent narrative/ image set 
conditions. However, the effect size was much larger when the narrative/ image sets 
were congruent. A small effect of valence was also found for discrimination of words in 
Experiment 3. An interaction with rotation qualified this main effect, whereby this was 
only significant when negative lists were presented first. Experiments 1 and 2 did not 
uncover the same effect between positive and negative materials. However, the 
manipulation of valence in Experiment 1 was unsuccessful, meaning valence 
differences would not be expected. There is no obvious reason why a trend in the 
opposite direction was found in Experiment 4, other than the addition of an encoding 
task.  
Notably, very few differences in response bias were identified between positive 
and negative conditions across the experiments. Children displayed less conservative 
bias for negative than positive words in Experiment 3, but only in one rotation 
condition. Although this mirrors the valence and rotation effect on discrimination, it 
was only found in a handful of children, and cannot be generalized. Decision criterion 
does not appear to differ substantially for negative, compared to positive materials.  
Greater memory performance for negative than positive stories has also been 
identified in previous literature (Baltazar et al., 2012; Miller & Sperry, 1988; Van 
Bergen et al., 2015). One explanation for these findings, presented by Van Bergen et al 
(2015) is that negative emotions typically involve greater complication or goal failure 
than positive emotions (O’Kearny & Dadds, 2005). Negative experiences usually 
provoke increased effort towards understanding, and more effortful cognitive processing 
(Habermas, Meier, & Mukhtar, 2009; Lagattuta, 2014). This increase in cognitive 
processing would subsequently increase memorability of the negatively valenced stories 
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(Lagattuta, 2014). Although Experiment 3 used word stimuli rather than stories, stories 
were presented immediately prior to the negative word lists, when this valence effect 
was observed. Experimental evidence shows that when new stimuli are presented, 
individuals first search their memory for antecedent information that matches the new 
stimuli (Haviland & Clark, 1974). In the current experiment, children could have 
potentially searched the antecedent stimuli in memory (the story) for the negative 
stimuli, when they were presented first; resulting in a similar effect.  
By comparison, there was only one condition where memory performance for 
positive material significantly exceeded that for negative; for visual stimuli in 
Experiment 2, when the narrative/image sets were congruent. This corresponds with a 
lower level of response bias for the positive, than negative visual items, regardless of 
congruency. However, this modality effect cannot be interpreted adequately in isolation. 
Negatively valenced narrative was also discriminated at a significantly greater rate than 
the images, with no such difference observed for the positively valenced material.  
One possible explanation is the effect of valence on attention. Attention is 
considered a limited resource, and material needs to be selected to be attended to; 
various models provide differing hypotheses of how selection is undertaken. For 
example, Broadbent hypothesized that a specific physical characteristic of one channel 
of information is selected to attend to, without processing semantic content (Broadbent, 
1958). Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) extend upon Broadbent’s model and propose a 
shifting reference standard, whereby the filter takes up the level of the most important 
arriving signal. This means that when one signal is perceived as more important, it will 
be preferentially attended to. In the case of the negative condition, stress can trigger 
coping behaviours such as information seeking (Hoffner, 1993; Miller, 1987). If the 
negative narrative provides a richer source of information, attention may be directed 
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towards that, at the expense of the images. Increased attention can lead to an increase in 
memory performance through various mechanisms (for a review see Kensinger, 2004). 
For positively valenced material, this attention split may be more even between the two 
sources, resulting in no significant difference in discrimination. Therefore, when 
comparing discrimination for positive and negative visual items, discrimination appears 
greater for positive visual items. Discrimination for the images could be tested 
separately to test this hypothesis, as well as measuring attention during the 
discrimination task. 
Depth of Encoding 
It was originally anticipated that introducing a deep encoding condition in 
Experiment 4 would both enhance memory performance (Toglia et al., 1999), and 
potentially reduce valence effects (Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). Neither of these effects 
were borne out, but a difference was apparent in response bias; liberal response bias was 
evident in the high elaboration condition, whilst conservative response bias (of a lower 
value) was evident in the low elaboration condition. This effect was driven by 
significantly conservative bias for neutral words in the low elaboration, but significantly 
liberal bias for the negative words in the high elaboration condition. It is hypothesized 
that in the higher elaborative task, a denser network is activated. This would lead to 
lower discriminability in a subsequent recognition task (Demb et al., 1995). This 
initially seems to discredit one of the possible explanations offered in response to effect 
of greater recognition for semantically denser material. However, a crucial difference 
here is that Experiment 3 involved a story context, providing a schema to limit the 
spread of activation to unrelated items. This could therefore be an extra step, modifying 
valence affects. Alternatively, findings from either experiment may have been spurious 
rendering one explanation null. Further research would need to be conducted, 
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potentially with more divergent levels of encoding tasks to test these theories more 
fully. For example, the shallow encoding task could focus on visual aspects of the word 
displayed, such as colour of font.  
Contribution of Other Factors on Memory Performance 
Modality 
The interaction effects between valence and modality have been discussed 
above. However, modality also appears to interact with congruency independently of 
valence. In Experiment 3, the narrative items were discriminated significantly better 
than the visual items for both story conditions. Both were large effects. This suggests 
that when an element of uncertainty or stress in introduced, the richest source of 
information is sought out and attended to, regardless of its valence; in the same way as 
in the congruent negative condition. This could then lead to an increase in memory 
(Kensinger, 2004).  
Context 
In addition to the congruency effects discussed above, mood was manipulated in 
Experiment 3 prior to presenting the word lists. Lists of a congruent valence would be 
remembered better, with a potential interaction between this effect and valence. No 
context effects were found, despite successful mood manipulation. This is most likely 
due to ceiling effects, low power of the study, or only partial success in manipulating 
mood.   
Moderators 
Three potential moderators were measured and included in analytical models 
across the four experiments: age, gender and trait anxiety. Overall, there was a trend for 
memory performance to increase with age across the experiments, but no reliable effects 
of gender or trait anxiety on memory performance were found. None of the three 
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variables appeared to moderate emotional memory reliably; a tentative finding is that 
age may moderate recognition and recall memory performance for emotionally positive 
and negative materials differentially depending on whether the stimuli is semantically 
dense. 
Age 
In three of the four experiments (Experiments 1, 2 and 4) discrimination 
increased significantly with age. This held across all stimulus types; both visual and 
verbal aspects of TV clips, static images, aurally presented narratives and word lists. 
The proportion of narrative material correctly recalled in the monster condition of 
Experiments 1 also increased significantly with age, as did the number of false narrative 
details recalled overall in Experiment 1.  
A general increase in memory performance was expected with age (Gathercole, 
1998) although findings have been mixed in previous literature. Howe (2007) and Howe 
et al. (2010) analyse recognition and recall for true (target items) and false items 
(critical lures) separately, reporting that both increase with age. In contrast, Cordon et al 
(2013) report an increase in discrimination with age, whilst others report no significant 
changes with age (Moradi et al., 2000; Neshat-Doost et al., 1998; Van Bergen et al., 
2015). An increase in both true and false information recognized or recalled could lead 
to an increase in discrimination, or no difference, depending on how strong each 
relationship was. The current findings suggest that memory performance for correct 
items increases at a faster rate than that for false items.   
There was an interaction between age and valence on discrimination in 
Experiment 2, whereby discrimination increased with age for positive, but not negative 
material. This may be because negative false alarms were increasing, along with hit 
rates, but positive false alarms did not. This would need to be tested with further 
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analysis. This effect was only found once, and cannot be considered a general effect 
across memory. The implications of this are that valence effects were generally stable 
across the age ranges included in the four experiments. Valence effects would therefore 
have either developed before age 7 years, or remained constant from birth.  
Despite existing literature showing a negativity preference in attention from a 
very young age, and therefore providing evidence against acquisition models (Field & 
Lester, 2010) these studies primarily used evolutionarily threatening stimuli such as 
snakes and spiders. The stimuli used throughout this thesis include mythical creatures 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and words lists not related to survival or mortality such as cry, 
sweet and music (Experiments 3 and 4). It is possible that memory preferences for some 
types of emotional stimuli are acquired and some are present from birth. Alternatively, 
it may be the case that other factors combine to moderate these preferences. 
Experiments of a similar design would need to be repeated with younger age groups to 
explore whether memory preferences for this type of stimuli were explained best by 
integral, acquisition or moderation models of fear acquisition.   
There were no significant effects of age on response bias in any of the 
experiments, or number of false memories recalled in Experiment 1 and 2. Most DRM 
studies with children have not reported response bias, but Cordon et al. (2013) found 
children exhibit more liberal response bias than adults. Cordon et al. used purely 
pictorial stimuli, so it is not possible to directly compare with the experiments in this 
thesis.  
Gender 
In Experiment 1 boys could discriminate signals from noise to a significantly 
greater extent than girls. However, this effect was not replicated through Experiments 2-
4. There was no significant effect of gender on response bias through any of the 
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experiments, and no significant effect of gender on levels of true, false or visual recall 
in Experiments 1 and 2. Most child DRM studies either do not explore gender 
(Brainerd, Holliday, & Reyna, 2004; Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Howe et al., 
2010; Howe & Derbish, 2010b; Metzger et al., 2008), or report no significant gender 
effect (Cordon et al., 2013; Howe, 2007). As discussed in Chapter III, this anomaly 
could be due to a particular feature of the stimulus. Streicher and Bonney (1974) note 
that the fantasy genre is typically more appealing to boys, so they are more likely to 
watch it. In addition, familiarity with fantasy characters can increase recognition of new 
characters from the same series in visual short-term memory (Xie & Zhang, 2016). 
However, there were no significant gender differences reported in how much boys and 
girls liked watching Merlin, levels of excitement after viewing the clips, or frequency of 
viewing Merlin at home, negating these potential explanations.  
There is some limited evidence that females produce higher rates of false 
memories for negative stimuli than males (Dewhurst et al., 2012). Higher false alarm 
rates for females would mean lower discrimination compared to males, if hit rates were 
equal, mirroring the result shown in Experiment 1. However, Dewhurst et al. included 
an adult rather than child sample, and negative and neutral, rather than negative and 
positive stimuli. The authors suggest that women reflect on associations within negative 
lists to a greater degree than men and are more likely to generate the negative critical 
lures. If this held only for negative, rather than all emotional content, then an interaction 
would be expected between gender and valence, which was not found. Additionally, it 
is unclear why these results were found for just one set of results in the thesis, and only 
within one existing publication. The observed gender effect was therefore treated as a 
spurious finding.  
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Trait anxiety 
Trait anxiety was included as a third potential moderator for Experiments 1-3. If 
memory preference for negative material (such as scary TV) is the mechanism for 
internalizing emotions, including anxiety, then trait anxiety should co-vary differentially 
for stimuli of negative, compared to positive or neutral valence.  
In Experiment 1 there was an increase in the proportion of true memories 
recalled that matched the overall valence of the clip, as trait anxiety increased. No other 
effects of anxiety were found throughout Experiments 1-3. This suggests that more 
dominant information types are focused on as anxiety increases; but does not suggest 
any effects of valence. It may be that the relationship between trait anxiety and valence 
effects on memory only becomes large enough to identify an effect when trait anxiety 
reaches higher than average levels. For example, attention preferences are significantly 
higher in clinically anxious compared to non-anxious children (Dudeney et al., 2015). 
Alternatively, memory preferences towards negative content may not be the mechanism 
mediating the relationship between scary TV and anxiety. 
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Contributions and Limitations 
Child Anxiety  
This thesis demonstrates a reliable effect of scary TV on children’s internalizing 
emotions. Whilst many researchers have warned of the dangers of TV viewing, 
particularly for children, much of the advice to date appears to have been based on 
qualitative evidence and anecdotal accounts of negative effects. Despite showing that 
negative symptoms increase with scary TV viewing, this finding should also be kept in 
context. The effect size was small, suggesting that for most children the viewing of 
scary TV is unlikely to cause substantial distress past that experienced in everyday life. 
However, moderator analyses offer some further insight; children under 10 years of age 
may be particularly susceptible to negative emotional effects, and are more likely to 
show physical symptoms of internalizing emotions. Policy makers and parents should 
bear this in mind when setting guidelines and assigning ratings to TV shows, and when 
deciding what appropriate viewing for their child is.  
An increase in memory performance for negative, over positive narrative 
material partially supports the hypothesis that fear responses towards scary TV content 
could be moderated by valence effects in memory. However, an increase in memory for 
negative over neutral material would also be expected. By its nature, the meta-analysis 
included a mix of studies, including experimental and correlational studies, with both 
shorter and longer-term outcomes on internalizing symptoms. Dominant theories of 
emotional memory draw a distinction between emotional enhancement during short 
term and long term memory. A neuroimaging and neuropsychological review by 
Hamann (2001) concludes that emotional arousal influences memory via factors that act 
during memory encoding (attention and elaboration) and factors that modulate memory 
consolidation. The Memory Modulation Model proposes that stress hormones released 
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during emotionally arousing situations modulate memory processes. McGaugh and 
Cahill (1996) and McGaugh (2004) provide literature reviews, concluding that the 
amygdala mediates the memory-modulating effects of these stress hormones and several 
classes of neurotransmitters when modulating the consolidation of long-term memories. 
The preferences identified within short term memory tasks have limited applicability to 
long term internalizing outcomes (such as the effects of PTSD two years after a 
bombing; Pfefferbaum, 2000). Time between exposure and internalizing response 
should be included as a moderator for future meta-analyses, and future experiments 
should seek to explore long term memory mechanisms to explore long term 
internalizing responses observed after TV viewing.  
Children’s Emotional Memory  
The remainder of this section highlights some of the difficulties and limitations 
which were faced when exploring emotional memory throughout this thesis, and how 
these have in part been successfully navigated to add to the small, but growing body of 
literature focusing on children’s emotional memory.  
 Difficulties in designing appropriate stimuli. Success of the main 
manipulation of valence varied between experiments. Experiment 1 and 2 sought to use 
more naturalistic stimuli than the majority of previously reported emotional memory 
studies with children, which have predominantly used picture (Cordon et al., 2013) or 
word lists (e.g. Howe, 2007; Howe et al., 2010; Moradi et al., 2000; Neshat-Doost et al., 
1998; Quas et al., 1999). In psychological experiments there is always a trade-off 
between having tight control of conditions and exploring behaviour or cognition in the 
manner in which it would naturally occur in day-to-day life. The clips used in 
Experiment 1 and images in Experiment 2 were edited from TV episodes of Merlin 
(Hawes et al., 2009). Due to the fantasy and adventure element to the programme, it was 
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not possible to edit an episode down into an entirely positive clip or negative clip, and a 
small proportion of both the positive and negative clips contained material of the 
opposite valence. Consequently, the levels of internalizing emotions reported after 
viewing each clip did not significantly differ. It was also difficult to control for other 
properties of the clip, such as familiarity, novelty, and arousal, although analysis 
suggested that children were equally familiar with both episodes of Merlin used in 
Experiment 1 and 2, and stimulus did not differ in arousal. Valence was successfully 
manipulated for the overall positive and negative conditions in Experiment 2, allowing 
for some consistent, if tentative findings on memory performance for naturalistic, but 
controlled narrative material to come to light.  
Emotionally neutral material. The difficulty in generating appropriate neutral 
stimuli has been noted by previous researchers (Kensinger, 2009; Van Bergen et al., 
2015). This was addressed somewhat in Experiment 2 by adding a neutral portion of 
narrative for each story, which remained constant between the negative and positive 
versions. This addition allowed for the naturalistic element of the stimuli to be retained, 
because the stories were matched to the images directly taken from the clips in 
Experiment 1, but also allowed for some comparison between memory performance for 
the emotional and neutral portions in each valence condition. However, this still did not 
provide an overall control condition, and for this reason, entirely neutral words lists 
were included in Experiment 3 and 4 as control conditions, at the loss of some 
ecological validity.  
Other properties of word lists. Many other properties of words can affect 
memory performance in addition to valence (see Appendix, Chapters IV, V – Stimuli 
for a review). The word lists employed as stimuli in Experiments 3 and 4 differed in 
valence in the anticipated directions, but also differed on some other key aspects; 
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arousal, age of acquisition, and imageability. Lists should be carefully constructed in 
future experiments, to ensure that these characteristics do not vary between conditions.    
Limited items within trials. An additional potential limitation is the use of only 
one positive and one negative clip (Experiment 1), and likewise one positive and one 
negative set of images (Experiment 2). Although the clips contained multiple scenes, 
and the image sets contained multiple still shots, they represented only one overall 
story. It may be suggested that any differences in memory performance between the two 
clips in Experiment 1 could be due to a confounding variable of the specific clip chosen. 
The TV clips were complex in nature, including multiple characters, actions and events, 
and themes in each clip. For example, the negative clip includes two negative characters 
(a witch and a monster), various scenes with negative actions including a monster 
hatching, examining a dead body, and a fight scene, and contains both real and fantasy 
threats. The recognition task contained questions relating to multiple characters and 
scenes. Each scene could be conceptualised as a separate stimulus in this case. 
Furthermore, content or thematic analysis could be carried out on data collected in the 
recall tasks to identify whether there were any particular themes or characters which 
seemed most memorable. In retrospect, the methodology of Experiment 1 would have 
ideally included multiple positive, negative and neutral clips, with a between-subjects 
design. This would increase the number of participants needed by a substantial amount 
to achieve the desired level of power.  
The stimuli in Experiment 2 included image sets to more distinctly separate the 
stimulus into a range of image stimuli, rather than one long clip. Although this meant 
there were multiple images for each valence condition, they were still centred on one 
particular story line, so did not fully address the limitation of Experiment 1. In addition, 
a positive and negative story was written for each image set. This means that there were 
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two positive and two negative stories, rather than just one. Because the same image sets 
were matched to the negative and positive version of each story, there was still only one 
combined stimulus set with positive images and narrative, and one with negative images 
and narrative. The other two contained an image set and narrative of incongruent 
valence, which appeared to lead to a different style of processing. Whilst the processing 
of congruent and incongruent emotional material is an interesting topic to explore, any 
replications of Experiment 2 could look to instead, include multiple congruent stories, 
as with Experiment 1. This limitation was fully addressed by including an emotionally 
positive, negative and neutral version of each of three different stories in Experiment 3, 
and 4 BAS DRM lists for each valence condition in Experiments 3 and 4.  
General design limitations. Near-ceiling effects were observed in Experiments 
3 and 4. In Experiment 3 this was believed to reflect the tasks being too easy, so the 
upper age limit was lowered from 11 years to 10 years in Experiment 4, with the 
addition of a distraction task between each presentation phase and recognition task. 
Changing from an immediate to a delayed recognition task should have prevented 
rehearsal and lowered discrimination, in a similar way to that seen for recall tasks (Tan 
& Ward, 2000). In fact, discrimination rates actually increased in Experiment 4, which 
may be due to the slightly longer presentation duration for each stimulus, allowing a 
deeper level of encoding (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). The near-ceiling effects did not 
obscure all possible effects from coming to light, as a valence effect was still observed. 
However, this effect varied from that observed in Experiment 3. It would be advisable 
to replicate the study with a shorter presentation time and explore whether these 
findings held, or whether effects vary with duration. 
All experiments were also likely to be underpowered to various degrees. Each 
was designed to have a minimum of 30 observations per cell (in line with guidelines by 
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Cohen, 1988). Once rotation order was introduced into the analysis as a fixed effect, this 
decreased to 18-19 in Experiment 1, 3-6 in Experiment 3, and 15 in Experiment 4. 
Rotation was not included in Experiment 2 because it would have correlated too highly 
with congruency; there were 26-28 observations per cell.     
Knowledge Gained  
This thesis has built on current theory of memory performance for emotional 
material in children, by drawing a distinction between the conditions under which 
valence effects in memory can be produced experimentally. Few studies have explored 
differences in memory preference for positive and negative material in non-clinical 
child samples; even fewer have included comparisons between positive and neutral 
stimuli. This has allowed for various models of emotional memory processing to be 
tested more fully. 
Additionally, the use of a DRM paradigm in Experiments 1-4 allowed for signal 
detection analysis, to take accuracy into account, in addition to response bias. This is an 
improvement over some existing research which analyses and reports hit and false alarm 
rates separately, thus not accounting for their interaction (For example, Howe, 2007; 
Howe et al., 2010). This design allows for comparisons between experiments, within the 
thesis, and to those already published using standardized units of analysis (such as d’ or 
A’). Additionally, there is limited report of response bias in children; so these findings 
may be of particular interest to other researchers. Finally, Experiments 1 and 2 used a 
ratings response scale. This has provided data which could be used for Type II d’ prime 
analysis, which would provide insight into children’s meta-memory; an area which has 
scarcely been researched to date. 
There are several tentative findings, which emerge from this thesis and add to 
the body of literature on emotional memory in children. In respect to valence effects, 
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there was little evidence of a general preference toward or away from emotionally 
valenced, compared to neutral stimuli. A preference away from negative material was 
observed, but only in two specific conditions across four experiments. Findings are 
therefore considered too mixed, and not robust enough to claim an overall valence 
effect. The preference away from negative items was found only in the experiments 
using the simplest stimuli, and design. When more complex stimuli, such as narratives 
were used as part of the experimental design (as a primer to provide mood context, or as 
the material to be remembered), then negative material tended to be remembered more 
accurately than positive. There was also a tendency toward children responding 
positively more often for negative content, followed by positive, and responding 
negatively more often for neutral content. This finding highlights the importance of 
using stringent analysis, such as signal detection, rather than more simple analyses such 
as percent correct, which does not account for response bias.  
In addition to valence effects, a different pattern of findings was apparent when 
two stimulus sets of a different valence were presented simultaneously; richness of 
information became a more important deciding factor for what material would be best 
remembered, with the richer, narrative content better recognized, regardless of valence.   
These patterns of results do not favour evolutionary models that propose only 
threatening material is privileged in cognitive processing. Cognitive models and 
theories such as the Network Affect Model (Bower & Cohen, 1982) and semantic 
elaboration theory (Kensinger, 2004) are partially supported by the findings of this 
thesis. Although they propose that all emotionally valenced material is privileged, 
significant differences in recall and recognition between positively and negatively 
valenced materials were observed. These differences are likely due to stimuli 
confounds, such as arousal or novelty. Tighter control of these extraneous variables is 
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therefore advised in future studies to tease apart the contributions of valence and 
arousal.   
Future Directions 
As discussed, the experiments in Chapter III were limited by not having a 
neutral condition included, as well as including a mixture of positively and negatively 
valenced stimuli in each clip in Experiment 1. Next steps would be to refine the stimuli 
to ensure each clip was entirely valenced in one direction, to include more than one clip 
per valence, and to include neutral clips. This would allow the original hypotheses to be 
tested more successfully.  
 Likewise, Experiment 2 would ideally be replicated with additional neutral 
images and narratives and more than one stimulus set per valence condition. The 
tentative conclusions reached from Experiment 2 were that richness of information 
source overrides valence of information, when multiple sources are presented 
simultaneously which include negatively valenced stimuli from at least one source. 
Adding a manipulation where visual and narrative stimuli were presented separately 
would allow this conclusion to be further tested.  
Experiment 3 found no significant effect of context. Previous studies included 
an instruction for children to picture themselves as the main character, leading to a 
congruency effect. Future studies could replicate this design with additional self-
referencing instructions.  
Finally, Experiment 4 included a shallow and deep encoding task. Upon 
reflection, the shallow task asked children to rate the spelling of the word, which may 
have led to children sounding-out the word, and therefore reading it. The deep 
processing task asked children to rate how good or bad the word made them feel. This 
added a self-referencing aspect. Future studies could explore shallow encoding tasks 
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which related to a non-verbal aspect of the word, such as colour of font (more typically 
employed as a shallow processing task), and deep encoding tasks which did not 
encourage self-referencing (shown specifically to interact with processing of valenced 
material), such as thinking of a semantically related word. Should effects still not 
support the hypothesis being tested; other potential mechanisms should be researched.  
Conclusion 
Results of the meta-analysis support the hypothesis that scary TV is a plausible 
explanation for increasing levels of anxiety in typically developing children. The effect 
was smaller than perhaps expected, indicating that some qualitative studies may have 
over-estimated the negative effects negative TV has on internalizing emotions, such as 
anxiety, depression, and sleep disorders. Negativity preferences in memory were 
explored as a potential mechanism between viewing scary TV and internalizing 
emotions. No reliable link was found between the levels of trait anxiety children 
reported, and levels of negativity preference. It is possible that a shift occurs when 
anxiety reaches clinically significant levels, where negativity preferences drastically 
increase. This would need to be tested by comparing the performance of clinically 
anxious and non-anxious children in similar experiments.  
Despite no reliable link between anxiety and memory preferences, some valence 
effects on memory were observed. Memory performance was better for negative than 
positive narrative/ word stimuli; a findings which appeared fairly consistent and 
reliable. However, this depended on richness of stimuli; this effect was only observed 
where narratives were included either as the material to be remembered or as context 
immediately prior to stimulus presentation. When stimuli of positive and negative 
valence were presented simultaneously, richness of material became a stronger predictor 
of memory than valence, with narratives recognized more accurately than visual items. 
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There did not appear to be an interaction effect between mood and valence on memory, 
although mood manipulation was only partially successful. Semantic elaboration was 
explored as a potential mechanism behind valence effects in memory. However, no 
positive findings were identified. This could have been due to the specific encoding 
tasks employed, or might signify that another mechanism has a stronger role in valence 
effects.    
Memory performance generally increases with age, but no firm changes of 
valence effects across age were identified. Effects may become apparent if using a 
wider age group, or experiments with higher power. Gender did not appear to moderate 
memory performance.   
Future research should further explore the underlying factors behind response 
bias, so that conditions can be identified where children may be less likely to provide 
accurate accounts of emotional events or materials. Memory enhancement for negative 
material may have particular uses in situations such as eyewitness testimony and during 
social worker interviews with children. Alternatively, positive memory enhancement 
may be particularly useful as a tool in the treatment of depression, anxiety and other 
conditions linked with negative affect. It is therefore imperative that research continues 
into the precise motivations and mechanisms behind enhancement of emotional 
memory.  
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Appendix 
Chapter III – Supplementary Material. 
A series of ANCOVAs was conducted for each outcome variable of the 
recognition task (sensitivity and response bias in Experiments 1 and 2) and recall task 
(percentage of true and number of false memories recalled in Experiments 1 and 2, and 
percentage of visual memories in Experiment 2). In the first step, age was added as a 
potential covariate, gender in the second, and levels of trait anxiety in the third step. 
Covariates were only retained in subsequent steps if they were significantly related to 
the outcome variable. All non-significant main effects and interaction effects between 
the potential covariates and outcome measures are reported below. All significant 
relationships are reported within the main report.  
Experiment 1: Children’s True and False Memories of Emotional Fictional TV 
Excitement Ratings 
Children did not report significantly different ratings of excitement for the 
positive (M = 2.27, SE = 0.22) and the negative clip (M = 2.49, SE = 0.21), t(40) = 
−1.30, p = .199, 95% BCa CI [−0.54, 0.12], d = 0.20. Excitement ratings after viewing 
the positive clip did not differ significantly between boys (M = 2.27, SE = 0.32), and 
girls (M = 2.26, SE = 0.30), t(39) = 0.02, p = .983, 95% BCa CI [−0.86, 0.88], d = 0.01. 
They did not differ significantly for the negative clip between boys (M = 2.59, SE = 
0.24), and girls (M = 2.37, SE = 0.37), t(31.92) = 0.50, p = .618, 95% BCa CI [−0.60, 
1.12], d = 0.16.    
Recognition Task: Covariate Analysis 
Sensitivity (d’). Age did not significantly interact with the effect of clip valence, 
F(1, 34) = 0.35, p = .558, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00, modality, F(1, 34) = 1.39, p = .247, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .04, or clip 
valence by modality, F(1, 34) = 0.16, p = .692, 𝜂𝑝
2= .01. Gender did not interact 
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significantly with clip valence, F(1, 33) = 0.72, p = .403, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02, modality, F(1, 33) = 
3.10. p = .088, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .09, or with the clip valence by modality interaction, F(1, 33) = 
0.15, p = .698, 𝜂𝑝
2= .01. Trait anxiety was not significantly related to d’ scores, F(1, 32) 
= 0.54, p = .469, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02, and did not significantly interact with clip valence, F(1, 32) = 
0.52, p = .478, 𝜂𝑝
2= .02, modality, F(1, 32) = 1.48, p = .233, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .04, or the clip valence 
by modality interaction, F(1, 32) = 1.55, p = .222, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .05. 
Response bias (C). Age was not significantly related to response bias, F(1, 34) 
= 0.00, p = .999, 𝜂𝑝
2= .00, and did not interact significantly with clip valence, F(1, 34) = 
0.01, p = .905, 𝜂𝑝
2= .00, modality, F(1, 34) = 2.63, p = .114, 𝜂𝑝
2= .07, or the clip valence 
by modality interaction, F(1, 34) = 0.48, p = .491. 𝜂𝑝
2= .01. Gender was not significantly 
related to response bias, F(1, 34) = 0.01, p = .924, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00, and did not significantly 
interact with the main effect of clip valence, F(1, 34) = 0.15, p = .703, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00, 
modality, F(1, 34) = 0.03, p = .861, 𝜂𝑝
2= .00, or the interaction between clip valence and 
modality, F(1, 34) = 2.34, p = .136, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .06. Trait anxiety was also not significantly 
related to response bias, F(1, 34) = 0.90, p = .766, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00, nor did it interact 
significantly with valence, F(1, 34) = 0.06, p = .814, 𝜂𝑝
2= .00, modality, F(1, 34) = 0.54, 
p = .466, 𝜂𝑝
2= .02, or the interaction between clip valence and modality, F(1, 34) = 0.90, 
p = .349, 𝜂𝑝
2= .03. 
Recall Task: Covariate Analysis 
False factual memories. Age did not significantly interact with the effect of clip 
type on number of false memories recalled, F(1, 37) = 2.93, p = .095, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .07. Gender 
was not significantly related to number of false memories recalled, F(1, 36) = 4.42, p = 
.461, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .02, and did not significantly interact with the effect of clip, F(1, 36) = 0.39, 
p = .536, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  .01. Trait anxiety was not significantly related to the number of false 
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memories recalled, F(1, 36) = 0.57, p = .456, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02, and did not interact significantly 
with clip, F(1, 36) = 47, p = .498, 𝜂𝑝
2  =  .01. 
True factual memories. Age was not significantly related to the proportion of 
material recalled, F(1, 37) = 2.87, p = .099, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .07, and did not significantly interact 
with the effect of clip, F(1, 37) = 0.79, p = .381, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .02, or clip by valence, F(1, 37) = 
0.44, p = .510, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .01, on the proportion of material recalled. Gender was not 
significantly related to the proportion of material recalled, F(1, 36) = 0.08, p = .776, 𝜂𝑝
2   
= .00, and did not interact significantly with the effects of clip, F(1, 36) = 2.97, p = 
.093, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .08, valence, F(1, 36) = 0.09, p = .773, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00, or clip by valence, F(1, 36) 
= 2.50, p = .123, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .07.   
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Experiment 2: Children’s Memories of Emotional Images and Stories 
Stimuli: Druid Slides 
 
 
Image Positive narrative Negative narrative 
1.  
The Druids are a magical group of people that 
live outside Camelot. 
Druids only use magic spells to help people. 
Some Druids came back to pick up supplies 
from 
Camelot. 
Some of the Druid Children started playing a 
game where they all hide and the first person 
home wins. 
Merlin and Lady Morgana met one of the 
boys 
and let him hide in Lady Morgana’s room. 
The Druids are a magical group of people that 
live outside Camelot. 
Some of them have used magic spells to hurt 
people. 
King Uther threw them out of the kingdom 
because magic is not allowed in Camelot. 
Some Druids came back to cast a spell against 
King Uther, but one of the Druid boys got 
separated from his family. 
Merlin and Lady Morgana did not know the 
Druids plans and hid him in Lady Morgana's 
Room. 
2.  
There was a gentle knock on the bedroom 
door. 
Lady Morgana and Merlin glanced at each 
other. 
They knew that if the boy was spotted by his 
friends he wouldn’t win the game. 
‘Morgana am I allowed in?’ Prince Arthur 
asked 
from outside her bedroom. 
“Some children are playing a game and I 
want to 
see if there is a Druid boy in here”. 
There was a loud bang on the bedroom door. 
Lady Morgana and Merlin looked up in fear. 
They knew that if the boy was caught he would 
be put in prison, and maybe even sentenced to 
death. 
‘Morgana, open up!’ Prince Arthur yelled angrily 
from outside her bedroom. 
“I need to come in and search for the Druid 
Boy!” 
3.  
They rushed to hide the boy behind the bed 
curtain and hoped that Prince Arthur would 
not 
spot him. 
Arthur told them he was searching every 
room in 
the castle and did not want to give up until he 
had 
found the Druid Boy. 
He began opening cupboards and drawers for 
any 
sign of the boy. 
They rushed to hide the boy behind the bed 
curtain and hoped that Prince Arthur would not 
spot him. 
Arthur told them he was searching every room in 
the castle and did not want to give up until he 
had 
found the boy. 
He began opening cupboards and drawers for 
any 
sign of the boy. 
 
4.  
Merlin spotted the boys soft, leather boots on 
the 
floor. 
To keep the boy hidden, Merlin whispered 
some 
magical words,and the boots began to walk 
towards him, all on their own. 
As Prince Arthur looked round, Merlin told the 
boots to hide. 
Merlin spotted the boys muddy leather boots on 
the floor. 
Worried the boy would be caught, Merlin 
whispered some magical words and the boots 
began to walk towards him, all on their own. 
As Prince Arthur looked round, Merlin told the 
boots to hide. 
5.  
Prince Arthur did not see the boots, and left to 
search the other rooms. 
Before he left, he told Lady Morgana that if 
she 
saw the Druid Boy, she should tell him. 
He said he would like to win the game. 
He said that if she told him, he would share 
his 
prize with her. 
But Lady Morgana didn't want to cheat, so 
she 
didn't tell him. 
Prince Arthur did not see the boots, and left to 
search the other rooms. 
Before he left, he told Lady Morgana that if she 
knew where the Druid Boy was, she had better 
tell him. 
He said he would know if she was telling lies. 
He said if the King found out she was telling lies, 
he would throw her in prison. 
But Lady Morgana did not tell him. 
6.  
Later that day Merlin, Lady Morgana and 
Gwen 
met in the market to discuss how to help the 
boy 
get home to win the game. 
Guards were searching everyone that left the 
Kingdom so they would have to be very 
clever to 
get past them. 
Merlin offered to take the boy out of Camelot 
through a secret tunnel that needed a special 
key. 
Lady Morgana said she would take the boy 
because he was her responsibility. 
Later that day Merlin, Lady Morgana and 
Guinevere met in the market to discuss how to 
help the boy escape from the town. 
Guards were searching everyone that left the 
Kingdom so they would have to be very careful 
to get past them. 
Merlin offered to take the boy out of Camelot 
through a dangerous, secret tunnel that needed 
a special key. 
Lady Morgana said she would take the boy 
because he was her responsibility. 
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Image Positive narrative Negative narrative 
7.  
Prince Arthur guarded the key to the secret 
tunnel out of Camelot. 
Merlin knew he needed to borrow the key 
from Prince Arthur or they would never be 
able to help the boy. 
Merlin decided his best chance to take the 
key was when Prince Arthur was eating his 
dinner. 
Merlin waited until the evening when he 
served Arthur some soup. 
Prince Arthur guarded the key to the secret 
tunnel out of Camelot. 
Merlin knew he must steal the key from Prince 
Arthur or they would never be able to help the 
boy. 
Merlin decided his best chance to take the key 
was when Prince Arthur was eating dinner. 
Merlin waited until the evening when he served 
Arthur some soup. 
8.  
Merlin whispered some more magic words. 
The keys silently slid off the belt around 
Prince Arthur’s waist. 
They floated up into the air and danced 
behind Prince Arthur’s head as he turned 
around. 
It was fun for Merlin to use magic and the 
trick made him giggle. 
Merlin whispered some more magic words. 
The keys silently slid off the chain around Prince 
Arthur’s waist. 
They floated up into the air and hid behind 
Prince Arthur’s head as he turned around. 
It was very dangerous for Merlin to use magic in 
case he was also caught and put in Prison. 
9.  
Arthur could hear the keys jangling but could 
not spot them. 
“Can’t you hear that noise?” he said to 
Merlin? 
Merlin pretended he couldn’t hear anything 
and dropped the keys into the food. 
Prince Arthur heard the splash and found the 
keys. 
He laughed with Merlin at the trick, and Merlin 
explained the boy had never won the game 
before so they were helping him. 
Arthur could hear the keys jangling but could not 
spot them. 
“Can’t you hear that noise?” he said to Merlin? 
Merlin pretended he couldn’t hear anything and 
dropped the keys into the food. 
Prince Arthur heard the splash and found the 
keys. 
He laughed with Merlin at the trick, and Merlin 
explained the boy had never won the game 
before so they were helping him. 
 
10.  
Merlin, Prince Arthur and Lady Morgana had 
a secret meeting about the Druid Boy. 
They had to keep it secret because they 
wanted to make sure no-one would spoil the 
surprise for the boy. 
Prince Arthur was very good at the game, and 
knew he would be the best person to help him 
win. 
Prince Arthur was very excited to help. He 
was glad that he and his friends could all join 
in together. 
Merlin, Prince Arthur and Lady Morgana had a 
secret meeting about the Druid Boy. 
They had to keep it secret because if anyone 
found out about it, they would be put in prison. 
No-one was allowed to help the Druid Boy – not 
even Prince Arthur. 
Merlin and Morgana had to try very hard to 
convince Prince Arthur, because he didn't want 
to help. 
11.  
Prince Arthur agreed to help the Druid Boy 
get home first. 
He asked Merlin to meet him and the Druid 
boy at the end of the tunnel with some tools 
and a horse. 
Guards were patrolling the town so he had to 
be very cunning to get past them. 
If the guards found Merlin they might also find 
the Druid Boy and end the game. 
Prince Arthur agreed to help the Druid Boy 
escape from Camelot. 
He asked Merlin to meet him and the Druid boy 
at the end of the tunnel with some tools and a 
horse. 
Guards were patrolling the town so he had to be 
very careful not to be caught by them. 
If the guards found Merlin sneaking about he 
would surely be thrown in prison. 
12.  
The Druid Boy and Prince Arthur went all the 
way down the tunnel. 
It was warm and dry, and the floor had straw 
on it. 
When they got to the end, they had to wait at 
the gate. 
But Prince Arthur and the Druid Boy were still 
very excited.  
The Druid Boy knew he would get home and 
win the game any minute now. 
The Druid Boy and Prince Arthur went all the 
way down the tunnel. 
It was cold and wet, and it was full of rats. 
When they got to the end, they couldn't get 
through the bars. 
Prince Arthur was angry, and the Druid Boy was 
very scared. 
He felt for sure he would never be able to go 
home again. 
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Stimuli: Monster Slides 
 
 
Image Positive narrative Negative narrative 
13.  
Merlin followed their plan and met them 
exactly on time. 
They used the key and the tools to open the 
gate at the end of the tunnel. 
Arthur had brought the fastest, friendliest 
horse with him. 
Merlin and Prince Arthur helped the Druid 
Boy onto the horse 
Merlin was late to meet them at the end of the 
tunnel. Prince Arthur told him off for being late. 
They used the key and the tools to open the 
gate at the end of the tunnel. 
They thought they would most definitely be 
caught, and were as quiet as they could be. 
Merlin and Prince Arthur pulled the Druid Boy 
onto the horse. 
14.  
Prince Arthur and the Druid boy left Camelot. 
The journey was very quick. 
They could hear birds tweeting and leaves 
rustling in the gentle, warm breeze. 
Prince Arthur was sure they would make it 
back first and the Druid boy started to feel 
very excited. 
Prince Arthur and the Druid boy left Camelot. 
They rode for hours and hours. 
There were creaks and growls coming from all 
around them. 
Prince Arthur was sure they were being followed 
and that somebody would find out what he was 
doing. 
15.  
Soon, they reached the Druid Boy’s home. 
The boy had made it back the fastest and 
won! 
As Prince Arthur rode away, the Druids 
smiled. 
They were happy to have the boy home and 
were pleased he had finally won the game. 
Eventually they reached the Druid Boy’s home. 
Prince Arthur asked them not to tell anyone he 
had helped. 
As Prince Arthur rode away, the Druids smiled. 
They had discovered a better way into Camelot 
and could think up a new plan to kill King Uther. 
 
Image Positive narrative Negative narrative 
1.  
Nimueh is a nice witch who lives in a cave 
outside of Camelot. 
She uses magic only for good, to help people 
the people of Camelot. 
Nimueh is friends with King Uther and many 
other people in the kingdom. 
She watches the people of Camelot to make 
sure she can keep them safe. 
Nimueh is a nasty witch who lives in a cave 
outside of Camelot. 
King Uther threw her out of the kingdom 
because she used magic spells to hurt people. 
Nimueh is very angry at King Uther and wants 
everyone in Camelot dead. 
She watches the people of Camelot and plans 
how she will kill them. 
2.  
One day Nimueh decided she needed some 
help to look after the people of Camelot so 
she made an animal out of some clay. 
She put the clay animal inside a round, white 
egg and closed it up tightly. 
Nimueh said some special magic words as 
she held the egg over the well. 
The animal inside the egg came to life and 
began to grow inside the egg. 
One day Nimueh decided she wanted to kill 
all the people of Camelot so she made an 
animal out of some clay. 
She put the clay animal inside a round, white 
egg and locked it up tightly. 
Nimueh said some evil magic words as she held 
the egg over the well. 
The animal inside the egg came to life and 
began to grow inside the egg. 
3.  
Nimueh dropped the egg into the well. 
It sank down to the bottom of the well. 
The egg floated through lots of underwater 
tunnels. It twirled gently round and round as it 
went. 
Nimueh dropped the egg into the well. 
It plummeted down into the depths of the well. 
The egg sped through lots of dark, underwater 
tunnels. It bounced off the jagged walls as it 
went. 
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Image Positive narrative Negative narrative 
4.  
After a short time, the egg reached a pool in 
another cave. 
The pool was underneath the Kingdom of 
Camelot. 
Once it reached the surface of the water, the 
shell began to crack and break apart. 
After a long time, the egg reached a pool in 
another cave. 
The pool was underneath the Kingdom of 
Camelot. 
Once it reached the surface of the water, the 
shell began to crack and break apart. 
5.  
Back in Camelot, King Uther found one of his 
servants asleep on the castle floor. 
He was was very confused about the sleeping 
man. 
“Why is my servant asleep on the floor?” he 
said to Prince Arthur. “It's day time, and he 
has a bed of his own.” 
 
Back in Camelot, King Uther found one of his 
servants dead on the castle floor. 
He was very angry and upset. 
“Why has my servant died?” he shouted at 
Prince Arthur. “Who is going to bring me food 
and drink now?” 
6.  
King Uther called the Doctor, Gaius, to come 
to the castle and look after the servant. 
“Is there anything you can do to wake him 
up?” he asked. 
Gaius told King Uther that he needed to sleep 
for a long time to feel better. 
He suspected there was a bug in Camelot, 
causing people to fall asleep for a long time. 
King Uther called the Doctor, Gaius, to come 
to the castle and examine the servant. 
“Is there anything you can do to bring him 
back to life?” he asked. 
Gaius told King Uther that he could not, and 
that the victims died 24 hours after becoming 
ill. 
He suspected sorcery and magic might have 
caused the death. 
 
7.  
Later that day, Gaius found another villager 
who had caught the bug. 
He did not know how it was being passed on 
and wanted to stop it spreading. 
He asked Merlin to help him take the villager 
to his house. 
After thinking very hard, they realised that 
both people had been drinking the same 
water in the village. 
Later that day, Gaius found another dead 
body in the village. 
He was very worried and wanted to find out 
what was causing people to die. 
He asked Merlin to help him look at the body 
in his house. 
After thinking very hard, they realised both 
the dead people had been drinking the same 
water in the village. 
8.  
They decided to go down to the cave where 
the village water comes from. 
They wanted to collect some of the water to 
take back with them and test. 
They wanted to see if it was making people 
sleepy so they could find a cure. 
The water pool was not far from the entrance 
of the cave. 
Merlin and Gaius soon found it. 
They decided to go down to the cave where 
the village water comes from. 
They wanted to collect some of the water to 
take back with them and test. 
They wanted to see if it was making people 
sleepy so they could find a cure. 
The water pool was hidden deep down in the 
cold, dark cave. 
Merlin and Gaius had to walk for a long time 
to get there. 
9.  
When they got to the pool Merlin filled up a 
small bottle with water. 
They hoped it would help the rest of the 
villagers. 
When the bottle of water was safely tucked 
away, Merlin and Gaius turned to leave the 
cave. 
They began to hear a low purring sound from 
the pool. 
When they made it to the pool Merlin filled up 
a small bottle with water. 
There were bubbles and ripples in the water 
and Merlin had been afraid to put his hand 
into it. 
When the bottle of water was safely tucked 
away, Merlin and Gaius turned to leave the 
cave. 
They began to hear a low rumbling sound, as 
if something was growling. 
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10.  
As they looked back towards the pool, an 
animal popped up out of the water. 
It was not like any creature Merlin or Gaius 
has seen before. 
The magical animal made Merlin and Gaius 
jump. 
They ran out of the cave excitedly to tell 
Prince Arthur what they had discovered in the 
cave. 
As they looked back towards the pool, a 
huge monster sprang out of the water. 
It was not like any creature Merlin or Gaius 
had seen before. 
The slimy monster had big, sharp claws and 
roared as loudly as it could. 
They ran out of the cave in horror to tell 
Prince Arthur what they had discovered in 
the cave. 
11.  
Merlin decided he would like to know what 
kind of animal he had seen. 
He looked in all his books to discover what 
kind of animal lives in water, and is magical, 
and could jump high up in the air. 
He found out about all sorts of animals that 
were similar, so he still didn't know which kind 
it was. 
Merlin decided to go back to the cave and 
find out for himself. 
Merlin knew he should find out what kind of 
monster it was. 
He looked in all his books to discover what 
kind of monster lives in water, and is slimy, 
and has big, sharp claws. 
But none of the books could tell him what 
kind of monster it was, or what would kill it. 
Merlin was very worried. 
12.  
Prince Arthur and Lady Morgana went back to 
the cave with Merlin to see if they could spot 
the animal again. 
They wanted to find out what type of animal 
he was and how he had got there. 
They wondered whether he would be able to 
help them find out what was wrong with the 
water 
supply. 
Prince Arthur and Lady Morgana went back 
to the cave with Merlin to search for the 
monster. 
Merlin thought the Monster was poisoning 
the drinking water. 
They wanted to fight and kill the monster to 
make sure the people of Camelot were safe 
from it. 
 
13.  
As Prince Arthur turned a corner he spotted 
the animal. 
The animal bounded towards him playfully, 
stopping a few steps away from Prince 
Arthur. 
Prince Arthur asked the animal his name, and 
what he was doing in the cave. 
“Boben” said the animal. “Nimueh asked me 
to help her protect the people of Camelot”. 
As Prince Arthur turned a corner he came 
face to face with the Monster. 
The Monster raced towards him, snarling and 
foaming at the mouth. 
Prince Arthur jumped out of the way and 
swung his sword at the Monster. 
The Monster was too fast and darted into the 
shadows. 
14.  
Merlin and Lady Morgana rushed over to 
Prince Arthur when they heard him talking to 
Boben. 
Prince Arthur introduced them to each other. 
Boben explained to them that he had been 
investigating the water in the cave. 
He had worked out what was making the 
people sleepy and he had found out how to 
fix it. 
Merlin and Lady Morgana rushed over to 
Prince Arthur when they heard the monster. 
They checked whether Prince Arthur had 
been hurt. 
He had some scratches but was not badly 
injured. 
They spent the rest of the day and all night 
looking for the monster. They couldn’t find 
him anywhere! 
15.  
Merlin, Prince Arthur and Lady Morgana 
thanked Boben warmly and returned to 
Camelot. 
Nimueh cast another spell to clean the 
village's water in the pool and nobody else 
caught the bug. 
Nimueh and Boben continued to watch over 
Camelot and keep the villagers safe. 
Merlin, Prince Arthur and Lady Morgana 
gave up trying to find the monster and 
returned to Camelot. 
The monster was left free to roam around the 
pool and continued to poison the water. 
Nimueh and the monster killed many more 
people in Camelot. 
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Manipulation Checks: Emotion Ratings of Stimuli 
Table 1 presents the findings of a mixed ANOVA exploring the effects of story, 
modality, and congruency on internalization ratings. Internalization differed 
significantly between the druid (M = 0.65, SE = 0.09) and the monster story conditions 
(M = 0.80, SE = 0.08), but did not differ by modality or congruency. No significant 
interactions were observed.  
Table 1. 
Results of a mixed ANOVA exploring the effects of story, modality, and congruency on 
internalization ratings. 
Table 2 presents the findings of a mixed ANOVA exploring the effects of story, 
modality, and congruency on happiness ratings. Only the main effects of story condition 
and modality were significant.  
Table 2. 
Results of a mixed ANOVA exploring the effects of story, modality, and congruency on 
happiness ratings. 
 
 
Effect F df p 𝜂𝑝
2 
Story 6.29 1, 53 .015 .11 
Modality 1.03 1, 53 .314 .02 
Congruency 0.33 1, 53 .571 .01 
Story × congruency 1.05 1, 53 .310 .02 
Story × modality 0.00 1, 53 .951 .00 
Modality × congruency 0.02 1, 53 .899 .00 
Story × modality × congruency 0.72 1, 53 .401 .01 
Effect F df p 𝜂𝑝
2 
Story 11.69 1, 53 .001 .18 
Modality 8.80 1, 53 .005 .14 
Congruency 1.18 1, 53 .177 .03 
Story × congruency 1.00 1, 53 .322 .02 
Story × modality 0.01 1, 53 .947 .00 
Modality × congruency 0.00 1, 53 .992 .00 
Story × modality × congruency 1.05 1, 53 .310 .02 
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Table 3 presents the findings of a mixed ANOVA exploring the effects of 
valence, modality, gender, and congruency on excitement ratings. Excitement did not 
vary depending on any variables entered into the analysis. 
Table 3. 
Results of a mixed ANOVA exploring the effects of valence, modality, gender, and congruency 
on excitement ratings. 
 
Recognition Task: Covariate Analysis 
Sensitivity (d’). Age did not interact significantly with modality, F(1, 50) = 
2.46, p = .123, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .05, or story by modality, F(1, 50) = 0.01, p = .926, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00.  
Gender did not significantly predict d’ scores, F(1, 49) = 0.71, p = .403, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .01, and 
did not significantly interact with story, F(1, 49) = 0.62, p = .436, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .01, modality, 
F(1, 49) = 1.86, p = .179, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .03, or story by modality, F(1, 49) = 0.02, p = .877, 𝜂𝑝
2   
= .00. When trait anxiety scores were added as a covariate, they did not significantly 
predict d’ scores, F(1, 49) = 0.11, p = .743, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00, and did not significantly interact 
with story, F(1, 49) = 0.37, p = .546, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .01, modality, F(1, 49) = 2.40, p = .128, 𝜂𝑝
2   = 
.05, or story by modality, F(1, 49) = 0.02, p = .889, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00. 
Effect F df p 𝜂𝑝
2 
Valence 0.00 1, 51 .998 .00 
Modality 0.34 1, 51 .558 .01 
Gender 0.71 1, 51 .404 .01 
Congruency 2.00 1, 51 .164 .04 
Valence × gender 2.59 1, 51 .113 .05 
Valence × congruency 0.02 1, 51 .903 .00 
Valence × modality 0.35 1, 51 .558 .01 
Modality × gender 1.36 1, 51 .250 .03 
Modality × congruency 0.07 1, 51 .788 .00 
Gender × congruency 0.27 1, 51 .604 .01 
Valence × gender × congruency 1.30 1, 51 .260 .03 
Valence × gender × modality 1.36 1, 51 .250 .03 
Valence × modality × congruency 0.06 1, 51 .807 .00 
Modality × gender × congruency 0.07 1, 51 .788 .00 
Valence × modality × gender × congruency 0.07 1, 51 .788 .00 
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Response Bias (C). Age was not significantly related to C scores, F(1, 50) = 
2.67, p = .138, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .04, and did not significantly interact with story, F(1, 50) = 0. 63, p 
= .437, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, modality, F(1, 50) = 0.48, p = .490, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, or story × modality, F(1, 
50) = 0.05, p = .825, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00. Gender was not significantly related to C scores, F(1, 50) 
= 1.85, p = .180, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .04, and did not significantly interact with story, F(1, 50) = 0.81, 
p = .372, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02, modality, F(1, 50) = 1.33, p = .254, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, or story × modality, 
F(1, 50) = 0.10, p = .754, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00. Trait anxiety scores were not significantly related to 
C scores, F(1, 50) = 0.33, p = .566, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, and did not significantly interact with 
story, F(1, 50) = 1.49, p = .228, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, modality, F(1, 50) = 1.78, p = .188, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, 
or story × modality, F(1, 50) = 0.97, p = .330, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02. 
Recall Task: Covariate Analysis 
False utterances. Age was not significantly related to number of false memories 
recalled, F(1, 50) = 0.59, p = .446, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, and did not interact significantly with story, 
F(1, 50) = 0.49, p = .486, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. Gender was not significantly related to number of 
false memories, F(1, 50) = 0.01, p = .941, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and did not interact significantly 
with story, F(1, 50) = 1.81, p = .185, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04. Trait anxiety was not significantly related 
to number of false memories recalled, F(1, 50) = 0.12, p = .736, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and did not 
significantly interact with story, F(1, 50) = 3.69, p = .060, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. 
Visual Utterances. Age was not significantly related to proportion of visual 
memories recalled, F(1, 51) = 0.16, p = .690, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and did not interact significantly 
with story, F(1, 51) = 2.53, p = .118, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05. Gender was not significantly related to 
proportion of visual memories, F(1, 51) = 0.05, p = .819, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and did not interact 
significantly with story, F(1, 51) = 0.66, p = .419, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. Trait anxiety was not 
significantly related to proportion of visual memories recalled, F(1, 51) = 1.14, p = 
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.290, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, and did not significantly interact with story, F(1, 51) = 0.48, p = .494, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .01. 
True Narrative Material. Age did not significantly predict proportion of 
narrative material recalled correctly, F(1, 51) = 2.85, p = .097, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02, or interact with 
story, F(1, 51) = 0.69, p = .412, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, valence, F(1, 51) = 1.32, p = .257, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, or 
story × valence, F(1, 51) = 1.62, p = .209, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, on number of true narrative 
utterances recalled. Gender was not significantly related to the proportion of narrative 
material recalled correctly, F(1, 51) = 1.79, p = .379, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, and did not significantly 
interact with story, F(1, 51) = 0.19, p = .662, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00, valence, F(1, 51) = 0.24, p = 
.630, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, or story × valence, F(1, 51) = 2.19, p = .145, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .04. Trait anxiety was 
also not significantly related to the proportion of narrative utterances recalled correctly, 
F(1, 51) = 0.62, p = .433, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .01, and did not significantly interact with story, F(1, 51) 
= 2.92, p = .093, 𝜂𝑝
2= .05, valence, F(1, 51) = 1.35, p = .251, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .03, or story × 
valence, F(1, 51) = 0.07, p = .706, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .00.  
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Chapters IV, V - Stimuli 
Presented Words 
Table 4 
List pool of words presented in the learning phase of the recognition task in Chapters IV and V. 
Positive List A  Positive List B 
SWEET 
Sugar 
Candy 
Taste 
Tooth 
Honey 
Chocolate 
Cake 
Pie 
LOVE 
Heart 
Kiss 
Care 
Admire 
Adore 
Friendship 
Hug 
Kindness 
 SOFT 
Pillow 
Light 
Cotton 
Fur 
Fluffy 
Feather 
Downy 
Kitten 
MUSIC 
Sound 
Note 
Piano 
Radio 
Band 
Melody 
Concert 
Instrument 
Neutral List C  Neutral List D 
GREEN 
Arrow 
Grass 
Blue 
Colour 
Red 
Leaf 
Arrow 
Clover 
CHAIR 
Wood 
Table 
Seat 
Couch 
Desk 
Sofa 
Wood 
Cushion 
 FRUIT 
Vegetable 
Apple 
Orange 
Pear 
Banana 
Kiwi 
Citrus 
Ripe 
FOOT 
Toe 
Shoe 
Kick 
Sandals 
Ankle 
Heel 
Boot 
Inch 
Negative List E  Negative List F 
CRY 
Sad 
Tears 
Tissue 
Sorrow 
Eyes 
Weep 
Sob 
Frown 
THIEF 
Robber 
Steal 
Crook 
Burglar 
Bad 
Jail 
Gun 
Villain 
 ANGER 
Fear 
Mad 
Hate 
Rage 
Temper 
Fury 
Fight 
Hatred 
SICK 
Cold 
Ill 
Hospital 
Vomit 
Doctor 
Flu 
Fever 
Medicine 
Note: Critical lures are written in CAPITALS, associated lures in italics. Lures were not 
presented in the learning phase but were included in the recognition phase of the task 
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Features of presented words. In order to test the effect of valence on memory, the presented word lists should differ significantly on 
valence scores, and not differ significantly on any other features. Norms for relevant features were obtained from databases, for as many of the 
stimuli words as available. The lists were compared using a series of between group ANOVAs. Table 5 shows the differences between the 
positive, neutral, and negative word lists, across a variety of features. 
Table 5 
Features of valenced word lists presented in the learning phase of the recognition task in Chapters IV and V. 
 List Mean (SD) ANOVA Results 
Word Feature Positive Neutral Negative df F p 𝜂𝑝
2 
Valence 6.87 (0.79) 5.90 (0.66) 3.28 (1.24) 2, 79 107.00 <.001*** .73 
Arousal 4.20 (0.96) 3.55 (0.71) 4.90 (1.08) 2, 79 14.27 <.001*** .27 
Subjective Familiarity 556. 91 (40.49) 563.64 (45.14) 529.10 (52.02) 2, 65 3.51 .036* .10 
Imageability 556.73 (78.98) 581.60 (58.15) 523.00 (74.03) 2, 65 3.89 .025* .11 
Age of Acquisition 274.07 (62.47) 253.79 (4.63) 323.38 (62.14) 2, 47 6.14 .004** .21 
Word Frequency (Total) 36.63 (60.76) 40.61 (54.91) 52.33 (82.51) 2, 81 0.41 .662 .01 
   Written Word Frequency 37.77 (63.33) 42.62 (57.68) 54. 27 (86.41) 2, 81 0.41 .666 .01 
   Spoken Word Frequency 22.09 (43.27) 14.92 (21.35) 27.58 (49.27) 2, 81 0.71 .494 .02 
   Subjective Frequency 503.36 (79.12) 487. 08 (53.96) 439.29 (97.88) 2, 37 2.35 .110 .11 
Word Length         
   Character Length 5.54 (1.90) 4.75 (1.04) 4.89 (1.50) 2, 81 2.13 .126 .05 
   Syllable Length 1.79 (0.74) 1.50 (0.58) 1.46 (0.58) 2, 81 2.15 .123 .05 
   Phoneme Length 4.61 (1.81) 3.79 (1.13) 4.07 (1.39) 2, 81 2.25 .112 .05 
Neighbourhood Size 5.14 (6.19) 5,25 (5.17) 6.32 (6.78) 2, 81 0.32 .726 .01 
Subset Frequency 4009.41 (1431.68) 418.21 (1255.66) 30.91 (1131.84) 2, 36 2.42 .103 .12 
Superset Frequency 37.08 (63.27) 25.62 (53.63) 139.82 (55.16) 2, 68 1.29 .283 .04 
* p< .05, ** p < .005, *** p < .001   
Note: Positive Ms and SDs include all available items from Lists A and B, neutral includes all available items from Lists C and D, and  
Negative includes Lists E and F. 
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Selection of norms. Valence and Arousal scores were taken from the Warriner, 
Kuperman, and Brysbaert norms for 13,915 English lemmas (2012). Approximately 20 
respondents rated each word from 9 (happy; excited) to 1 (unhappy; calm), for valence, 
and arousal respectively. There were 1,827 valid responders, aged 16-87 years old, with 
60% female respondents, recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk’s crowdsourcing 
website in the US. Most studies use (Bradley & Lang, 1999) Affective Norms for 
English Words (ANEW) ratings to assess valence. However, this contains only 1,034 
words, including 12 from the negative, 8 from the neutral, and 13 from the positive lists. 
Ratings of valence are not available for the word lists Sweet, Chair, Fruit, Foot, Angry, 
Cry, and Thief. In comparison, the Warriner, Kuperman, and Brysbaert norms included 
27 of the negative, 27 of the neutral, and all 28 of the positive words presented. It was 
therefore deemed to give more reliable means of the words lists.  
All remaining values were provided through the software N-Watch (Davis, 
2005). Total word frequency was calculated using CELEX word frequency (per million) 
measures (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Rijn, 1995); number of occurrences in 
COBUILD/ECT corpus divided by 17.9 (reflecting the 17.9 million words in the 
corpus). Written and spoken word frequency was calculated from CELEX written and 
spoken word frequency values; number of occurrences in the COBUILD written and 
spoken corpus divided by 16.6 and 1.3, respectively (reflecting 16.6, and 1.3 million 
words in each corpus). CELEX word frequency (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Run, 
1995) was chosen over Kûcera–Francis count (Kučera & Francis, 1967), since it is 
based on a sample that is both significantly larger and more representative of everyday 
reading texts (Davis, 2005). Some researchers have argued that familiarity ratings 
provide a superior index of the relative frequency of exposure to a word than do 
objective measures of word frequency. Subjective measures of frequency of exposure 
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were therefore included from a corpus of 2,938 monosyllabic words collected by Balota, 
Pilotti, and Cortese (2001). Subjective familiarity scores from the MRC database 
(Coltheart, 1981) were also analysed. They were measured on a 7-point Likert scale of 1 
(very unfamiliar/ never encountered) to 7 (very familiar/ encountered several times a 
day). Values were multiplied by 100 to create a range from 100-700, in line with other 
N-Watch variable scales.  
Age of acquisition from Bristol/ Gilhooly-Logie (Gilhooly & Logie, 1980) was 
measured on a scale of 1-7, representing years of age. Scores were multiplied by 100 to 
again create a range from 100-700. The Gilhooly-Logie ratings of age of acquisition 
(Gilhooly & Logie, 1980) were chosen over the Bird, Franklin, and Howard norms 
(2001). Despite the Bird et al database containing more recent norms, and norms for 
1,988 compared to 1,686 words, a far greater number of presented words were included 
in the Gilhooly-Logie database (50, compared to 27). The ratio of positive, neutral, and 
negative presented words with age of acquisition scores was also more similar across 
the Gilhooly-Logie database.  
Imageability (the ease with which a mental image of the word can be formed) 
from the MRC dataset (Max Coltheart, 1981) was also scaled to a range of 100 to 700, 
where a higher value indicates greater ease in forming a mental image. Imageability 
scores were taken from the Bristol/ MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Max Coltheart, 
1981), which was formed by merging three smaller databases (Gilhooly & Logie, 1980; 
Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968; Toglia & Battig, 1978). This was chosen over the 
imageability norms collected by Bird et al (2001) due to a much larger overall database, 
and more of the presented words being contained in the default vocabulary; 68, 
compared to 13. 
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Neighbourhood size is determined by counting the number of words that can be 
formed by substituting a single letter at any of the letter positions within the string 
(Coltheart, Davelaar, Jonasson, & Besner, 1977). Subset frequency refers to the 
frequency of any words (per million) which are embedded within the target word (e.g. 
arm is a subset word embedded within the target word army). Superset frequency is the 
frequency of words (per million) which contain the target word (e.g. target word arm is 
contained within the superset word army). Neighbourhood size, subset and superset 
frequency are calculated by N-watch.  
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Chapter IV – Supplementary Materials. 
Effects of Emotional Context and Valence on Children’s True and False Memories 
Covariate Analysis 
Sensitivity: d’ analysis. A series of four mixed ANCOVAs was run using a 3 × 
3 × 6 (Story valence [positive, neutral, negative], DRM list valence [positive, neutral, 
negative], Rotation order [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]) design with Bonferroni corrections, to 
identify any covariates. Story valence and rotation were included as between 
participants variables, list valence as a repeated measures variable, and d’ scores as the 
dependent variable. Age, gender, and trait anxiety scores, were each entered as 
covariates in cumulative steps, and retained only where they were significant predictors 
of d’ scores. All non-significant results are reported below, whilst significant results are 
reported within the main results.  
Age did not significantly predict d’ scores, F(1, 63) = 1.22, p = .273, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .02, 
or significantly interact with list valence, F(2, 126) = 0.02, p = .983, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .00. Gender 
did not significantly predict d’ scores, F(1, 63) = 0.30, p = .585, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .01, or interact 
significantly with list valence, F(2, 126) = 0.42, p = .661, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .01. Trait anxiety was 
not significantly related to d’ scores, F(1, 63) = 0.67, p = .416, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .01, and did not 
interact significantly with list valence, F(2, 126) = 1.48, p = .232, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .02.  
Response Bias: Criterion C analysis. A series of mixed ANCOVAs with 
Bonferroni adjustments, similar to that for d’ scores were run, using C as the dependent 
measure. Age did not significantly predict C scores, F(1, 63) = 0.00, p = .954, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = 
.00, or significantly interact with list valence, F(2, 126) = 0.79, p = .458, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .02. 
Gender did not significantly predict C scores, F(1, 63) = 0.20, p = .655, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .00, or 
interact significantly with list valence, F(2, 126) = 0.59, p = .558, 𝜂𝑝
  2 = .01. Trait 
anxiety did not significantly predict C scores, F(1, 63) = 1.62, p = .209, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .03, and 
293 
 
did not interact significantly with list valence, F(2, 126) = 1.43, p = .242, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .02. No 
potential covariates were retained for subsequent analysis.  
Mood and Word List Valence Analysis  
Additional analysis was conducted excluding rotation order as a fixed effect, to 
investigate whether increasing power led to any further significant effects. A 3 × 3 
(Story [positive, neutral, negative], Valence of DRM list [positive, neutral, negative]) 
mixed ANOVA with Bonferroni corrections was conducted. There was no significant 
difference between discrimination scores depending on story condition, F(2, 79) = 1.07, 
p = .347, 𝜂𝑝
  2 = .03, valence of word list, F(2, 158) = 2.43, p = .092, 𝜂𝑝
  2 = .03, or the 
interaction between the two, F(4, 158) = 0.57, p = .683, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .01.  
Context Analysis on First Block of Presented Lists  
Additional analysis was conducted using recognition data from only the first 
block of word lists presented, including congruency of the valence of the story and word 
lists as an independent variable. This was to account for any interference effects which 
could have been caused by a repeated measures design. A 2 × 3 (Congruency of story 
and list valence [congruent, incongruent], Valence of DRM list [positive, neutral, 
negative]) between measures ANOVA with Bonferroni corrections was conducted. 
There was no significant difference between discrimination scores in the congruent 
context (M = 2.79, SE = 0.13, 95% BCa CI [2.52, 3.02]) and the incongruent context 
condition (M = 2.77, SE = 0.10, 95% BCa CI [2.59, 2.94]), F(1, 76) = 0.02, p = .881, 
𝜂𝑝
  2  = .00. There were no significant differences between discrimination of positive (M 
= 2.56, SE = 0.13, 95% BCa CI [2.27, 2.83]), neutral (M = 2.88, SE = 0.15, 95% BCa CI 
[2.60, 3.14]) and negative valence word lists (M = 2.90, SE = 0.14, 95% BCa CI [2.58, 
3.20]), F(2, 76) = 1.96, p = .148, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .05. The congruency by valence interaction 
effect on discrimination was also not significant, F(1, 76) = 1.75, p = .180, 𝜂𝑝
  2  = .04.   
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Chapter V - Supplementary Material 
Explicit Elaboration and Valence Effects on Children’s Emotional Memory 
For analysis of emotion and spelling ratings of words, d’ scores, and C scores, 
series’ of 2 × 2 × 2 (Word type [emotional, neutral], Valence [positive, negative], 
Rotation [emotional first, neutral first]) mixed ANCOVAs were conducted. Age was 
added as a potential covariate in the first step, gender in the second. Covariates were 
retained only where they significantly predicted the outcome variable or interacted 
significantly with other independent variables. All non-significant main effects and 
interaction effects between the potential covariates and outcome measures are reported 
below. All significant effects are reported within the main report. 
Ratings of Words in DRM Lists 
Ease of spelling (low elaboration condition). Gender did not significantly 
predict spelling ratings, F(1, 54) = 0.04, p = .838, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or interact significantly with 
word type, F(1, 54) = 1.46, p = .233, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, so was not retained as a covariate for 
further analysis.  
Emotion evoked (deep processing condition). Age was not a significant 
predictor of emotional rating, F(1, 54) = 0.00, p = .977, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00, and did not interact 
significantly with word type, F(1, 54) = 0.01, p = .907, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00. Gender did not 
significantly predict emotion ratings, F(1, 54) = 0.01, p = .940, 𝜂𝑝
2   = .00, or interact 
significantly with word type, F(1, 54) = 0.10, p = .758, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00. No covariates were 
retained for further analysis. 
Recognition Task: Covariate Analysis 
Sensitivity: d’ analysis. Gender did not significantly predict d’ scores, F(1, 109) 
= 0.00, p = .958, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, or interact significantly with word type, F(1, 109) = 0.04, p = 
.834, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and was not retained as a covariate in subsequent analysis.  
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Response Bias: Criterion C analysis. Age did not significantly predict 
response bias, F(1, 110) = 0 .02, p = .891, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00, and did not interact significantly 
with word type, F(1, 110) =  0.37, p = .546, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .00. Gender did not significantly 
predict response bias, F(1, 110) = 0.51, p = .479, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, or interact significantly with 
word type, F(1, 110) = 1.26, p = .263, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01. Age and gender were not retained as 
covariates in subsequent analysis. 
 
 
